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Abstract
The long conversations about corporate responsibility predominantly take place in forums
and conferences in the Global North. Yet, the majority of the human rights abuses and their
impacts are felt by peasants, farmers, children, and women in local communities in the
Global South who do not have a voice in the institutionalized governance systems that
animate global affairs. This thesis answers the question of how norms and human rights
institutions in Africa can influence the corporate responsibility to respect (CR2R) norm as
embedded in pillar II of the United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human
Rights. Through the theory of social constructivism, this thesis examines how the CR2R
norm is changing the dominant narrative that MNCs do not have human rights
responsibilities in international law. In light of the CR2R norm’s status as a social and
(growing) legal norm, this thesis asks how norms and human rights institutions in Africa
can contribute to the interpretation and application of the CR2R norm. The central
argument is that international law-making, especially in human rights, should be an
inclusive process that promotes an exchange of norms and ideas between the Global North
and South divide. The ultimate goal of this thesis is to generate conversations about the
potential role that norms and human rights institutions in Africa can play in the
development of the CR2R norm. As a start, this thesis puts Africans at the center of the
CR2R norm development discussion in terms of the inclusion of their views to affect the
prescriptive and policy implications of emergent human right norms and principles.
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Chapter 1: General Introduction
1.0.

Problem Statement

Globalization in the 21st century is changing the world in many ways. One of these is
growth in the economic power of multinational corporations (MNCs). 1 Multinational
corporations are difficult to define. However, they
usually comprise companies or other entities established in more than one
country and so linked that they may coordinate their operations in various
ways. While one or more of these entities may be able to exercise a
signiﬁcant inﬂuence over the activities of others, their degree of autonomy
within the enterprise may vary widely from one multinational enterprise to
another.2
MNCs are often expressed in a corporate structure where a company is incorporated in a
country but has operational branch(es) called subsidiaries or groups in foreign countries
for different reasons, including administrative convenience and transnational capital
flows.3 The economic capital and growth of MNCs make them as powerful as states; in

1

See Gralf-Peter Calliess, “Introduction - Transnational Corporations Visited” (2011) 18:2 Indiana Journal
of Global Legal Studies 601.
2
OECD, Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises (Paris, OECD Publishing, 2011) at 17. See also Arnold
Allan Lazarus, “Multinational Corporations” in Neil Smelser & Paul Baltes, eds, International Encyclopedia
of the Social & Behavioural Sciences (Pergamon: Oxford University Press, 2001) 10197 at 10197. John
Ruggie also defines MNCs as “companies that conduct business in more than one country, whether as
vertically integrated firms, joint ventures, corporate groups, cross-border production networks, alliances,
trading companies, or through ongoing contractual relationships with off-shore suppliers of goods and
services; and whether publicly listed, privately held, or state owned.” See John Ruggie, Just Business:
Multinational Corporations and Human Rights (New York: WW Norton, 2013) at XXXI. Since there is no
legally acceptable definition of multinational corporations, this thesis used the term descriptively. See Peter
Muchlinski, Multinational Enterprises and the Law (Oxford, UK: Oxford University press, 2007) at 12–15.
For ease of reference, this thesis uses the term multinational corporations (MNC), transnational corporations
(TNC), corporations, and enterprises interchangeably. This is similar to Baleva’s approach. See Mary Baleva,
Regaining Paradise Lost: Indigenous Land Rights and Tourism: Using the UNGPs on Business and Human
Rights in Mainstreaming Indigenous Land Rights in the Tourism Industry (Leiden: Brill Nijhoff, 2013) at 60.
3
See generally, Abhash Kumar, “Role of Multinational Companies in Developing Markets: A Special
Reference to India” (2015) 1:4 International Journal of Applied Research 154. See also Ntina Tzouvala,
Capitalism as Civilization: A History of International Law (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press,
2020).

1

some cases, they are more powerful than states.4 MNCs’ operations across borders have
increased their tendency to commit human rights abuses that harm individuals, the
environment, and the planet in diverse ways.5 They can also be complicit with state
governments in perpetuating human rights abuses and environmental damage.6
However, states are the primary duty-bearers under international law.7
Traditionally, corporations are not recognized as duty-bearers under international law.8
This is because corporations are artificial entities created by or under the law of a state. In
other words, the juridical status of a corporation is dependent on the state of their
incorporation.9 This dependent status makes MNCs objects and not subjects of
international law; they have only a derivative legal personality.10 Conversely, the nature of
MNCs and their operations make it difficult for some states with weak governments or

4

See Joseph Stiglitz, “Regulating Multinational Corporations: Towards Principles of Cross-Border Legal
Frameworks in a Globalized World Balancing Rights with Responsibilities” (2007) 23:3 American
University of International Law Review 451 at 476.
5
John Ruggie, supra note 2 at 1-15.
6
See generally Florian Wettstein, “The Duty to Protect: Corporate Complicity, Political Responsibility, and
Human Rights Advocacy” (2010) 96 Journal of Business Ethics 33; Caroline Kaeb, “Emerging Issues of
Human Rights Responsibility in the Extractive and Manufacturing Industries: Patterns and Liability Risks”
(2008) 6:2 Northwestern Journal of International Human Rights 327.
7
See generally José Alvarez, “Are Corporations ‘Subjects’ of International Law?” (2011) 9 Santa Clara
Journal of International Law 1; Sukanya Pillay, “And Justice for All? Globalization, Multinational
Corporations, and the Need for Legally Enforceable Human Rights Protections” (2004) 81 University of
Detroit Mercy Law Review 489 at 502.
8
See generally Adefolake Adeyeye, “Corporate Responsibility in International Law: Which way to Go?
(2007) 11 Singapore Yearbook of International Law 141.
9
See Barcelona Traction (Belgium v Spain) [1970] ICJ 3.
10
Bin Chen, “Introduction to Subjects of International Law” in Mohammed Bedjaoui, ed, International Law:
Achievements and Prospects (London, UK: Martinus Nijhoff, 1991) 23. However, the status of MNCs is an
evolving one in international law. See Math Noortmann, August Reinisch & Cedric Ryngaert, eds, Non-State
Actors in International Law (Oxford-Portland: Hart Publishing, 2015); Davor Muhvić, “Legal Personality as
a Theoretical Approach to Non-State Entities in International Law: The Example of Transnational
Corporations” (2017) 1 Pécs Journal of International and European Law 1. Andrew Clapham argues that that
MNCs can be potentially liable under criminal law by virtue of the fact that individuals who direct corporate
affairs are amenable to the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court. Therefore, criminal liability may
be extended to MNCs in this regard. See generally Andrew Clapham, “State Responsibility, Corporate
Responsibility
and
Complicity
in
Human
Rights
Violations”
in Lene Bomann-Larsen & Oddyny Wiggen eds, Responsibility in World Business: Managing Harmful SideEffects of Corporate Activity (New York: United Nations University Press, 2004).

2

legislation to hold them accountable.11 Even if states could, they may, for different reasons,
be unwilling to hold MNCs accountable for human rights abuses committed abroad.12 Fleur
Johns describes MNCs as “invisible” because they do not have a “concrete presence” under
international law.13 Indeed, under this legal regime, they are elusive.14 MNCs definitely
enjoy the rights conferred on them by legal doctrines, such as corporate legal personality.
However, they often avoid national and international legal responsibilities that come with
this recognition. It has been noted that “[t]he ability of multinationals to move capital
between different countries, to create flexible international structures, and exploit the legal
fiction that subsidiaries are independent from their parents, makes it difficult for any single
state to regulate their activities.”15 Therefore, the challenge for states, non-governmental
organizations, and scholars is how to regulate them transnationally to ensure that they are
accountable for their actions and inactions under national and international law. Some
examples of MNC’s human rights and environmental abuses will illustrate this point in the
next sub-section.
1.1. Corporations Operating in Governance Gaps
The cases illustrated in this section are drawn from two African countries—Nigeria and the
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). They are chosen to demonstrate the abundance of

11

See Lewis Solomon, “Multinational Corporations and the Emerging World Order” (1976) 8:2 Case
Western Reserve Journal of International Law 329. Sometimes, states may even be complicit in the human
rights abuse. Therefore, there is no impetus to hold corporations accountable. See generally, Viljam
Engström, Who Is Responsible for Corporate Human Rights Violations? (LLM Thesis: Åbo Akademi
University Institute for Human Rights, 2002).
12
See Phillip Blumberg, “Accountability of Multinational Corporations: The Barriers Presented by Concepts
of the Corporate Juridical Entity” (2001) 24 Hastings International and Comparative Law Review 297.
13
Fleur Johns, “The Invisibility of the Transnational Corporation: An Analysis of International Law and
Legal Theory” (1994) 19 Melbourne University Law Review 893 at 893.
14
Sarah Joseph, “Taming the Leviathans: Multinational Enterprises and Human Rights” (1999) 46:2
Netherlands International Law Review 171 at 172.
15
The International Council on Human Rights, “Beyond Voluntarism: Human Rights and the Developing
International Legal Obligations of Companies” (2002) The International Council on Human Rights Policy 1
at 12.

3

natural resources in Africa that have encouraged massive human rights and environmental
abuses in host communities. They paint the picture of MNCs’ exploitation, driven by greed,
which has had negative effects on the environment, human dignity, and health of the host
communities in which they operate. The cases show that from the oil-rich country (Nigeria)
to the civil war raged country (DRC), the stories are broadly similar.
1.1.1 Oil Curse: The Niger Delta Region of Nigeria and Shell.
Shell Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria (Shell), a subsidiary of an MNC, Royal
Dutch Shell Plc, is one of the major oil exploration, development, and production
companies in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria. The Niger Delta, though richly blessed
with crude oil, continues to suffer environmental and human rights abuse from the activities
of Shell.16 The environmental effect of gas flaring and crude oil spillage from pipelines
continue to have ravaging effects on the lives of the Niger Delta people.17 For example, in
a 1992 scientific study of the environmental impact of oil operations in the Niger Delta
region, it was discovered that incessant oil spills resulted in enormous pollution of water
bodies and the degradation of agricultural land.18 Furthermore, the oil spillages have
negatively affected the availability and productivity of farmland, as well as the quality of
water for agricultural and consumption purposes. Since the basic means of livelihood of
the Niger Delta people is farming and fishing, oil spillage has negatively affected the

16

Daniel Bertram, “Transnational Experts Wanted: Nigerian Oil Spills before the Dutch Courts” (2021) 33
Journal of Environmental Law 423 at 425.
17
See Joint written statement submitted by the Europe-Third World Centre (CETIM), a non-governmental
organization in General consultative status, Environmental Rights Action/Friends of the Earth Nigeria
(ERA/FoEN) to the Human Rights Council (6 June 2014) A/HRC/26/NGO/100, online:
CETIM<www.cetim.ch/wp-content/uploads/G1404473.pdf>.
18
Oladele Osibanjo, “Industrial Pollution Management in Nigeria” in EOA Aina & NO Adedipe, eds,
Environmental consciousness for Nigerian national development (Lagos: The Federal Environment
Protection Agency, 1992).

4

economic lives of this community.19 Water pollution has also had a devastating effect on
marine life, especially fish, and the health of inhabitants of the Niger Delta. The perpetual
impoverishment and deteriorating health of the Niger Delta people are mainly attributed to
Shell’s disregard for the lives of those living in its host communities, notwithstanding the
huge profit it makes yearly from oil exploration in the region.20
Similarly, Shell’s incessant gas flaring activities are a major cause of environmental
concern in the region.21 For example, the continuous gas flaring has substantially
contributed to the release of greenhouse gases (GHG) into the atmosphere and reportedly
caused acid rain.22 The Niger Delta people also claim that gas flaring has destroyed their
plants and wildlife. Shell’s gas flaring activities in Nigeria has contributed to the countries’
reputation as a major producer of GHG affecting global warming in the world today.23
Concomitantly, gas flaring has been identified as a major cause of health problems in the
Niger Delta, including asthma, bronchitis, cancer, blood disorders, and skin diseases.24
These diseases have considerably reduced the numbers of life expectancy of the Niger delta
people.25 An Ogoni song aptly puts the devastating effect of Shell’s activities as follows:

19

Kaniye SA Ebeku “The Right to a Satisfactory Environment and the African Commission” (2003) 3
African Human Rights Law Journal 149.
20
Amnesty International, Nigeria: Petroleum, Pollution and Poverty in the Niger Delta (London, UK:
Amnesty
International,
2009),
online:
Amnesty
Interntaional<www.amnestyusa.org/wpcontent/uploads/2017/04/afr440172009en.pdf>.
21
Cyril Nwankwo & Difference Ogagarue, “Effects of Gas Flaring on Surface and Ground Waters in Delta
State Nigeria” (2011) 3:5 Journal of Geology and Mining Research 131.
22
See generally Inumidun Fagorite, Feyisayo Anifowose, & Victor Chiokwe, “Air Pollution; Causes, Effects
and Remediation in Nigeria” (2021) 7:1 International Journal of Advanced Academic Research 13.
23
Eferiekose Ukala, “Gas Flaring in Nigeria ‘s Niger Delta: Failed Promises and Reviving Community
Voices” (2011) 2 Washington & Lee Journal of Energy, Climate and Environment 97 at 102-103.
24
See Nnimmo Bassey, “Gas Flaring: Assaulting Communities, Jeopardizing the World” (paper delivered at
the National Environmental Consultation hosted by the Environmental Rights Action in conjunction with the
Federal Ministry of Environment at Reiz Hotel, Abuja, 10-11 December 2008) [unpublished].
25
Ibid.

5

“[t]he flames of Shell are flames of hell, we bask below their light, nought for us to serve
the blight, of cursed neglect and cursed Shell.”26
Despite the enactment of a Nigerian law in 1979 that bans gas flaring27 and claims
against Shell in Nigerian Courts, Shell remains largely uncountable for its activities in the
Niger Delta.28 Shell’s non-accountability can be attributed to many factors, including the
weak judicial and governance systems in Nigeria, the complicity of the Nigerian
government in the human rights and environmental abuses, corruption, and the connivance
of the political class with Shell to maximize wealth at the expense of the local communities.
To demand and enforce Shell’s responsibility to respect human rights, some
activists under the aegis of Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP), led
by author and activist, Ken Saro-Wiwa, confronted the Nigerian government and Shell.29
The activists led protests to prevent Shell from continuing oil exploration but they were
repressed through the Nigerian military might.30 In 1995, matters came to its head when
nine MOSOP members, including Ken Saro Wiwa, were brutalized, tortured, summarily
tried for their campaigns against Shell activities, and executed by the Nigerian

26

Reproduced in Augustine Ikein, The Impact of Oil on a Developing Country: The Case of Nigeria (New
York, Prager Publishers, 1990) at 262.
27
Associated Gas Reinjection Regulation Act, Laws of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 2004,
online:<http://extwprlegs1.fao.org/docs/pdf/nig150976.pdf>.
28
There have been few instances where the court declared that Shell’s activities constitute a human rights
and environmental abuse in the Niger Delta. See e.g., Jonah Gbemre v Shell Development Company Nigeria
Ltd & ors (Suit no FHC/B/CS//53/05). Notwithstanding this “victory,” the Nigerian government has been
criticized for failure to enforce the judgment. See generally Bukola Faturoti, Godswill Agbaitoro & Obinna
Onya, “Environmental Protection in the Nigerian Oil and Gas Industry and Jonah Gbemre v. Shell PDC
Nigeria Limited: Let the Plunder Continue?” (2019) 27:2 African Journal of International and Comparative
Law 225.
29
See generally Amnesty International, A Criminal Enterprise? Shell’s Involvement in Human Rights
Violations in Nigeria in the 1990s (London, UK: Amnesty International, 2017), online: Amnesty
International<www.amnesty.org/en/wp-content/uploads/2021/05/AFR4473932017ENGLISH.pdf>.
30
Human Rights Watch, Nigeria: A Case Study of Military Repression in Southeastern Nigeria” (1995) 7:5
Human Rights Watch 1, online: Human Rights Watch<www.hrw.org/legacy/reports/1995/Nigeria.htm>.

6

government.31 Although Shell was fingered in the role it played in the executions, the
company denies any involvement to this day.32 Due to the problems of access to Justice in
Nigeria highlighted above, the Niger Delta people, including the wives of the activists
executed, resorted to transnational litigation by suing Shell’s parent companies in the
United States and the Netherlands in 2002 and 2017 respectively.33 Although these cases
are discussed in chapter 5 of the thesis, it suffices to point out at this juncture that Shell’s
inability to respect human rights has sown the seeds of underdevelopment, health crisis,
and environmental pollution in the Niger Delta region.34 In 2017, the United Nations
reported that it will take at least 25-30 years to fully clean up the contaminated water and
land in the Ogoni area.35
1.1.2. Mining—Child Labour and Human Rights abuse in the Democratic Republic
of Congo
The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) is one of the poorest countries in the world and
has suffered from decades of war and poor governance.36 However, the country is widely
known for its mineral resources, including tin, copper, tungsten, gold, and tantalum.37 For
example, Cobalt has been mined since 1924 in the DRC.38 Approximately two-thirds of the
31

Amnesty International, In the Dock: Shell’s Complicity in the Arbitrary Execution of the Ogoni Nine
(London, UK: Amnesty International, 2017).
32
Ibid.
33
Amnesty International, “Nigeria: Shell Complicit in the Arbitrary Executions of Ogoni Nine as Writ Served
in
Dutch
Court”
(29
June
2017)
Press
Release,
online:
Amnesty
International<www.amnesty.org/en/latest/press-release/2017/06/shell-complicit-arbitrary-executionsogoni-nine-writ-dutch-court/>.
34
Amnesty International, supra note 20.
35
United Nations Environment Program (UNEP), Environmental Assessment of Ogoni Land: Executive
Summary
(UNEP
Report,
2017),
online:
UNEP<https://postconflict.unep.ch/publications/OEA/UNEP_OEA_ES.pdf>.
36
DRC Congo: Cursed by its Natural Wealth”, BBC News (9 October 2013), online:
BBC<www.bbc.com/news/magazine-24396390>.
37
Ibid.
38
Institute for Geosciences and Natural Resources, Mapping of the Artisanal Copper-Cobalt Mining Sector
in the Provinces of Haut-Katanga and Lualaba in the Democratic Republic of Congo (German Institute for
Geosciences and Natural Resources Report, 2019), online: German Institute for Geosciences and Natural
Resources<
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global supply of cobalt is mined in the “copper belt” region of Haut-Katanga and Lualaba
provinces in the DRC.39 Cobalt is a key component of every rechargeable lithium-ion
battery in all technology and automobile products.40 Therefore, companies like Apple,
Google, Tesla, Alphabet, Microsoft, and Dell highly seek cobalt for their products.41
However, the rush for Cobalt has brought about cruel exploitation fueled by greed,
corruption, and indifference to a population of powerless, starving Congolese people.42
Cobalt is produced by traders who forcefully conscript children and women into mines to
work under deplorable conditions and without safety equipment.43 In 2014, approximately
40,000 boys and girls worked in all the mines across southern DRC, many of them involved
in cobalt mining.44 The children worked for up to 12 hours a day in the mines, carrying
heavy loads, to earn between one and two dollars a day.45 They were beaten and exploited
by security operatives whenever they trespassed on mining companies’ land concessions.46

www.bgr.bund.de/EN/Themen/Min_rohstoffe/Downloads/studie_BGR_kupfer_kobalt_kongo_2019_en.pdf
?__blob=publicationFile&v=3>.
39
Ibid.
40
Jasper Jolly, “Cutting Battery Industry’s Reliance on Cobalt will be an Uphill Task” (5 January 2020),
online: The Guardian Newspaper<www.theguardian.com/environment/2020/jan/05/cutting-cobaltchallenge-battery-industry-electric-cars-congo>.
41
Ewelina Ochab, “Are the Tech Companies Complicit in Human Rights Abuse of Child Cobalt Miners in
Congo?”
(13
January
2020),
online:
Forbes
News,
online:<www.forbes.com/sites/ewelinaochab/2020/01/13/are-these-tech-companies-complicit-in-humanrights-abuses-of-child-cobalt-miners-in-congo/?sh=299f6fac3b17>.
42
See Isabel Padalecki, “Cobalt, Computation, and the Congo: Making Corporations Pay for Their
Transnational Terror” (2020) 12:9 Inquiries Journal 1.
43
Padalecki, ibid. See also Amnesty International, “Is my Phone Powered by Child Labour?” (6 June 2016),
online (blog): Amnesty International <www.amnesty.org/en/latest/campaigns/2016/06/drc-cobalt-childlabour/>.
44
World Economic Forum, Making Mining Safe and Fair: Artisanal cobalt extraction in the Democratic
Republic of the Congo (World Economic Forum White Paper, September 2020), online: World Economic
Forum < www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_Making_Mining_Safe_2020.pdf>.
45
Amnesty International, This is what we Die for: Human Rights Abuses in the Democratic Republic of the
Congo Power the Global Trade in Cobalt (Amnesty International Report, 2016) at 5, online: Amnesty
International <www.amnesty.org/en/wp-content/uploads/2021/05/AFR6231832016ENGLISH.pdf>.
46
Hermann Boko, “DR Congo: Video of Miners Beaten for Trespassing Shows Stranglehold of Foreign
Mining
Interests”
(30
July
2021),
online:
The
Observers
News<https://observers.france24.com/en/africa/20210802-dr-congo-video-artisanal-miners-beaten-fortrespassing>.
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The children were also left to suffer the effects of a mine collapse that had maimed and
killed some of them. These accidents, which occurred because of the companies’ dangerous
mining practices and recklessness have endangered the lives of many children and adults.47
Beyond the immediate hazardous conditions under which the miners worked, they face
potential long-term health conditions because exposure to dust containing cobalt can cause
lung disease, called hard metal lung disease.48 Also, inhaling cobalt particles can cause
birth defects, respiratory sensitization, asthma, shortness of breath, decreased pulmonary
function and sustained skin contact with cobalt can lead to dermatitis.49 There is already a
manifestation of the symptoms of these diseases, including difficulty in breathing and body
pain, among mine workers.50
Congo Dongfang Mining International (CDM), a 100% owned subsidiary of Chinabased Company Ltd (Huayou Cobalt), buys cobalt from traders, who buy directly from the
miners.51 CDM smelts the ore at its plant in the DRC before exporting it to China from
where it is shipped to technology companies in different parts of the world, including
China, Germany, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, the UK, and the USA.52 The relationship
between the Chinese company and its buyers in different parts of the world reflects a supply
chain relationship that encourages the use of child labour to generate wealth for companies
in developed countries. Tech companies that benefit from these arrangements intentionally
look away from the source of the cobalt because of the profit that the business venture
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creates. While the MNCs and developed countries profit from this supply-chain
arrangement, it comes at a great cost to the human dignity and health of children, women,
and other workers in the DRC mines.
MNCs may argue that they are not directly involved in human rights abuse in the
DRC. Hence, they are absolved from any wrongdoing. However, as this thesis
demonstrates, the corporate responsibility to respect human rights goes beyond the direct
relationship between those that are harmed and the company. It also covers supply chain
relations where there is no direct contact with those harmed. This responsibility can be
discharged through a supply chain due diligence that investigates, identifies, mitigates, and
remedies human rights abuse risks that arise from business relationships. Therefore,
although the MNCs have not directly caused the human rights abuse, they contributed to it
through their failure to conduct human rights due diligence. The MNCs’ attitude of “don’t
ask, don’t tell” demonstrates corporate irresponsibility that negatively affects the human
dignity of Africans and one which perpetually enslaves poor local communities in Africa
for the benefit of MNCs and the developed countries.
Although there are cases of human rights abuse in other African countries,53 the
two cases from Nigeria and the DRC Congo show a discernable pattern of thriving human
rights and environmental abuse amidst weak governance systems in Africa that is driven
by resource exploitation and greed.54 They also show that MNCs manipulate this
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governance gap to maximize profit, for example, by outsourcing their due diligence
responsibilities.55 In effect, because African states fail in their duty to protect citizens from
harmful conduct by non-state actors

as stipulated in international human rights

instruments, MNCs are not held accountable for their failure to respect human rights in
these countries. Therefore, the question of corporate accountability continues to be a major
problem for states, host communities, NGOs, academics, international organizations, and
lawyers. These actors agree that there is a need to induce and sustain a corporate
responsibility behaviour that is independent of states’ obligation to protect human rights.
However, the challenge of regulating MNCs is not a light one. This is because of the
enormous economic power that MNCs wield in the present global power dynamics.
1.2. Towards Closing the Governance Gaps
The gaps existing in public and private international law, along with the inability
or unwillingness of states to regulate and control MNC activities have led to the evolving
development of a global governance framework on this subject.56 The framework allows a
form of communication between private and public actors in a way that suggests “a system
of coordinated meta-governance.”57 Although decisions reached through the framework
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lack the positivist nature of domestic and international law, they rely on the power of the
consensus of all actors to hold corporations accountable.58 It is noteworthy that because of
their economic power, autonomy, and authority, MNCs are now considered as actors within
this emerging global governance structure.59
As an international organization, the United Nations (UN), plays a role in the
development of this global governance framework.60 Thomas Weis and Ramesh Thakur
have identified five major gaps in the construction of global governance—they are
institutional gaps, normative gaps, knowledge gaps, compliance gaps, and policy gaps.61
This thesis focuses on one of the efforts of the UN to close the normative gaps in the
business and human rights field. In particular, this research focuses on the UN Human
Rights Council’s endorsement of the United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and
Human Rights (UNGPs).62 The UNGPs are important because their endorsement signaled
the first time that the UN adopted a set of standards on the subject of business and human
rights.63 It is also the first time that the Council has “endorsed a normative text on any
subject that governments did not negotiate themselves.”64 Its further scrutiny is necessary
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to show how a norm of corporate responsibility to respect human rights (CR2R) can
develop in a globalized world.65
2.0.
Background to the United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and
Human Rights
The UNGPs are a product of the United Nations High Commissioner’s mandate to
the Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) on the issue of Human rights,
Transnational Corporations, and other Business Enterprise.66 In 2005, the United Nations
Commission on Human Rights adopted a resolution that mandated the Secretary-General
to appoint a Special Representative whose mandate was to
(a) identify and clarify standards of corporate responsibility and
accountability for transnational corporations and other business
enterprises with regard to human rights;
(b) elaborate on the role of States in effectively regulating and
adjudicating the role of transnational corporations and other
business enterprises with regard to human rights, including through
international cooperation;
(c) research and clarify the implications for transnational
corporations and other business enterprises of concepts such as
'complicity' and 'sphere of influence;
(d) develop materials and methodologies for undertaking human
rights impact assessments of the activities of transnational
corporations and other business enterprises;

65

Polycentricism is defined as a regulatory system that consists of “a collective of partially overlapping and
nonhierarchical regimes.” See Kal Raustiala & David Victor, “The Regime Complex for Plant Genetic
Resources” (2004) 58 International Organizations 277 at 277. In polycentric governance, states play little or
no role in the rule-making process. Rather, it “comprises of a complex array of interdependent entities or
decision-making centers, both state and nonstate, which may be formally independent of one another, form
networks and interact among themselves.” These entities act to add value to each other and to complement
each other’s limitations and weaknesses. See Jamie Prenkert & Scott Shackelford, “Business, Human Rights,
and the Promise of Polycentricity” (2014) 47 Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 451 at 460.
66
See generally Jena Martin & Karen Bravo, The Business and Human Rights Landscape: Moving Forward,
Looking Back (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2015).

13

(e) compile a compendium of best practices of States and
transnational corporations and other business enterprises.67
The former UN Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, appointed John Ruggie, a political
scientist, as his Special Representative. Ruggie’s appointment was significant because he
had made intellectual contributions to the study of international relations, focusing on the
impact of globalization on global rulemaking.68 However, before Ruggie’s appointment
and the advent of the UNGPs, other soft law initiatives sought to regulate corporate
behavior.69 They were motivated by concerns about the impact of corporations’ powerful
economic interest on the socio-economic and political lives of individuals and states.70 For
example, the Draft United Nations Code of Conduct on Transnational Corporations was
the first attempt to provide guidance for MNCs.71 The negotiation ended in 1992 amidst
stiff opposition from governments in the Global North who sought to protect their
economic interests in the Global South.72 The quest for corporate accountability was also
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championed by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)
which introduced the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises in 1976.73 However,
although the 1976 version of the OECD Guidelines made provisions for labour rights, they
did not incorporate human rights provisions.74
In 1977, the International Labour Organization (ILO), a specialized agency of the
United Nations, also adopted the Tripartite Declaration of Principles Concerning
Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy.75 The Declaration is another soft law that
“offer[s] guidelines to multinational enterprises, governments, and employers’ and
workers’ organizations in such areas as employment, training, conditions of work and life,
and industrial relations.”76 In 2000, the United Nations birthed yet another initiative—the
Global Compact, which is a network-based program that involves public-private
collaboration among UN agencies, Non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and
corporations.77 The Global Compact, as soft law, contains ten Principles. Corporations
voluntarily agree to annually report their compliance with these Principles by submitting a
Communication on Progress (COP) Report.78 The Principles cover issues relating to human
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rights, labour and environmental standards, and commitment against corruption.79
Although they are non-binding, companies that do not comply are displayed on the Global
Compact website as “non-communicating participants.”80 Since there are no real sanctions
for non-compliance with the Global Compact, Katarina Weilert questions its value and
effect on MNC conduct.81 However, John Ruggie, Dirk Ulrich Gilbert, and Michael
Behnam argue the Global Compact’s value as a learning network which was the rationale
for setting it up, rather than as a tool for corporate accountability.82
In 2003, for the first time, the UN Sub-Commission on Human rights attempted to
subject corporations to international human rights law through the Draft Norms on the
Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises (Draft
Norms).83 The Sub-Commission was an advisory expert body to the UN Commission on
Human Rights (now known as the Human Rights Council). The Draft Norms are couched
in the form of obligations that bind both states and corporations to adhere to the
internationally recognized instruments on human rights through a framework of shared
responsibility. It is based on the notion that although states are primary duty holders,
corporations also have obligations under international human rights law. Article 1 of the
Draft Norms states that “[w]ithin their respective spheres of activity and influence,
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transnational corporations and other business enterprises have the obligation to promote,
secure the fulfillment of, respect, ensure respect of and protect human rights recognized in
international as well as national law.”84 This means that, contrary to the recognized status
of corporations under international law, the Draft Norm seek to make corporations subjects
of international law, just like individuals and states.85
Although the Draft Norms were not a binding instrument, proponents of the Norms,
which include academics like David Weissbrodt and Muria Kruger, and some NGOs hoped
that the Norms’ implementation would either facilitate the development of an international
human rights treaty or provide a legal statement around which international human rights
interpretation and corporate practice might coalesce.86 Indeed, Amnesty International
characterized the Draft Norms, in comparison to the OECD Guidelines, the ILO Tripartite
Declaration, and the Global Compact, as “the most comprehensive statement of standards
and rules relevant to companies in relation to human rights.”87
However, the international business community objected to the Draft Norms—they
argued that it is the responsibility of states, and not corporations, to enforce compliance
with human rights.88 For example, the International Chamber of Commerce and the
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International Organization of Employers issued a joint statement saying that the Draft
Norms evince a “legalistic” approach to tackling the concern.89 They argued that “[i]f put
into effect, it [the Draft Norms] will undermine human rights, the business sector of society,
and the right to development.”90 Some states also criticized the Draft Norms as vague and
arbitrary—the Draft Norms do not distinguish between human rights obligations of states
and the responsibility of corporations.91 Overall, the Draft Norms were rejected because
(1) they were drafted by a group of legal experts without consultation with business
communities and states (2) they seek to extend states’ obligations to corporations (3) they
included vague and overly inclusive human rights provisions without properly demarcating
those that apply to states and corporations (4) they recommend impractical implementation
options, and (5) they have a questionable basis for proposed human rights obligations.92 In
2003, the UN Commission on Human Rights declared that the Draft Norms have no legal
standing because they were not requested by the Commission.93 It directed the UN Subcommission to cease any implementation of the Draft Norms, thereby confining the Draft
Norms to the archives.
2.1. The Mandate of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Human
Rights
89
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John Ruggie started his mandate as the SRSG in 2005.94 He had the option to either
continue with the work of the Sub-Commission on the UN Draft Norms or to build on other
soft law initiatives, which include the OECD Guidelines, ILO Declaration, and the Global
Compact. Ruggie unequivocally rejected the work of the UN Sub-Commission in its
entirety, labeling it as a “distraction” and that no part of it can be salvaged.95 According to
him, “the Norms exercise became engulfed by its own doctrinal excesses.”96 He questioned
the Draft Norms’ notion of shared responsibility under international human rights law
because it has a “little authoritative basis in international law.” 97 Corporations, he asserts,
are specialized organs of society that cannot be imbued with the same human rights
obligations as states. Therefore, the “Norms end up imposing higher obligations on
corporations than on States by including as standards binding on corporations, instruments
that not all States have ratified or have ratified conditionally….”98 Ruggie concludes that
“the divisive debate over the Norms obscures rather than illuminates promising areas of
consensus and cooperation among business, civil society, governments and international
institutions with respect to human rights.”99 In sum, the SRSG committed what he termed
“Normicide.”100
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Ruggie decided to use a “principled form of pragmatism” to move his mandate
forward.101 He describes a principled form of pragmatism as “an unflinching commitment
to the principle of strengthening the promotion and protection of human rights as it relates
to business, coupled with a pragmatic attachment to what works best in creating change
where it matters most – in the daily lives of people.”102 Contextually, Ruggie sought to
generate a “thick consensus” on a soft law rather than a “thin consent” on an international
binding instrument which may not be ratified or enforced by states. 103 He adopted this
approach as a persuasive tool to move his mandate forward. His approach may have been,
partly, influenced by his training as an international relations scholar and a social
constructivist. Ruggie’s background and ideology are further explained in chapter 3 of this
thesis.
Unlike the process of drafting the Draft Norms, which was criticized for lack of
consultation, the SRSG commenced a wide stakeholder consultation with states,
corporations, and civil society organizations. He submitted a report to the UN Human
Rights Council in 2007, a “mapping exercise” that illustrated international standards,
practices, gaps, and trends regarding business and human rights.104 The SRSG recognized
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that there was an expanding market that has not been matched with expansive protection
of individuals that suffer from corporate human rights abuse, and which has created a
governance gap in curbing the adverse effects of globalization.105 He noted the reluctance
or inability of states to regulate and redress corporate human rights abuse and reviewed
some soft laws, including the ILO Declaration and OECD Guidelines, noting that their
“normative role remains essential to elaborating and further developing standards of
corporate responsibility.”106 Ruggie concluded that corporate accountability must evolve
from state practice and self-regulatory measures observed by all relevant actors because
“no single silver bullet can resolve the business and human rights challenge.”107
In his 2008 Report, the SRSG presented to the UN Human Rights Council a
conceptual and policy framework titled “Protect, Respect and Remedy: A Framework for
Business and Human Rights,” which is designed to help to anchor the business and human
rights debate and guide relevant actors.108 The framework outlined three core principles:
(1) states have the duty to protect human rights abuse by third parties, including
corporations (2) corporations have a responsibility to respect human rights (3) victims of
business and human rights abuse require greater access to remedy, including non-state
grievance mechanisms.109 These principles are complementary and are intended to help all
social actors—governments, corporations, and civil societies—to reduce the adversities of
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corporate human rights abuse and, consequently, to reduce the governance gap created by
the interaction of market forces.
He explains that the state duty to protect human rights is based on the traditional
role of states in international human rights law, which includes prevention, investigation,
and provision of access to remedy in cases of abuse.110 The second principle—corporate
responsibility to respect human rights—is based on the notion that corporations are
expected to obey the laws (recognized human rights instruments or national laws), even if
they are not enforced, or where there is no sanction for non-compliance.111 In effect,
corporations should ensure that they do not infringe on the rights of others—that is, to do
no harm.112 He argued that through a corporate due diligence exercise, corporations can
avoid the risk of human rights abuse, as well as comply with national laws.113 The third
principle—access to remedy—states that where individual human rights are violated,
victims should have access to effective remedy, and both states and corporations have a
role to play in enabling this to occur.114 The SRSG aptly summarized the framework of the
three overlapping principles as follows: “…the State duty to protect ... lies at the very core
of the international human rights regime; the corporate responsibility to respect ... is the
basic expectation society has of business; and access to remedy because even the most
concerted efforts cannot prevent all abuse.”115 Ruggie requested the UN Human Rights
Council’s support to elaborate on the framework, which would make an intellectual
contribution to closing the governance gaps he identified in his previous reports.116
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2.2. The United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights—A
Smart Mix of Regulations
In June 2008, the Human Rights Council extended the SRSG’s mandate for another
three years and asked him to “operationalize” the framework by providing concrete
guidance to state and corporations, as well as promote the framework by coordinating with
regional and international organizations and other stakeholders.117 After submitting
successive reports to the Council in 2009 and 2010,118 the SRSG completed his work in
March 2011 and submitted the UNGPs, a set of 31 recommendations containing foundation
and operational principles.119 While the “protect, respect and remedy framework”
addresses what should be done regarding business and human rights, the UNGPs prescribe
how to do it.120 The UN Human Rights Council welcomed the SRSG’s work and
unanimously endorsed the UNGPs, which implemented the United Nations Protect,
Respect, and Remedy framework.121
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The UNGPs contain three pillars: state duty to protect human rights, corporate
responsibility to respect human rights, and access to remedy for victims in case of harm.
The first pillar—the state duty protect provides that states must protect their citizens against
human rights abuse within their territories by third parties, including businesses.122 This
pillar is a restatement or elaboration of states’ responsibility under international human
rights. Pillar I does not create any new obligation other than the ones already contained in
human rights instruments. This pillar gives states an oversight role as they have the
responsibility to ensure that businesses within their territory respect human rights
throughout their operations.123 When states are part of a business enterprise or network,
Pillar I provides that states must use their status to promote respect for human rights within
the business enterprise.124 However, regardless of whether they are part of the business
enterprise or not, states should ensure that in cases where human rights abuse arise from
business operations, those persons harmed have access to effective remedy (including
legislative, administrative, and judicial mechanisms).125
Pillar II, which is the focus of this thesis, specifically provides that “[b]usiness
enterprises should respect human rights. This means that they should avoid infringing on
the human rights of others and should address adverse human rights impacts with which
they are involved.”126 The UNGPs sets the standard against which corporate respect should
be measured when it states that
[t]he responsibility of business enterprises to respect human rights
refers to internationally recognized human rights – understood, at a
minimum, as those expressed in the International Bill of Human
122
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Rights and the principles concerning fundamental rights set out in
the International Labour Organization’s Declaration on
Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work.127
It explicates further that
[a]n authoritative list of the core internationally recognized human
rights is contained in the International Bill of Human Rights
(consisting of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the
main instruments through which it has been codified: the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights),
coupled with the principles concerning fundamental rights in the
eight ILO core conventions as set out in the Declaration on
Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work. These are the
benchmarks against which other social actors assess the human
rights impacts of business enterprises.128
Pillar II lists requirements to respect human rights in Principles 13 through 23.
Principle 13 provides that the responsibility to respect human rights requires that MNCs
should avoid causing or contributing to human rights abuse through their own activities but
in case human rights abuse occurs, they should address it. Also, the Principle states that
MNCs should prevent or mitigate human rights abuses that are directly linked to their
products, services, or business relationships, notwithstanding that they did not contribute
to the abuse.
Principle 15 provides MNCs need to know and show that they respect human rights.
To do this, they should have policies that expressly show their respect for human rights.
Also, they should put in place a human rights due diligence (HRDD) process to identify,
prevent, and mitigate human rights abuses. Similarly, MNCs should create processes that
enable the remediation of any human rights abuse they cause or to which they contribute.
The requirements for policy commitment, HRDD, and remediation of harm are further
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elaborated in Principles 16 through 22. For example, Principle 17 defines the essential
parameters of the HRDD to include considerations about the size of the company and the
duration of the HRDD exercise. Principles 18 through 21 disclose the essential components
of HRDD, which include MNCs’ responsibility to identify actual or potential impacts of
human rights abuse and to prevent and mitigate the abuse identiﬁed.129 Also, MNCs should
effectively integrate the results of the HRDD exercise across the whole of the business and
the response of the exercise should be tracked and communicated to affected stakeholders.
Principle 22 provides that in a case where MNCs identify that they have caused or
contributed to adverse impacts, they should provide for or cooperate with other actors in
the remediation through legitimate processes.
Principle 14 provides that the responsibility to respect human rights should be
undertaken by all companies, “regardless of the size, sector, operational context,
ownership, and structure.”130 Principle 23 states that in all contexts, MNCs should “comply
with all applicable laws and respect internationally recognized human rights, seek ways to
honour the principles of internationally recognized human rights when faced with
conflicting requirements, and treat the risk of causing or contributing to gross human rights
abuses as a legal compliance issue wherever they operate.”131 The UN Working Group on
business and human rights clarified this to mean that a corporate responsibility to respect
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human rights exist even when the state in question is unable or unwilling to fulfil their
human rights obligations.132
A few take-aways from Pillar II are important here. Unlike Pillar I which restates
states’ obligations in international law, Pillar II does not create legal liability for MNCs
because issues of legal liability remain defined by national law and international law.133
Pillar II only subjects corporations to the court of public opinion.134 In other words,
corporations have the responsibility to respect human rights, not because of any binding
international obligation, but because this is what society expects from them.135 If this
expectation is met, MNCs are rewarded with a social licence from society.136 In sum, Pillar
II is based on the prevailing social norm,137 which proposes that corporations should avoid
infringing on human rights (“do no harm”) in their activities.138 However, this does not
stop them from voluntarily undertaking any other activities that promote human rights.139
Although Pillar II is an independent pillar, it is expected to complement other
pillars. For example, when reading the UNGPs as a whole, Pillars I and II contain
normative elements that reflect provisions on corporate responsibility to respect human
rights (CR2R).140 Principle 3 of the UNGPs provides that states should provide guidance
on how businesses can respect human rights and ensure that their law does not constrain
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businesses from operationalizing the CR2R. Principles 4, 5, and 6 also contain the CR2R
prescription for states-owned enterprises (SOEs) when they enter into business
relationships with MNCs. These principles provide that states should also conduct human
rights due diligence which is one of the tools for discharging the CR2R obligations.
Therefore, because the CR2R applies to all enterprises regardless of their “size, sector,
operational context, ownership, and structure,” the CR2R is a continuum that animates the
operations under pillars I and II. Although discussions in this thesis touch on both pillars
in chapters 4 and 5, their operational dimensions are not conflated because as Surya Deva
cautions, “[a]lthough the UNGPs ‘should be understood as a coherent whole’ and there are
important interlinkages between Pillars I and II, the two pillars should not end up becoming
one.”141
Pillar III provides that in cases where human rights abuses arise from business
operations, victims of human rights abuse should have access to adequate remedy.142
However, the provision of adequate remedy should not be limited to states. MNCs should
also remediate harm whenever it occurs during their operations. Pillar III envisages a
situation where states, MNCs, multi-stakeholder groups, or industry or association leaders
can provide mechanisms to redress business-related human rights abuse.143 Therefore,
pillar III categorizes grievance mechanisms into state-based judicial mechanisms, statebased non-judicial grievance mechanisms, and non-state-based grievance mechanisms.144
However, it sets out certain criteria against which the effectiveness of the grievance
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mechanisms can be measured. To ensure effective remedy, the grievance mechanism must
be legitimate, accessible, equitable, transparent, and have predictable rules and
procedures.145
Pillars I, II, and III weave three governance systems into one framework—the
traditional system of public law governance as evidenced in international law and domestic
law, civil governance system that centers on stakeholders concerned with adverse business
conduct, and corporate governance that focuses on management conduct.146 These
governance systems are expected to play mutually reinforcing roles to influence cumulative
change in business conduct. The UNGPs are a normative framework that states, companies,
and civil society organizations can utilize to close the governance gap created by the effect
of globalization.147 They are a “smart mix” of regulatory and voluntary approaches, “which
do not by themselves create new legally binding obligations but derive normative force
through their endorsement by states and support from other key stakeholders, including
business itself.”148
The UNGPs aim to be a blueprint for action because they define parameters within
which states and corporations can develop to promote and protect human rights policies,
practices, and rules, depending on their peculiar roles and circumstances.149 By providing
such a blueprint, the UNGPs hope to “create a common platform for action and
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accountability against which the conduct of both states and companies can be assessed.”150
Ruggie notes that the UNGPs “marks the end of the beginning, by establishing a common
global platform for action, on which cumulative progress can be built, step-by-step, without
foreclosing any other promising longer-term developments.”151 In effect, the UNPGs are
not an end in themselves; they are only policy statements that seek to influence the global
public debate on corporate accountability.
As soft law, the UNGPs influence practice in states, corporations, and international
organizations.152 Some states have created National Action Plans and due diligence
legislation that implement the UNGPs’ framework. Also, in 2015, the South African
Appellate Court cited the UNGPs when it held that a garnishment law was unconstitutional
because it does not adequately protect human rights, which states should protect under
Pillar I of the UNGPs.153 The Court noted that “while reports of the UN General Assembly
and Human Rights Council are not binding, they are highly persuasive and generally
express the current consensus among States.”154 As well, corporations have created internal
policy procedures and grievance mechanisms that mirror the UNGPs’ corporate
responsibility to respect human rights under pillar II. The OECD also incorporated the
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UNGPs’ framework into its 2011 update of the OECD Guidelines for Multinational
Enterprises.155 Indeed, Ruggie notes that the UNGPs have influenced major developments
in states, international organizations, and corporate decisions since the endorsement of the
UNGPs by the UN Human Rights Council in 2011.156
3.0.

Criticism/Contestation Amidst the UNGPs’ Endorsement
Despite the endorsement by the UN Human Rights Council, the UNGPs were

received with mixed reactions by NGOs and scholars. Civil society organizations critique
the UNGPs on the ground that: (1) they do not guide how states can regulate companies
both at home and abroad (2) they set a lower bar than international human rights standards,
especially as it relates to corporate accountability and access to remedies (3) they do not
provide robust guidance for the protection of rights of women, children, Indigenous
Peoples, and human rights defenders (4) they do not take a comprehensive approach to
provide remedy through a legally binding treaty and (5) they do not provide guidance for
states to assist individuals and communities to overcome barriers to justice, which include
power imbalance and information asymmetry between local communities and
corporations.157 In sum, civil society organizations argue that the endorsement of the
UNGPs is a regressive step in the regulation of corporate human rights abuse.
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Amnesty International argued that although the UNGPs’ policy approach is a step
in the right direction for corporate accountability, a regulatory legal framework in the form
of a treaty is needed to ensure corporate responsibility because “[l]aw and policy are often
two sides of the same coin…, [w]hen it comes to corporate abuses, we need more of
both.”158 Therefore, the UNGPs present a “woefully inadequate approach” to corporate
accountability because they lack mechanisms to ensure compliance or to measure
implementation from corporations, a state of affairs that may perpetuate human rights
abuse.159 In effect, the UN Human Rights Council’s endorsement is approval of “the status
quo: a world where companies are encouraged, but not obliged, to respect human rights.”160
Other critics argue that the UNGPs are very state-oriented and they do not bring any
groundbreaking new ideas to corporate accountability.161 Ruggie admits this as much when
he notes that the normative contribution of the UNGPs “lies not in the creation of new
international law obligations but in elaborating the implications of existing standards and
practices for States and businesses, integrating them within a single, logically coherent and
comprehensive template.”162
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Some scholars and civil society organizations also criticized the drafting process of
the UNGPs, especially as it relates to voices incorporated into the “protect, respect, and
remedy” framework.163 Surya Deva argues that the drafting group did not include leading
human rights or corporate social responsibility scholars as well as representatives of NGOs
such as Greenpeace, Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, Earthrights
International, Centre for Constitutional Rights, and Corporate Watch.164 Birgit Spiesshofer
also critiqued the representation on the SRSG’s team.165 Spiesshofer argues that though the
UNGPs were politically sponsored by five states –Argentina, India, Nigeria, Norway, and
Russia— the composition of his team does not reflect inclusivity. This is because
“[Ruggie’s] team was exclusively made up of individuals from the United States and (a
few) western Europeans.”166
Even when consulted, NGOs argue that the SRSG gave great importance to the
concerns of corporations and neglected the views and submissions of civil society
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organizations on issues of rights to remedy.167 Human Rights Watch particularly argued
that the United Nations Human Rights Council ignored recommendations from civil
society organizations, thereby squandering the opportunity to take stronger action against
corporate human rights abuse.168 In sum, critics argue that there is a bias in favour of
powerful stakeholders, like corporations and states in the Global North, who can influence
the acceptance or rejection of the SRSG’s work.
Ruggie’s reason for excluding civil stakeholder voices from the final report may
have been his strong belief in the nature of his approach to developing international human
rights standards.169 The SRSG maintained that his mandate was focused on reducing human
rights abuse by prescribing policies and practices for states and businesses alike, rather
than create a binding regulatory framework that is “abstract” and presently “elusive.”170
The SRSG’s response reflects a desire for a polycentric governance framework that could
finally culminate in a corporate accountability norm, instead of the uncertain future of a
treaty. Denise Wallace describes Ruggie’s response to Amnesty International and other
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civil society organizations as “a self-serving edict that resonated with the childless taunt,
‘it’s my way or the highway.”171
Beyond the drafting process, Deva contends that the stakeholder consultation
process was also narrow.172 Although the SRSG consulted in different regions of the world,
his consultation mainly or largely focused on three groups—businesses, states, and civil
society organizations.173 This obscured the voices of victims in local communities that are
affected by corporate human rights abuses. Of importance in this regard is the SRSG’s
regional consultation in South Africa held on 27-28 March 2006.174 The participants
underscored the importance of replicating the consultation with local communities that are
directly affected by corporate human rights abuses.175 Although Ruggie visited South
Africa again on 21 October 2008 for another consultation, he only consulted with “experts
from states, corporations, and civil society as well as academics and legal practitioners.”176
Ruggie’s excuse for this deliberate omission was that “…a mandate aimed at producing
171
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general principles and guidance for states and business would not mix well with jumping
into the middle of specific disputes, which in any case are extremely difficult to resolve
from thousands of miles removed…”177 He claims to have heard the voices of the victims
and that they animate the UNGPs’ framework.178 However, Deva argues that the lack of
direct (adequate) consultation with victims in local communities still opens the UNGPs
framework to a legitimacy attack.179
Notwithstanding the criticisms, the UNGPs continue to be influential in the
corporate accountability context.180 Therefore, it is important to engage with the SRSG’s
framing of the UNGPs. If the SRSG claims that the overlapping mutual effort of actors will
culminate in a global corporate accountability norm, it is only reasonable to examine how
actors in Africa can contribute to the development of the norm. The inquiry in this regard
relates to the theoretical underpinnings of the UNGPs that (can) enable them to drive a
corporate responsibility norm in the absence of an international treaty or an obligatory legal
framework for corporations. This exercise is important because of the claim that the
existing regulatory initiatives to make MNCs accountable for human rights abuse are
“seriously inadequate.”181
4.0.

Thesis Focus & Original Contribution to Literature

This thesis fills a gap in the literature on Africa’s contribution to the interpretation and
application of the UNGPs. Particularly, an African perspective on what corporate
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responsibility to respect human rights (pillar II) means and entails is lacking, despite the
continent being at the receiving end of many human rights atrocities attributed to
corporations. The long conversations about corporate responsibility predominantly take
place in forums and conferences in the Global North. Yet, the majority of the human rights
abuses and their impacts are felt by peasants, farmers, children, and women in local
communities in the Global South who do not have a voice in the institutionalized
governance systems that animate global affairs. This thesis is an effort to generate some
conversation about the potential role that norms and human rights institutions in Africa can
play in the development of the corporate responsibility to respect (CR2R) norm. In effect,
this thesis puts Africans at the center of the CR2R norm development discussion in terms
of the inclusion of their views to affect the prescriptive and policy implications of emergent
human rights norms and principles.
Specifically, this thesis answers the question of how norms and human rights
institutions in Africa can influence the CR2R norm as embedded in pillar II. Through the
theory of social constructivism,182 this thesis examines how the CR2R norm is changing
the dominant narrative that MNCs do not have human rights responsibilities in
international law. In light of the CR2R norm’s status as a social and (growing) legal norm,
this thesis asks how norms and institutions in Africa can contribute to the interpretation
and application of the UNGPs.183 First, this thesis argues that to contribute to global
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behavourial change, the CR2R norm must be contextually interpreted to reflect the sociocultural realities of different regions. This is because “…without a deep engagement in
diversity, without robust interaction, law cannot be created in international society.”184
Therefore, this thesis proposes localization of the CR2R norm through the African norm
(Ubuntu). Second, this thesis argues that the CR2R, as a social and growing legal norm,
can be supported by African human rights institutions to further influence corporate
responsibility culture in Africa. In sum, this thesis contends that Africa’s normative and
human rights institutions’ contributions to the CR2R norm diffusion may potentially
increase the norm’s application, legitimacy, and legality in Africa.185 These two main
contributions of this thesis are further broken down below.
4.1 Localizing CR2R through an Ubuntu Lens—An Ethical and Moral Perspective
From an African perspective, this thesis examines how Ubuntu, as a social norm,
can contribute to the legitimacy and development of the CR2R norm.186 By way of
interpretation, it examines what a CR2R norm could look like if unpacked through
Ubuntu’s moral and ethical lens.187 Ubuntu is a pan-African philosophy that emphasizes
being human through other people—relationality.188 It is aptly reflected in the phrase “I am
because of who we all are,” or “I am human because I belong, I participate, I share”189—a
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popular Zulu saying “Umuntu ngumuntu ngabantu.”190 This thesis identifies the
importance of reframing the CR2R norm through Ubuntu. First, Ubuntu framing increases
the CR2R norm’s intelligibility in Africa because it clarifies and contextualizes the
meaning of the term “respect” as used in the UNGPs. Second, Ubuntu infuses an ethical
perspective into the interpretation, application, or implementation of the CR2R norm.
Third, an Ubuntu-inspired interpretation insulates the CR2R norm from some scholars’
critique that the scope of the norm is narrow because it only encourages MNCs to avoid
infringing on the human rights of others without prescribing positive obligations.
Ubuntu is an African social norm that has been applied in various fields, including
theology, institutional management, computer science, politics, social work, business
ethics, public governance, and journalism.191 It has not been interpreted in the context of
the UNGPs, especially as they relate to the CR2R norm. Although Ubuntu’s existence is
not controversial, its application and scope as a social and legal norm for guiding social
conduct is controversial.192 For example, as a social norm, Eusebius McKaiser argues that
Ubuntu is vague and incapable of providing a publicly justifiable rationale for decisions.193
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This is because what Ubuntu means in a legal context “depends on what a judge had for
breakfast… [Ubuntu] is a terribly opaque notion not fit as a normative moral principle that
can guide our actions, let alone be a transparent and substantive basis for legal
adjudication.”194 Ima Kroeze also argues that Ubuntu originated from a traditional smallscale culture that bears no or little resemblance to contemporary African society.195 Kroeze
suggests that the influence of Ubuntu is waning in the 21st century because it does not
influence conduct as it did in the pre-colonial African societies.196 Also, Ethna Swartz and
Rae Davies criticize Ubuntu for its collectivist orientation because it fails to acknowledge
the value of individual freedom; it requires individuals to make sacrifices and deny
themselves for the benefit of society.197 In the same vein, Molly Manyonganise argues that
Ubuntu does not promote contemporary human rights, such as gender equality.198 She
argues that “Ubuntu needs to be seen as a creation of men who were determined to regard
women as restricted, dominated, and marginalized.”199
This last critique, which castigates patriarchy, may be an isolated position. This is
because other scholars argue that Ubuntu supports gender diversity and social
empowerment. From an African feminist epistemological standpoint, Faith Wambura
Ngunjiiri argues that Ubuntu enables women, as agents of change, to exemplify spiritual
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leadership, courage, and a spirit of collectivism to stand against social injustice.200 Angelo
Nicolaides also argues that the marginalization of women is contrary to the spirit of
Ubuntu.201 She notes that though “…the issue of gender disparity exists in virtually all parts
of the world, from Asia to Africa, from Europe to the Americas,”202 Ubuntu is an ethical
tool for gender transformation in Africa. In support of these efforts, Drucilla Cornell, in
2003, convened an Ubuntu feminism project that examined controversies in western
feminism to show how feminism, influenced by Ubuntu, can respond to some of the
criticisms.203
At first blush, criticisms of Ubuntu may make readers think that Ubuntu is an
anachronistic norm that cannot be used to interpret the CR2R norm. This is because of the
question whether Ubuntu is a progressive African concept, or it has outlived its
relevance.204 The argument is that vices like corruption and other economic fraud do not
show that Ubuntu exists in Africa. It is in this sense that Ubuntu is considered irrelevant in
modern times. It could, therefore, be said to be counter-intuitive to attempt an interpretation
of the CR2R norm through Ubuntu. In other words, “…culture is a double-edged sword
that can be used as a weapon to strike a blow for empowerment or to threaten those who
would assert their own self-expression of identity.”205 However, these arguments do not
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recognize Ubuntu’s potential contribution to the ethical grounding of the CR2R norm.206 It
is almost impossible for any culture, religion, or norm to be uncontested. Confucianism,
Christianity, Islam, and western philosophies of autonomy, self, and liberalism are often
criticized. Even the utility of the UNGPs as a tool for social business construct remains
contested on many, including gender-related terms.207 In effect, it is premature to discard
Ubuntu’s potential contribution to localizing the CR2R norm.208 Indeed, Mogobe Ramose
concludes that “[f]ar from being nostalgic for an obsolete tradition, the invocation of the
Ubuntu human rights philosophy is a credible challenge to the deadly logic of the pursuit
of profit at the expense of preserving human life…[it] is an alternative worldview that
people “should opt for.”209
In sum, Ubuntu interpretations used in this thesis are largely normative.
Notwithstanding that the normative influence of Ubuntu on corporate governance in Africa
is debated,210 this thesis argues that it would be wrong to simply deny Ubuntu’s potential
206
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to contribute to the interpretation of the CR2R norm in Africa. It is not denied that there is
corruption and poverty in Africa. Even so, this thesis focuses on normative insights into
the nature of the human community from an African perspective. To acknowledge and
consider the insights that Ubuntu brings to interpreting the CR2R norm is to accept that
“…in the long- run the special contribution to the world by Africa will be in this field of
human relationship. The powers of the world may have done wonders in giving the world
an industrial and military look, but the great gift still has to come from Africa – giving the
world a more human face.”211
4.2 The Role of African Human Rights Institutions in Promoting the CR2R Norm—
An Opportunity for Norm Entrepreneurship
The CR2R norm is presently being recognized by national and regional courts, and
arbitration tribunals.212 The phrase “CR2R norm recognition” as used in this thesis refers
to court decisions that directly reference the CR2R norm or indirectly incorporate it through
various means, including counsel or third-party submissions. This thesis examines how
court decisions are developing the CR2R norm into a legal norm, and how African human
rights institutions can contribute to its legalization. Specifically, it examines court decisions
from different countries, including Nigeria, South Africa, Kenya, Canada, the United
Kingdom, the Netherlands, and the United States, to demonstrate that the CR2R norm has
begun to directly or indirectly influence court decisions in transnational human rights abuse
cases involving MNCs.

However, Andreasson argues that the emerging South African model of corporate governance is a “genuine
hybrid” of Anglo-American shareholder model and Africa’s stakeholder model which is founded on African
values like Ubuntu. See Stefan Andreasson, “Understanding Corporate Governance Reform in South Africa:
Anglo-American Divergence, the King Reports, and Hybridization” (2011) 50:11 Business & Society 647 at
660-661.
211
Steve Biko, I Write What I Like, ed. Aelred A Stubbs (London: The Bowerdean Press, 1978) at 46.
212
See generally Debevoise & Plimpton, supra note 152.

43

Having emerged over time, the cases show how courts have grappled with the
CR2R norm. Beyond national courts, this thesis also focuses on how human rights
institutions in Africa can become “norm entrepreneurs” in the diffusion of the CR2R norm.
It uses the Community Court of Justice of the Economic Community of West African States
(ECCJ) as an example of an institution that has the potential to promote the CR2R norm.
The choice of the ECCJ is based on the court’s history, its strikingly capacious jurisdiction,
and access to justice rules. There is no other African sub-regional court that has a similar
expansive jurisdiction and authority.213 Given this, the ECCJ’s decisions can, potentially,
set a CR2R norm tone in the West African sub-region that can influence courts in other
sub-regions. This is more so because ECOWAS members, including Nigeria, Sierra Leone,
and Guinea-Bissau are countries where environmental and human rights abuse arise from
oil exploration and mining activities.214
Overall, this thesis examines Africa’s interaction with the CR2R norm through
normative and legal perspectives. These perspectives are combined in keeping with Jutta
Brunnée and Stephen Toope’s admonition (which is examined in detail in chapter 2) that
legal norms (or law) can only be created in the context of social norms, which are based on
shared understanding.215 A normative interpretation from an African point of view would
promote a shared understanding of the CR2R norm, more so when the continent’s sub-
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regional human rights court systems contribute to the interpretation effort and application
of the CR2R norm. Doing this would, in regard to ensuring the protection of human rights,
facilitate proffering African solutions to African problems.216 The overarching theme that
this thesis pursues can now be framed into one research question, as follows.
5.0.

Research Question
Can and if so how, may African social norms and human rights
institutions interact with the CR2R norm to influence the corporate
responsibility to respect human rights in Africa?

6.0.

Theoretical Framework
To answer this question, this thesis engages with the international relations theory

of social constructivism in the works of Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink.217
Finnemore and Sikkink developed a norm cycle theory. Defining a norm as a “standard of
appropriate behavior for actors with a given identity,”218 Finnemore and Sikkink propose
that norms exist in a patterned “life cycle” consisting of three stages: norm emergence,
norm cascade, norm internalization.219 Adopting this analytical framework, this thesis
examines how norms develop in society, and how a group of people accepts a norm as
binding without an external enforcing mechanism. In effect, the norm cycle theory helps
to understand how norms develop in international relations. The thesis then uses Pillar II
of the UNGPs as an example of a norm that promotes corporate responsibility to respect
human rights. The CR2R norm is subjected to the Finnemore—Sikkink norm cycle theory
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test to determine the cycle stage of the CR2R norm. The examination shows that the CR2R
norm is approaching the third stage of the norm cycle—norm internalization.
Though Finnemore and Sikkink’s norm cycle theory helps to understand norm
development, it does not explain factors that contribute to the reception or rejection of a
norm in political and international relations. Scholars, especially political scientists,
sociologists, and international relations experts, identify and fill this gap with the study of
causal mechanisms and processes through which norms and ideas spread. 220 They engage
with the theory of norm diffusion. Generally, diffusion is the “transfer or transmission of
objects, processes, ideas, and information from one population or region to another.”221
Using the norm diffusion theory as explained by Amitav Acharya, this thesis examines
requirements to be fulfilled before a global norm diffuses from one country to another.222
One of the requirements is that prior local norms must find interpretations/expressions in
the global norm for local actors to accept it. This is what Acharya calls norm localization.223
This theory will be examined in detail in chapter 3.
Going by Acharya’s theory of norm diffusion, the CR2R norm is a global norm that
can diffuse through its localization. This thesis undertakes a localization exercise of the
CR2R norm in Africa. It explores how local norms in Africa are congruent with the CR2R
norm. It uses Ubuntu as an example of a prior local norm through which the CR2R norm
220
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may be interpreted to aid its diffusion in Africa. Ubuntu is congruent with the CR2R norm
because it clarifies corporations’ responsibility to respect human rights. In effect, this thesis
takes an analytical approach to understand whether and if so, how the CR2R norm and
Ubuntu as social norms interact in an overlapping and reinforcing fashion with the potential
to contribute to a shared understanding of the concept of corporate responsibility to respect
human rights.
The importance of creating a shared understanding of ideas and norms among
global and local actors is illuminated by Brunnée and Toope’s interactional approach to
international law-making.224 Brunnée and Toope argue that the process of making a law
determines its legal force, and not the form of enforcement mechanisms put in place. 225 If
international law actors, including states and non-states, participate in law-making by
sharing normative understanding about a particular subject, Brunnée and Toope argue that
the law will be more likely obeyed notwithstanding that there is no enforcement
mechanism. This approach is fully discussed in chapter 2. This thesis chooses an
interactional approach to law-making for two reasons. First, an interactional framework is
not contingent on states’ political commitment, but on the interaction of international actors
who share a common understanding about an acceptable behaviour. Second, an
interactional framework embraces norm diversity and application that aligns with the
theme of this thesis.226 Understanding the influence of normative shared understanding in
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international law-making helps to appreciate the need to localize norms to increase the
intelligibility of global norms in local settings.
The application of a norm cycle theory and interactional approach to international
law-making in this thesis goes beyond the debate between proponents of ‘hard’ and ‘soft’
law approaches to corporate accountability.227 Some scholars believe that signing a treaty
is the only option to create a norm and ensure its acceptance in international law.228 To
them, the UNGPs “underestimates (whether intentionally or not) what is required to push
corporate responsibility for human rights beyond due diligence processes and the redress
of individual grievances.”229 Other scholars argue that the argument of “pro-treaty”
scholars is a non-starter because hardening the UNGPs not only poses problems in terms
of the transposition of primary obligations to MNCs in international law, but it may also
erode the very foundations of international law.230 This thesis moves beyond the hard/soft
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law dichotomy to examine how norms are generated and how a shared understanding of
the CR2R norm can generate compliance among global actors.231
7.0.

Literature Review and Contribution to Original Research
Scholars have written on the growing influence of soft law in international law,

especially as it relates to global governance.232 For example, Dinah Shelton and other
scholars examine factors that ensure compliance with hard and soft laws, especially in areas
of law like human rights, the environment, and trade.233 They note that a norm generates
compliance when: (1) different regions contribute to its development, (2) the norm is
specific, and (3) it is supported by strong institutions.234 However, few scholars have
examined how local norms and legal structures can interact with the CR2R norm to
influence corporate responsibility in Africa. Birgit Spiesshofer argues that the UNGPs can
be localized but does not demonstrate how it can be done.235 She questions western-centric
norms in the corporate accountability discourse and argues that “a historically and
culturally sensitive approach [to norm-making] should be promoted.”236 Particularly, in
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relation to the Global South, she notes that “the uncritical transfer of western standards,
developed through a long political-economic process, can lead to problematic
consequences in an environment that is on a different level of development...”237 She
concludes that the UNGPs should be interpreted to reflect the importance of national and
regional particularities and the different historical, cultural, and religious backgrounds,
especially the top priorities of fighting poverty and the right to life.238 This is the task that
my thesis seeks to undertake.
The thesis recognizes the importance of African norms, particularly because of their
ethical contributions to the understanding of the CR2R norm in Africa. This perspective is
important not only because of the insights it brings to understanding the CR2R norm
contextually, but also because of its potential to drive acceptance and legitimacy of the
CR2R norm in Africa. Beyond the norms, the potential contributions of African human
rights institutions play a complementary role in the judicial recognition of the CR2R norm.
In sum, understanding Africa’s contribution to the internalization of the CR2R norm places
Africans at the center of matters that concern them.
Florian Wettstein argues that ethical perspectives are conspicuously missing in the
UNGPs.239 This critique is similar to Cragg’s claim that the CR2R norm has a “serious
weakness” because it is not rooted in ethical foundations and principles.240 Cragg argues
that the failure to ground the CR2R framework on explicitly moral foundations makes it
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“intellectually unpersuasive.”241 He acknowledges that although the UNGPs’ CR2R is
important to improve standards of corporate conduct, the standards against which progress
will be evaluated should be ethical.242 This is because corporations have been or are subject
to public scrutiny and their actions are justified by reference to the intrinsic moral
significance of human rights.243 According to Wettstein, the CR2R norm ought to be built
on legal and ethical (moral) obligations.244 This is the task that my thesis embarks upon—
to localize the CR2R norm through an ethical and legal perspective to increase the
intelligibility and legitimacy of the CR2R norm in Africa.
7.1 TWAIL Literature
Third World Approach to International Law (TWAIL) literature on the UNGPs is
concerned about the fairness of norms, processes, institutions, and practices regarding the
people in Third World states.245 TWAIL scholarship “exists in opposition to, and as a limit
on, the triumphal universalism of the liberal/conservative consensus in international
law.”246 TWAIL-ers strongly oppose and reject the universalization of specific cultures
under the guise of promoting global order, peace, and security in international law.247 This
is because the universalization agenda of international law, especially in human rights, does

241

Cragg, ibid at 10.
Ibid at 11.
243
Ibid at 25.
244
Ibid at 27.
245
See James Thuo Gathi “Fairness as Fidelity to Making the WTO Fully Responsive to All Its Members”
(2003) 96 American Society of International Law 157; Usha Natarajan & K. Khoday, Fairness and
International Environmental Law from Below: Social Movements and Legal Transformations in India (2012)
25 Leiden Journal of International Law 415. See also Makau Mutua, “What Is TWAIL?” (2000) 94
Proceedings of the ASIL Annual Meeting 31.
246
James Thuo Gathii, “Rejoinder: Twailing International Law” (2000) 98 Michigan Law Review 2066 at
2067.
247
Mutua, supra note 245 at 36; Mohsen Al Attar, “Reframing the ‘Universality’ of International Law in a
Globalising World” (2013) 59 McGill Law Journal 95.
242

51

not reflect the richness of a diverse world.248 Although some TWAIL-ers acknowledge that
universality is inevitable, and even desirable, they oppose attempts to universalize norms
and practices that are rooted only in western origins, thought and experience.249
Some scholars draw on TWAIL to critique the UNGPs. For example, Sara Seck
examines the possibility of home state regulation in host states.250 Although the UNGPs
(and international human rights law) do not create binding obligations for transnational
home state regulation, she argues that home states should be obligated to protect human
rights in host states due to their role in creating and influencing structural orders that
support MNCs.251 She notes that while a TWAIL outlook to home state regulation is
fraught with problems of consultation, imperialism, and domination, Third World local
communities must be given a voice in their affairs to surmount these challenges—a voice
to subaltern resistance.252
Also, Sara Andersen, using TWAIL, examines the efficacy of the UNGPs to
provide transnational justice.253 Through a comparative approach, and using case studies
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in the United States, Denmark, and the United Kingdom, she argues that current business
and human rights frameworks do not sufficiently address the reality of “certain developing
states’ need to attract foreign direct investment by keeping their regulatory systems
powerless.”254 Andersen, therefore, proposes a UN business and human rights multilateral
treaty that is influenced by a TWAIL perspective to solve corporate accountability
problems in the Global North and Global South respectively.255
Penelope Simons also argues that Ruggie’s approach to addressing corporate
human rights impunity is misconceived.256 Using a TWAIL methodology, she notes that
although the SRSG identified a governance gap in the business and human rights context,
closing the governance gap is not the solution to securing corporate accountability.257 This
is because the SRSG did not deal with the root cause of corporate human rights impunity,
which is deeply embedded in the international legal system.258 Drawing inspiration from
the TWAIL approach and feminist critiques of international law, she contends “that
powerful states have used international law and international institutions to create a
globalized legal environment which protects and facilitates corporate activity and, although
the SRSG identified symptoms of this reality during his tenure, he did not examine the
deep structural aspects of this problem.”259 Like Andersen, she argues for a business and
human rights treaty to cushion the inequality created by the Global North and South divide.
She believes that a treaty will ultimately improve corporate accountability.
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Samentha Goethals also uses TWAIL as an analytical tool in her critique of the
UNGPs.260 She views the UNGPs from a historical materialist and southern counterperspective. She argues that the process leading to the UNGPs and the text of the UNGPs
“neither reflect the expectations and needs of the violated for binding corporate
accountability, nor address institutional and North/South agency asymmetries underlying
the governance gaps, but only provide weak and under-conclusive guidance potentially
undermining critical developments in international human rights law.”261 Like Penelope
Simons, Goethals also notes that the underlying international human rights legal
institutions and structures that legitimize inequalities are not challenged despite their
analysis in the 2008 UNGPs’ framework.262 She concludes that the UNGPs do not
challenge the power inequalities and hierarchical structures that TWAIL-ers identify in
international human rights law.
This thesis acknowledges the TWAIL critiques and adopts them in developing its
theme. However, as shown in chapter 2, the thesis does not approach the CR2R norm
through a critical deconstructive lens that is associated with some TWAIL literature.263
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Rather, it adopts a constructivist approach to construct channels through which Africa can
influence the diffusion of the CR2R norm. In effect, this thesis uses TWAIL as a method
to examine how Africa can participate in the norm cycle process. 264 It adopts James
Gathii’s view that “…[TWAIL] can also focus on ordinary people and social movements
not only in resisting rules made from above but in forging new ones that reflect their
concerns.”265 In sum, this thesis uses a constructive TWAIL method to tease out the role
of Africa in international norm-making. This methodology is considered in detail in the
next Part and chapter 2.
8.0.

Research Methodology
Legal methodology is described as a field that deals with questions concerning

methods, while a legal method is understood to be an orderly and systematic manner to do
research.266 This thesis is desk research that relies on legal methods to develop its analysis
and ground its theme. Apart from the theories (interactional theory of law and norm cycle
theory) described above, this thesis adopts a theoretical approach (TWAIL constructivism)
that underpin its methodological presentation. Other methods used in this thesis include the
comparative and the doctrinal. These main analytical methods help to systematically
present Africa’s possible interactions with the CR2R norm.
8.1 Theory as Method
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Soft law has normative force when states and international actors recognize the social
expectations that it proposes.267 My thesis seeks to theoretically understand the UNGPs’
normative force, especially when interpreted through local perspectives. The social
constructivism theory, although arising from the field of international relations, can help
to understand the social process of norm development.268 Social constructivism is a
theoretically informed approach to the study of international relations.269 It is a social
theory that makes claims about the nature of social life and social change. 270 Social
constructivism is concerned about how social practices among a group of individuals
crystalize to become norms through a process of intersubjective learning.271 Social
constructivists believe that it is important to understand social relationships because this is
a way to explain how norms are generated and observed among a group of people.
Generally, social constructivists focus on how factors, including culture, ideas, institutions,
and social norms influence the behaviour of individuals.272 As discussed in chapter 3, the
SRSG presented the CR2R as a social norm and relied on institutions to promote the norm.
Although this thesis explores how an institution in Africa can promote the norm, it goes
further to examine how ideas and culture rooted in African philosophy can contribute to
the CR2R norm promotion. It examines and develops the theme of social norms in chapters
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2 and 3, and other influencing factors (culture, ideas, and institutions) in chapters 4 and 5.
Therefore, it suffices to say that constructivism’s contribution to international law is
important because of the insight it offers into the social process that drives the creation and
operation of international law.273
This thesis uses social constructivism the way Ibironke Odumosu-Ayanu, Olabisi
Akinkugbe, and Obiora Okafor have used it. Odumosu-Ayanu examines the contribution
of Third World Peoples to the development of the international investment dispute
settlement system and argues that there is a mutually reinforcing interaction between Third
World Peoples, investment law and activities, and the International Centre for Settlement
of Investment Disputes (ICSID) tribunals.274 Odumosu-Ayanu concludes that the Third
World Peoples’ resistance to the processes of the ICSID tribunal has the potential to
account for the reconstruction of the investment dispute settlement system. In sum,
Odumosu’s research examines the normative contributions of Third World Peoples in
international law.
This thesis benefits from the insights in what Odumosu-Ayanu’s terms “TWAIL
constructivism theory.”275 TWAIL constructivism involves the combination of insights
from social constructivism and TWAIL. Traditionally, international relations theories
ignore or do not analyze the impact of colonialism, and various post-colonial responses to
colonialism and its legacies in their account of relationship building and norm creation.276
Therefore, it is difficult to imagine or even construct international relations theories using
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contributions of Third World Peoples’ experience that is shaped by colonialism and
neocolonialism. For example, although social constructivism offers insights on how law is
socially constructed, it is difficult to imagine the application of such law without
considering the sociological backgrounds of the people to whom law is meant to apply.
Therefore, a TWAIL constructivism analysis fills a gap in international relations by
rendering the accounts of the Third World Peoples in the construction of social norms.
According to Odumosu-Ayanu, TWAIL constructivism is an interactional theory of law
that examines how actors from Third World states directly or indirectly interact within the
global normative framework. The actors are primarily Third World Peoples, as opposed to
formal structures of states and other institutions that represent Third World Peoples in
international law.
Applying this theory to this thesis, TWAIL Constructivism helps to tease out how
local actors and norms in Africa can interact with the CR2R norm. Indeed, insights from
TWAIL-constructivism are beginning to emerge from scholars like Acharya. Acharya used
TWAIL constructivism as a method to examine the role of norms in Third World states in
international politics.277 Acharya examines how Third World states and regions engage in
rule-making and normative actions to regulate relationships among themselves and with
other regions of the world. Using the relations between Third World and western states
after the second world war, Acharya demonstrated how leaders in the Third World,
including Jawaharlal Nehru of India at the Bandung Asia-Africa Conference in 1955
reformulated the norm of military non-intervention to prevent western domination after the
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second world war.278 Acharya argues that the process where local actors develop norms,
develop new rules, offer new understandings of global rules, or reaffirm global rules in the
regional context accounts for their role in norm creation in international relations. Although
Acharya did not term his research as TWAIL constructivism, he principally adopted a
TWAIL constructivism method as coined by Odumosu-Ayanu.
Akinkugbe’s research examines the normative importance and contribution of the
Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in a socio-political context.279
Contrary to criticisms that ECOWAS is a failure, Akikugbe uses a socio-legal approach to
illuminate the major contributions of ECOWAS as a sub-regional organization and its
importance to the global normative order. To the extent that Akinkugbe uses a socio-legal
analysis and a normative framework, this thesis uses insights from his social constructivism
architectural design. In effect, this thesis uses social constructivism to examine a bottomup framework where the local norms and actors support the interpretation and application
of CR2R as a global norm.
Similarly, Obiora Okafor’s constructivism theory helps to understand the potential
role of the ECCJ in the promotion of the CR2R norm in the business and human rights
context. Okafor used a constructivist method to examine how international human rights
institutions contribute meaningfully to local struggles.280 Specifically, Okafor examined
how local actors interact with human rights institutions, including the African Commission
on Human and Peoples Rights (ACHPR), to influence domestic practices in states. This
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thesis uses a similar constructivist approach by examining how local actors can engage
with the CR2R norm before the ECCJ. Decisions of the ECCJ will not only aid the cause
of local popular forces; it will also help to diffuse the CR2R norm beyond the West African
sub-region.281
The thesis’ choice of a norm dynamics theory is influenced by a social
constructivist approach. This is because the SRSG, John Ruggie, identifies himself as a
social constructivist.282 His scholarship as a social constructivist influenced the
construction of the UNGPs within a “public domain.” He describes the public domain as
...an institutionalized arena of discourse, contestation, and action
organized around the production of global public goods. It is
constituted by interactions among non-state actors as well as states...
It 'exists' in transnational non-territorial spatial formations, and is
anchored in norms and expectations as well as institutional networks
and circuits within, across, and beyond states ...283
In the business and human rights context, the public domain consists of three main
institutional

actors—states,

multinational

corporations,

and

non-governmental

organizations—who try to influence one another.284 It is important to critically engage with
Ruggie’s theoretical premise to tease out ways to demonstrate potential African
contributions to the internalization of the CR2R norm. It is when Ruggie’s model of social
constructivism is understood on its terms that scholars can engage with the architectural
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and normative design of the UNGPs to improve on it. In sum, it is important to adopt
African-focused social constructivism to analyze the CR2R norm.
8.2 Doctrinal Method
Adopting a doctrinal method involves an in-depth analysis of legal doctrines with
their development process and legal reasoning. The word doctrine is derived from the Latin
word “doctrina” which means “a synthesis of rules, principles, norms, interpretive
guidelines and values [that] explains, makes coherent or justifies a segment of the law as
part of a larger system of law.”285 A doctrinal method, therefore, involves “analysis of case
law, arranging, ordering and systematizing legal propositions and study of legal institutions
through legal reasoning or rational deduction.”286 This thesis analyzes case law on the
CR2R norm in different jurisdictions to demonstrate how the norm is being recognized by
courts at different levels. The aim is to show how courts as local actors in Africa can play
a complementary role to court decisions from other jurisdictions, including the United
States, the United Kingdom, Canada, and the Netherlands. At first blush, drawing examples
from domestic courts to ground analysis in a regional court may be tantamount to
comparing apples and oranges. However, considering that the ECCJ can exercise
jurisdiction in the same areas of competence as national courts, normative lessons from
national courts can serve as a compass for the ECCJ in its effort to assert its role as a CR2R
norm promoter in Africa. This doctrinal analysis helps to contribute to the socio-legal
theme of this thesis.
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Doctrinal analysis in this thesis is both textual and contextual. Textually, it
interprets black letter laws which include statutes and case law. It is contextual because it
situates the interpretation of these documents within a larger context of sociology and
international relations. This is what Richard Schwartz classifies as “internal” and
“external” methods in the study of law.287 An internal method reflects the viewpoint of a
participant in the legal system through a traditional doctrinal study, while an external
method uses knowledge in other fields to interpret a document, an exercise that results in
a broader interpretation from the original text.288 This thesis engages in an external study
because “…discarding an external outlook in a doctoral thesis would be perceived as fairly
short-sighted and would deprive the work of a more ambitious relevance.”289 This thesis
uses insights from international relations (constructivism) to understand the nature and
implication of judicial and legislative developments in the development of the CR2R norm.
Specifically, the discussion on the sources of law in international law in chapter 2
of this thesis combines internal and external doctrinal methods. First, it adopts an internal
doctrinal method to examine the traditional sources of law in international law as stated in
Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice.290 These traditional sources
are classified as hard and soft laws, depending on the nature of the obligation that they
impose on actors. This thesis, then, adopts an external doctrinal method to propose an
287
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interactional approach to international law-making that considers factors that command
compliance from actors, notwithstanding the choice of the global governance instrument
(hard or soft law). Similarly, chapter 5 of this thesis adopts an internal doctrinal method to
examine case law and mandatory human rights due diligence legislation that signify the
diffusion of the CR2R norm in different countries. It, then, adopts an external doctrinal
method to tease out the broader implication of these developments for local actors in
Africa.
8.3 Comparative Method
The comparative method involves the application of the comparative technique to
the field of law.291 Mark Van Hoecke notes that all scholarly research implies
comparisons.292 A comparative method is often used as: (1) instrument of learning and
knowledge on the law elsewhere and a better understanding thereof (2) instrument of
evolutionary and taxonomic science, (3) contribution to one’s own legal system to
understand it better (4) harmonization of law.293 Through a comparative method, this thesis
analyzes the present recognition of the CR2R norm by courts. This comparative analysis
does not aim to show that a state or regional approach is better than another. Rather, it
demonstrates how the CR2R norm is being recognized by courts along the Global NorthSouth divide.294 The comparative analysis shows how interpretations by national courts in
the UK, the Netherlands, Canada, and the United States, as well as the Inter-American
Court of Human Rights (IACHR) formally or indirectly promote the CR2 norm. It then
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examines how an African international human rights institution (the ECCJ) can play a
complementary role to the efforts of its counterparts in other jurisdictions.
8.4 Interdisciplinary Method
This thesis is a work in socio-legal research because it combines legal and non-legal
approaches.295 Akinkugbe notes that “[a]s a multidisciplinary method, socio-legal
approaches focus on the mutually constitutive interaction between law and society.”296 A
constitutive interaction occurs when social norms influence the development of law and
vice versa. The CR2R is a social norm whose effect is now transcending into law through
various approaches, including human rights due diligence policies of corporations,
mandatory due diligence legislation, and court decisions. This development shows a
constitutive interaction between law and society. Since this thesis examines the continuum
between social norms and law, it thematically adopts a socio-legal approach method to
ground its analysis.
Similarly, adopting the theoretical approaches (norm dynamics, and localization
theory) discussed above necessitates borrowing insights from disciplines such as
international relations, law, politics, culture, and sociology.297 To this end, this thesis draws
on interdisciplinary scholarship because “[l]aw, by its very nature, must be
interdisciplinary.”298 However, to the extent that my thesis draws from business ethics, law,
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and sociology to ground its analysis, it is not oblivious of what Roux calls the danger of
incorporation.299 Roux notes that
researchers who engage in the typical kind of interdisciplinary research in
which legal academics are engaged – socio-legal research – are pulled in
two seemingly incompatible directions. On the one hand, they need to
satisfy the standards of the legal tradition in which they are working – to be
faithful enough to conventionally accepted methods of legal reasoning that
their doctrinal arguments carry sufficient weight to be accepted. On the
other hand, they need to satisfy the standards of the scholarly literature to
which they are contributing, a literature whose standards are in the nature
of things policed by scholars from other disciplines. Straddling this divide
is very difficult, if not impossible…300
This thesis avoids the danger of incorporation because it does not extrapolate or
incorporate insights from sociology and ethics fields into doctrinal scholarship. Rather, it
borrows insights from these fields to ground another worldview of the CR2R norm—an
ethical perspective that is conspicuously lacking since its endorsement by the UNHRC.
While the doctrinal scholarship in this thesis focuses on decisions of courts at different
levels, insights from sociology help to understand the social purpose and relevance of the
CR2R norm. In sum, the theme of this thesis reinforces the notion that “successful
interdisciplinarity is not about ignoring or transgressing disciplinary boundaries, but about
researching across two or more disciplines while remaining true to their methods and
purposes.”301
9.0 Thesis Limitation/Definition of Terms
It is important to clarify the analytical scope of this thesis. This thesis acknowledges
that it is ambitious to talk of a universal African culture. However, it has been noted that
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“[a]lthough African cultures display awesome diversity, they also show remarkable
similarities. Community is the cornerstone in African thought and life.”302 In effect,
although debates pervade much of the existing literature on Ubuntu and business ethics,
this thesis does not engage in the debate. Rather it focuses on the simplistic meaning and
virtues of Ubuntu commonly shared in Africa—communalism and respect for human
dignity.
Also, the term “local community” or “host community” as used in this thesis
generally refers to a group of people who constitute a community at local levels or grassroot levels of government, especially in developing countries.303 The term is also used
interchangeably with host communities. This thesis adopts Aguilar’s definition of local
communities “as groups or organizations, inclusive and plural, which are based at the level
of geographic community and are unified by common needs and interests as articulated in
human rights terms.”304 In effect, the term is used to depict the group of people in global
governance who are far removed from the global hierarchies of power and decisionmaking. This thesis does not refer to, or engage in, the complexities of representation
within local communities. Rather, it adopts Oche Onazi’s simplistic mode of direct
participation of all community members in matters that directly affect them. 305 In Onazi’s
view, individuals, particularly, the poor and vulnerable, must be able to organize
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themselves democratically to claim ownership of the processes that determine their human
rights.306
Similarly, although there are debates about the term “Third World Peoples,”307 This
thesis uses the term in the same way Muni uses it to include nearly all African and Latin
American states.308 However, emerging economies in Latin America, like Brazil, and in
Asia, like China, may be excluded from the list because of their economic growth over the
years but this does not mean that human rights abuse does not occur in emerging
economies. Muller calls countries that do not fall between the categories of Global North
and Third World Countries “Global East.”309 Some scholars have even couched a new
terminology, “fourth world,” used to describe marginalized groups, especially Indigenous
Peoples.310 The Fourth World scholars criticize Third World approaches to international
law for their inability to accommodate the interests of Indigenous Peoples. Indigenous
Peoples hold spiritual relationships with land, the awareness of ecological disaster, and the
social commodities of land, water, and air.311 However, notwithstanding the differences, a
common theme with both Fourth and Third World theories is their representation of

306

Onazi, ibid at 5.
Some scholars even contest the existence of a “Third World” arguing that it is no longer relevant. See e.g.,
Mark Berger, “After the Third World?: History, Destiny and the Fate of Third Worldism” (2004) 25 Third
World Quarterly 9 at 31.
308
See Sukh Deo Muni, “The Third World: Concept and Controversy” (1979) 1:3 Third World Quarterly
119.
309
See generally Martin Muller, “In Search of the Global East: Thinking Between North and South” (2020)
25:3 Geopolitics 734 (“So, the East is inferior, but not inferior enough. It is kind of subaltern, but not really.
It is not rich, but neither is it poor. It has some elements of European modernity but lacks others: too different
to be included in the North, too European to be included in the South.”). See also Jerry Harris, “Emerging
Third World Powers: China, India, and Brazil” (2005) 46:3 Race and Class 7.
310
See Hiroshi Fukurai, “Fourth World Approaches to International Struggles and Quests for Recognition
under International Law” (2018) 5:1 Asian Journal of Law and Society 221.
311
See Amar Bhatia, “The South of the North: Building on Critical Approaches to International Law with
Lessons from the Fourth World” (2012) 14 Oregon Review of International Law 131. See also George
Manuel & Michael Posluns, The Fourth World: An Indian Reality (Minnesota: University of Minnesota
Press, 1974) at 11-12.
307

67

marginalized peoples in matters that concern them in international law. This is the premise
from which this thesis makes its analysis.
10.0

Chapter Summary

The next chapter, chapter 2, examines the literature on the debate whether soft or hard
laws are the appropriate instrument of global regulation. It focuses on the manifestation of
this debate in the business and human rights context, which is whether the UNGPs (soft
law) or the zero-draft treaty (hard law) is the appropriate instrument for ensuring corporate
accountability. However, the chapter moves away from the debate and argues that it is
important to think about what makes law generate commitment among international law
actors rather than focus on the instruments of regulation. In effect, it looks beyond the form
of global governance instruments and focuses on the characteristics of international lawmaking that ensure commitment from actors. Using Brunnée and Toope’s interactional
account of international law, this chapter proposes a global governance approach that
considers the interaction between legal and social norms. The UNGPs adopts an
interactional approach because it relies on social and legal norms as standard-setting tools.
To understand the application of norms, chapter 3 examines social constructivism’s
theory of norms. First, it examines the cycle of norms as postulated by Finnemore and
Sikkink. This theory explains how a norm develops and crystalizes to be an internalized or
universal norm. However, Finnemore and Sikkink do not explain the factors that cause
norms to move from one cycle to another. Riise and Sikkink attempt to fill this gap because
they explain how transnational networks contribute to the development of norms in their
spiral model theory. They argue that transnational social agents like international
organizations and international NGOs (INGOs) contribute to norm adoption from the
international to the domestic level. However, they still overlook domestic (local) factors
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that influence the adoption or internationalization of norms. Through the works of Amitav
Acharya, this chapter explores how conditions in local contexts influence norm diffusion
and adoption. Specifically, this thesis examines how the congruence theory as explained
by Acharya helps to understand how different domestic (local) actions shape and modify
international norms. Drawing from these theories, this thesis examines how the CR2R
norm is developing and the potential of local actors/ norms, especially in Africa, to resist
or support the CR2R norm through pre-existing local norms.
Chapter 4 presents an alternative epistemic worldview of the CR2R norm. This
chapter takes a methodological shift away from UNGPs’ discussions on formal governance
and institutionalized structures to engage with literature on business ethics, sociology, and
grassroots socio-cultural movements. In normative terms, this chapter examines how an
Afrocentric (Ubuntu-influenced) interpretation of the CR2R norm can support the CR2R
norm in Africa. The choice of an Afrocentric approach is influenced by the argument that
transplantation of the narrow formulation of western liberalism cannot adequately respond
to the historical reality, political, and socio-economic needs of Africa. The aim is to show
how a subsidiary norm (Ubuntu) can support and influence MNCs’ engagement with local
communities in Africa (African relations) to move from conceptions of “do no harm” to
“do good.” An Ubuntu analysis further clarifies societal expectations in Africa as
prescribed in the CR2R norm. Although this chapter identifies the potential of Ubuntu to
support MNCs’ positive obligations in the fulfilment of the CR2R norm, it does not provide
an exact quantification of those obligations. This question will be the subject of future
research. Also, this chapter does not construct a consultative framework for local
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community engagement with MNCs as this is already rehearsed in literature. 312 In sum,
chapter 4 only localizes the CR2R norm from an African perspective to interpret the CR2R
norm in light of Africans’ societal expectations from MNCs as exemplified in Ubuntu.
Chapter 5 examines a human rights institution in Africa that can potentially
promote the diffusion or internalization of the CR2R norm. Specifically, it examines a subregional human rights court in Africa— the Community Court of Justice of the Economic
Community of West African States (ECCJ)— and its unique position as a norm
entrepreneur to support the diffusion and internalization of the CR2R norm. It proposes
that through a purposeful interpretation of international guidance instruments, the ECCJ
can influence corporate responsibility in international law. In effect, this chapter proposes
a path to localize the judicial interpretation of the CR2R norm in Africa.
Altogether, this thesis fills a gap in the African literature on the CR2R norm. It
accentuates the combination and social and legal approaches influenced, and driven, by
African perspectives to promote a corporate human rights culture that reflects Africa’s
socio-cultural and economic realities.
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Chapter 2: An Interactional Approach to Law-making for Corporate Responsibility
2.0 Global Governance
The preceding chapter highlighted business and human rights (BHR) global governance
issues relating to transnational corporate accountability. John Ruggie aptly summarizes the
statement of the problem in the BHR context as “a microcosm of a larger crisis in
contemporary governance where there are widening gaps between the scope and impact of
economic forces and actors, and the capacity of societies to manage their adverse
consequences.”1 Global governance is a phrase that is used to describe attempts to regulate
the international system; it has become a prominent concept in the contemporary study and
practice of international relations.2 The phrase itself is easier described than defined
because of the ambiguity in the two words—“global” and “governance.”3
Lawrence Finkelstein notes that global governance “appears virtually to be
anything.”4 In an attempt to describe it, he says “[g]lobal governance is doing
internationally what governments do at home.”5 This definition is state-centric—it
describes global governance in terms of what states do. There is an increasing emergence
of other international actors, including non-governmental organizations and multinational
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corporations (MNCs) that, sometimes, are more powerful than states. 6 This thesis adopts
Ruggie’s definition of global governance as “the systems of authoritative norms, rules,
institutions, and practices by means of which any collectivity, from the local to the global,
manages its common affairs. [It] is generally defined as an instance of governance in the
absence of government.”7 Global governance used in this sense is a verb that indicates a
systematic regulation of international relations. International law, through its conventional
sources of law—treaties, international customs, general principles of laws, judicial
decisions, and the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations—
is a tool of global governance.8
This chapter focuses on how some scholars approach global governance models in
the BHR context. It classifies the scholars’ models of governance under two rubrics: (1)
the international treaty stream, representing traditional international law; and (ii) the soft
law stream, representing contemporary emerging practice. Scholars, like David Bilchitz,
Daniel Blackburn, and Giorgia Papalia that fall under the treaty rubric, argue that to
regulate state and non-state actors in the BHR context, there is need for an international
treaty that sets out the obligations of each international actor, particularly MNCs. Scholars,
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like John Ruggie, Tori Kirkebo, and Pierre Thielbörger that fall under the soft law rubric,
argue that in view of the history of states’ non-implementation of international human
rights treaties and the political nuances that engulf the negotiation, signing, ratification,
and implementation of treaties, a soft law that sets international standards for international
actors is the appropriate global governance instrument.
However, this chapter argues that there are inherent weaknesses in an exclusive soft
or hard law approach. This is because, as John Ruggie rightly noted, there is no silver bullet
solution to corporate accountability problems. This chapter invites us to look at what makes
law generate commitment among international law actors, rather than on the instruments
of regulation. In other words, it invites us to look beyond the form of global governance
instruments and focus on the process of international law-making that elicits compliance
from actors. It argues that an inclusive process of international law-making that promotes
an exchange of norms and ideas among state and non-state actors is likely to elicit
compliance from actors regardless of the form of the instrument.
The pursuit of this theme is divided into three parts as follows: Part I examines the
use of hard law—treaties and customary international law—as some of the traditional
sources of international law and how the term “soft law”—rules, standards, codes—
emerged because of the structural inadequacies of international law to respond to the
increasing complexity of state relations after the second world war. It examines the strength
and weaknesses of treaty as hard and soft law. It notes that notwithstanding the increasing
adoption of soft laws in international law, some scholars still oppose its use, labeling it as
normatively confusing and functionally redundant. Part II contextualizes the debate
between the use of hard and soft law in the BHR context. The debate focuses on the relative
strength and weaknesses of the business and human rights treaty proposal (zero draft) and
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the UNGPs. Scholars are divided on whether the zero draft (a proposal for hard law) or
UNGPs (soft law) can hold MNCs accountable and give justice to victims of corporate
human rights abuse.9 Although these arguments arose during the mandate of the SRSG as
discussed in chapter 1, Ecuador’s sponsorship of a zero Draft Treaty, which is being revised
by an intergovernmental working group (IGWG) at the time of writing this thesis, keeps
the debate alive.10 After examining the strength and weaknesses of both sides of the debate,
Part 2 concludes that a global governance regime that takes an exclusive hard or soft law
approach will be deficient. Contrary to the existing soft and hard law dichotomy, Part 3
explores an interactional approach that considers the normative underpinning of hard and
soft laws. It argues that since social and legal norms are foundations of hard and soft laws,
an understanding of the interactions of these norms is necessary to move beyond the soft
and hard law dichotomy and to focus on the requirements of international law-making that
may generate compliance from actors. Part 3 concludes that it is important to examine an
interactional approach through a Third World Approach to International Law (TWAIL)
lens because this thesis is concerned about the participation of Third World Peoples in
matters that directly affect them in international law. In effect, an interactional approach
informed by a TWAIL perspective is useful to examine whether it is possible for norms
and institutions in Africa to interact with the UNGPs’ norm of corporate responsibility to
respect human rights (CR2R norm).
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Part I
2.1 Hard Law
Hard law is a traditional instrument adopted by states in a form that suggests the
existence of legal obligation.11 Hard law, often in the form of treaties in international law,
is negotiated by states. This is followed by individual ratification and implementation of
the treaty by each state that becomes a party when the treaty enters into force. Treaties are
recognized by Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice as one of the
sources of international law.12 Abbott and Snidal define hard laws as “legally binding
obligations that are precise (or can be made precise through adjudication or the issuance of
detailed regulations) and that delegate authority for interpreting and implementing the
law.”13 In effect, hard law exhibits characteristics of binding obligations, precision, and
implementation/interpretation by independent bodies, including international courts and
tribunals. Abbott and Snidal argue that hard laws are desirable for ordering international
relations because they reduce transactional costs, strengthen the commitments of
international actors, expand available political strategies for actors, and ensure that all gaps
in the field are covered (complete contracting).14 They see international hard law in the
form of covenants and contracts that set out the duties and obligations of each state
signatory. Notwithstanding its advantages, they note that it is difficult to negotiate and
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implement a treaty because of the political and economic interests that inform and influence
treaty-making.15 States also find it difficult to reach consensus on treaty texts because of
power differentials among major actors, inability to craft treaty provisions to cover
uncontemplated future circumstances, sovereignty costs inherent in some state
concessions, differences in time horizons, and divergence among national preferences.16
Indeed, it has been argued that hard law is unsuitable for dynamic and fast-changing areas
of law, such as international economic issues, because treaties are slow to conclude, slow
to come into force, and bind only parties to them.17 However, it should be noted that in
some cases, treaties may create binding or non-binding commitments. For example, the
Paris Agreement in the international climate regime, although adopted as a treaty, contains
both binding and non-binding provisions.
Treaties are not the only form of hard law. Customary international law (CIL),
described as the “oldest and original source of law,”18 has also been identified as a form of
hard law.19 CIL is regarded as “a form of tacit agreement, by which States, in behaving in
certain ways towards each other, agree to guide their future conduct by it and be legally
bound by it.”20 CIL has two constitutive elements— consistent state practice and opinio
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juris (a psychological feeling among states that a consistent practice is legally binding).21
The status of a custom in international law is decided by these constitutive elements.
However, CIL is often overlooked as hard law because treaties have codified many legal
rules that were previously classified as customary rules.22 For example, it has been noted
that customary rules on torture, slavery, and genocide are essential components of treaties
regulating these issues.23 Similarly, customs are discarded as irrelevant because their
application is plagued by doctrinal confusion, and because they lack the precision of
statutory text.24
Three characteristics distinguish CIL from treaties and soft law. First, CIL is
universal in its application. Article 38 of the ICJ statute describes it as “general practice
accepted as law.”25 Unlike treaties and soft law, the formation of which states may choose
to participate or refrain from participating in, in principle, a custom is formed by the
participation of all states, even if stronger states have more influence in its formation than
weaker ones.26 As well, though the application of treaties is measured by the number of
state ratifications, and the widespread influence of soft law is measured by the adoption of
agreements and codes among state and non-state actors, the status of CIL is not measured
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by the active participation of actors because it is presumed that states have actively
acquiesced in its formation.27 The universalist nature of CIL was enunciated in Nevsun
Resources Ltd v Araya where the Supreme Court of Canada held that absent conflicting
legislation, CIL, which is referred to as the common law of the international legal system,
automatically forms part of Canadian law.28 Consequently, a civil action seeking to hold
Canadian companies liable for violations of customary international law committed outside
of Canada is a justiceable cause.
Second, a striking characteristic of CIL that distinguishes it from treaties and soft
law is that custom is unwritten.29 Treaties and soft law satisfy the requirement of
codification as proof of their existence. Often, the texts of treaties and soft law are part of
the evidence of state practice or opinio juris which then becomes an expression of custom.30
This is because a customary rule is not sourced from a single piece of an authoritative
document; it is inferred through a combination of different national and international
sources including, treaties, soft law, official publications, historical records, and newspaper
articles.31 In effect, unlike treaties and soft law, CIL is not a procedure for creating norms,
but an expression of a pre-existing legal rule.32 For example, Article 5 of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights 1948 states that “[n]o one shall be subjected to torture or to

27

Helfer & Wuerth supra note 19 at 570.
Nevsun Resources Ltd v Araya [2020] SCC 5 at para 74.
29
Roy Mersky & Jonathan Pratter, “A Comment on the Ways and Means of Re-searching Customary
International Law: A Half-Century After the International Law Commission’s Work” (1996) 24 International
Journal of Legal Information 302 at 303.
30
Helfer & Wuerth supra note 19 at 574.
31
Ibid. See also Malcolm Shaw, International Law, 5th ed (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press,
2003) at 78.
32
Ferreira et al, supra note 20 at 186.
28

78

cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.” This Article is widely regarded as
expressing customary international law.33
Third, CIL is not negotiated in the manner that treaties and soft law are negotiated.34
In other words, customs are not preceded by formal discussion or exchange of views to
reach an agreement.35 They are formulated through an unstructured, undefined, and slow
process of state practice and acquiescence (opinio juris). This is why some scholars refer
to CIL law-making as “informal, haphazard, not deliberate, even partly unintentional and
fortuitous”.36 Due to its non-negotiated nature, CIL is usually framed at a high level of
generality, unlike treaties and soft law principles whose content are fleshed out through
carefully delineated contours and exceptions during formal negotiations and meetings.37
In sum, the distinguishing features of CIL help us to understand that CIL does not
arise from conscious efforts at rulemaking, unlike treaties and soft law (which are discussed
together next). Customary rules are binding, expressed through constant state practice and
opinio juris, and are evidenced by written treaty instruments, soft law, and judicial
decisions, like the Nevsum case referenced above. It is important to note that whenever CIL
is identified and applied, it usually imposes legal obligations on either state or non-state
actors.38
2.2 Soft Law
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Soft law is not easy to define for reason of disagreements over its legal character
and effects.39 However, it has been described as consisting of non-binding norms that
govern international relations, and are codified in instruments like codes, declarations,
agreements, rules, and principles.40 Specifically, soft law refers to “rules (prescribing
conduct or otherwise establishing standards) that are in the process of becoming, though
may not ultimately become, binding rules of international law, in the form of any of the
established sources of international law—customary law, general principles of law, or as
an authentic (binding) interpretation of a rule of treaty law.”41 Pierre-Marie Dupuy notes
that soft law is a “troublemaker because it is either not yet or not only law.”42 Jan Klabbers
also notes that the term “soft law” is used to denote everything that falls short of being hard
law.43 However, Christine Chinkin adopts a content-oriented definition because she
distinguishes hard law from soft law based on the obligatory implications of their
provisions—while the provisions of hard law are enforceable, soft law provisions are not
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enforceable.44 In effect, she argues that the decisive factor that distinguishes hard from soft
law is the nature and precision of the behaviour requested or expected by a norm—if it is
non-binding, the norm is soft law.45 This thesis agrees with Chinkin’s definition because it
recognizes that the hardness or softness of a rule of law or principle of law depends on the
obligatory implications of the conduct expected from state and non-state actors to whom it
is directed.
The concept of soft law arose from the structural inadequacies of international law
by way of responses to the increasing complexity of state relations after the 2nd world war.46
This became inevitable because of the emergence of non-state actors (NGOs and MNCs),
international organizations, including the United Nations, and the increasing scope of
global issues that need international cooperation to deal with.47 Essentially, soft law is a
product of the descriptive normative activities being carried out outside of the regulatory
ambit of the traditional sources of international law as set out in Article 38 of the Statute
of the International Court of Justice.48 Fabián Castañeda notes that soft laws are “…the
result of reality modelling international law, of international practice modelling the

44

Christine Mary Chinkin, “The Challenge of Soft Law: Development and Change in International Law”
(1989) 38:4 The International and Comparative Law Quarterly 850 at 851 (she defines soft laws as
[i]nstruments ranging from treaties, but which include only soft obligations (legal soft law), to non —binding
or voluntary resolutions and codes of conduct formulated and accepted by international and regional
organizations (non-legal soft law), to statements prepared by individuals in a non— governmental capacity,
but which purport to lay dawn international principles”). For example, Pillar 1 of the UNGPs that restates
states’ obligations to protect human rights, which is already contained in international law treaties, is a hard
law, although embedded in a soft law instrument.
45
Ibid.
46
Ilhami Alkan Olsson, “Four Competing Approaches to International Soft Law” (2015) Scandinavian
Studies in Law 178 at 179.
47
Ibid; Chinkin, supra note 44 at 866.
48
However, this does not make them illegitimate or less than a source of law in contemporary times. See
Patricia Birnie & Alan Boyle, International Law and the environment, 2nd ed (Oxford, Oxford University
Press, 2002) at 25 (“these instruments are clearly not law in the sense used by that article but nonetheless
they do not lack all authority”).

81

sources!”49 This modelling, as Chinkin argues, causes “normative confusion” and
uncertainty,50 though she accepts that the emergence of soft law is an “inevitable
consequence of unresolved pressure for change in international law.”51
Soft law is increasingly attractive to international actors, scholars, and activists for
different reasons.52 For example, they reduce the transactional and political costs associated
with treaty negotiation, as well as provide a framework within which international actors
can adopt flexible arrangements as circumstances change over time.53 Hartmut Hillgenberg
notes that states adopt soft laws because of the need for mutual consensus building among
international actors; the need to stimulate development which is still in progress; the need
to coordinate national legislation; and the concern that a hard law may fail in a specific
issue area, resulting in straining or overburdening already fragile international relations.54
Other reasons include the need for simpler procedures compared to treaty conferences
associated with hard laws, the ability to include parties (NGOs, MNCs) that are not
recognized to vote on treaties in international law, and avoidance of cumbersome processes
in cases of treaty amendments or subsequent national legislation.55
In the context of international human rights law (IHRL), Stéphanie Lagoutte et al.,
argue that the introduction of soft law has helped to develop international law and filled
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the vacuum where there are decreasing hard laws to regulate emerging issues.56 Soft law
performs two functions in IHRL: it is norm-filling and norm-creating.57 Soft laws are norm
filling when they serve as interpretative tools for existing hard laws because they create a
common understanding of the existing rules.58 Second, soft laws are norm-creating in cases
where there are no existing hard laws or binding international standards. In this sense, soft
laws pave the way for the creation of hard law or even coalesce into binding standards
through a process called norm cascade.59
As shown in chapter 1, the history of the UNGPs demonstrates how human rights
standards can play a pivotal role in forging consensus when it is difficult for states and nonstate actors to agree on the content of hard law. The role of soft law in consensus building
is particularly important because of the emerging global non-state actors in international
human rights law, including NGOs, human rights activists, business associations, and
MNCs. Therefore, soft law is important to galvanize the views of those whose voices would
otherwise be hidden in the formation of hard law. In effect, soft law enhances the potential
to democratize international human rights law. This thesis uses the UNGPs as an example
of soft law that has the potential to generate policy convergence to align states and nonstates actors’ divergent interests.
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Soft law, especially in relation to human rights, can also serve as a decolonizing
tool for Third World Peoples.60 This is because it is usually framed in generic and vague
terms. Although this is a criticism of soft law,61 it also has its advantage. Soft law’s
vagueness leaves room for its adaptability for future developments and contextual
interpretation.62 Its vague and open-ended contents present an opportunity for scholars,
states, and NGOs to re-interpret it in a way to address the present and future normative
events. This feature could lend support for the re-interpretation of international law for the
benefit of Third World Peoples. Although the goal of re-interpreting international law for
some Third World scholars is examined in more detail later in this chapter, it suffices to
point out here that soft law lends itself to such re-interpretation.
However, not all scholars believe in the necessity and utility of soft law in global
governance. Chris Ingelse argues that soft laws weaken the global governance system
because of their unclear borderline with hard laws.63 He concludes that soft law is not
international law because the characteristics of soft laws can be included or excluded from
international law.64 Others argue that soft laws are unsuitable for some specific areas of
international law. For example, Alberto Székely argues that instruments, especially ones
relating to environmental law, that contains “supposedly agreed ‘rules’ of so-called ‘soft
law,’ which are so deprived of any mandatory or imperative language, and of any reciprocal
60

Tatiana Cardoso Squeff, “Overcoming the “Coloniality of Doing” in International Law: Soft Law as a
Decolonial Tool” (2021) 17:2 Revista Direito GV 1 at 17-23; Hikmat Salem Nasser, Sources and Norms of
International law: a Study on Soft Law, 2nd ed (São Paulo, Atlas, 2006).
61
See Opeoluwa Adetoro Badaru, “Examining the Utility of Third World Approaches to International Law
for International Human Rights Law” (2008) 10 International Community Law Review 379 at 384; Makau
Mutua, Human Rights Standards: Hegemony, Law, and Politics (New York: State University of New York
Press, 2016) at 124, 126.
62
See Squeff, supra note 60 at 17.
63
See Chris Ingelse, “Soft law?” (1993) 20 Polish Yearbook of International Law 75.
64
Ibid at 79 (“[t]here should either be law or non-law; law is not soft. It would be a contradiction in terminis”).
See also Lazlo Blutman, “In the Trap of a Legal Metaphor: International Soft Law” (2010) 59:3 The
International and Comparative Law Quarterly 605.

84

rights and obligations… could hardly be recognized as rules of international law at all.”65
Székely is concerned that the growing influence of soft laws in global governance is
reversing the long-tradition of the use of hard laws.66 Specifically, Székely advances the
following arguments against the adoption of soft laws: (1) soft laws lack the requisite
characteristics of international normativity, (2) usually the softness of soft law instruments
corresponds with the softness of its contents, (3) it results in creating a grey area between
law and non-binding agreements, (4) it is expressed in vague, imprecise, and uncompelling
language which blurs the distinction between legal and non-legal norms; (5) although it
allows international actors to adopt a provision unanimously, they are usually not
interpreted unanimously, and they weaken the willingness of states to pursue hard law or
to observe it.67
In terms of compliance with soft laws, it is argued that the risk of reputational
damage to non-adherent international actors impels them to comply with soft laws—this is
characteristically described as “naming” and “shaming.”68 However, Anthony D’Amato
argues that soft law non-adherents sometimes deem non-compliance to be cost-effective,
as the benefits accruing from non-compliance may well overweigh the reputational
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damage.69 Jean d’Aspremont also argues that soft law protagonists are “opportunists”
pushing non-treaty options in international law to carve a career for themselves at the risk
of destroying the structures of international law.70 Similarly, feminist scholars criticize the
use of soft law in global governance because soft law has the potential to marginalize the
interests of women in cases where states are unwilling to commit to obligations that
promote those interests.71 Indeed, it has been noted that soft law is a double-edged sword
that powerful states use to avoid obligations perceived as detrimental to their global
economic interests, and to strengthen their positions by undermining the strategy of weaker
states for strict commitments.72 Summarizing some of the arguments against the adoption
of soft law, Jan Klabbers concludes that
[t]he soft law thesis rests on shaky presumptions and finds but
meagre support in both state practice and judicial practice. The soft
law thesis encounters problems in cases of collision. Its most
sophisticated theoretical justification falters on several counts. And
it is not even necessary to resort to the soft law thesis to do justice
to political considerations. Isn’t it about time to discard the thesis
altogether and proclaim the redundancy of soft law?73
Notwithstanding the arguments against the adoption of soft laws in global
governance, this thesis argues that soft law, especially in international human rights law,
can play a complementary role to hard law. Therefore, both hard and soft laws contain
normative elements that shape the behaviour of actors towards specific conduct, which
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means that hard and soft laws can be used as alternatives, complements, and antagonists.74
This thesis does not advocate for the hard law and soft law divide, because “the choice
between hard law and soft law is not a binary one.”75 The strength and weaknesses of both
sides make it difficult to choose one side over the other. However, it is possible to use both
soft and hard law as part of a continuum in a global governance framework. Since hard
and soft laws contain normative elements,76 it is safe to conclude that soft laws, although
still viewed with skepticism in some quarters, are now part of a continuum in a global
governance structure.77
The next part contextualizes the hard and soft law divide by examining the debate
on the appropriate global governance instrument in the BHR context. Although the
discussion in the next section is similar to the traditional debate on hard and soft law,
arguments in the BHR context are slightly different because of the nuances of IHRL,
including (1) the longstanding (debatable) position that MNCs are not subjects of
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international law;78 and (2) the existence of a policy guidance document (UNGPs) that
combines established state treaty-obligations with voluntary standards on corporate
conduct meant to complement traditional states’ obligation to protect human rights.79 The
question, then, is whether the UNGPs, especially Pillar II on corporate responsibility,
which is couched as soft law, should be the subject of treaty negotiation to secure
commitment from states and non-state actors.80 The next part examines how scholars are
tackling this question amidst ongoing treaty negotiation for a business and human rights
treaty.
Part II
2.3 Soft versus Hard Law? — Contextualizing the Business and Human Rights
Debate
In 2014, the UN Human Rights Council adopted a resolution sponsored by Ecuador,
South Africa, Bolivia, Cuba, and Venezuela to draft a business and human rights treaty.81
The Council established an open-ended intergovernmental working group (IGWG),
chaired by Ecuador, with the mandate to elaborate an international legally binding
instrument on transnational corporations and other business enterprises with respect to
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human rights. In July 2018, the IGWG presented the zero draft treaty and invited
stakeholders to make comments and provide input.82 The zero draft treaty has been revised
thrice; the latest draft was published in August 2021.83 Article 8(3) of the draft proposal
stands out because it addresses the legal accountability of MNCs and the duties of states.
It provides that
[s]tate Parties shall adopt legal and other measures necessary to
ensure that their domestic jurisdiction provides for effective,
proportionate, and dissuasive criminal, civil and/or administrative
sanctions where legal or natural persons conducting business
activities have caused or contributed to human rights abuses.84
The content of the zero draft treaty has attracted some arguments, as well as the
preliminary question whether a treaty is the most appropriate regulatory instrument for
BHR issues in the first place.85 The debate whether the zero draft treaty is necessary is an
offshoot of the pre-2011 mandate of Ruggie.86
This thesis focuses on the form of the zero draft as it relates to the debate between
hard and soft law approaches to corporate accountability, an issue that continues to animate
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the UNGPs since its adoption by the UN Human Rights Council in 2011.87 Some scholars,
like David Bilchitz, Daniel Blackburn, and Giorgia Papalia, believe that a treaty is the only
means by which to create norm cascade under international law to ensure that MNCs are
held accountable for their human rights abuses.88 To Christine Parker and John Howe, the
UNGPs “underestimates (whether intentionally or not) what is required to push corporate
responsibility for human rights beyond due diligence processes and the redress of
individual grievances.”89 In contrast, scholars like John Ruggie, Tori Kirkebo, and Pierre
Thielbörger argue that the view of “pro-treaty” scholars is a non-starter because hardening
the UNGPs not only poses problems in terms of the transposition of primary obligations to
MNCs in international law, but this may also erode the very foundations of international
law because it places direct obligations on MNCs.90 Classifying these scholars as positivists
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and pragmatists respectively, this section maps out below the literature on the debate.91
This classification is for easy framing only. It does not suggest the usual contexts in which
these words are used. As stated earlier, the term “positivists” refers to protagonists of the
zero draft treaty because they rely on a traditional source of international law—treaty—for
global governance. Pragmatists, on the other hand, recognize that the contemporary global
governance regime necessitates a pragmatic and flexible instrument in their choice of a
non-traditional source of international law—soft law. These views are set out below.
2.3.1 Positivists
David Bilchitz argues that considering the ambiguity in the scope of MNCs’
obligations in Pillar II of the UNGPs and international law, a treaty is required to clarify
the state of the law and to create mechanisms that can influence human rights norms at the
national and international levels.92 He argues that a treaty will create mechanisms—
tribunals or international courts—that will balance commercial interests with human rights
obligations.93 Particularly, there are trade and investment treaties that specify states’ and
MNCs’ interests which may conflict with human rights obligations that are not delineated
in a treaty.94 Therefore, the zero draft treaty will ensure that trade and commercial interests
do not trump human rights obligations by providing mechanisms for interpretation and
enforcement, like tribunals, as it is under most treaty-created regimes.
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Bilchitz further argues that a BHR treaty will ensure access to justice for victims of
human rights abuses because it will obligate states to enact laws to investigate and
prosecute MNCs transnationally.95 Even if a national grievance mechanism is not
established, he argues that the zero draft treaty could create an international court or
tribunal before which claimants can file both civil and criminal claims against MNCs.96
This will obviate the need to solely rely on weak and inefficient national judicial systems.97
Daniel Blackburn contends that the zero draft treaty could be used to ensure a
radical transformation of international and domestic laws, including rules on criminal and
civil corporate liabilities on human rights violations.98 First, he says that a treaty will reduce
the jurisdictional battles that prevent victims of human rights abuse from accessing justice.
This is because a treaty will clarify the choice of law issues, evidentiary procedures, and
jurisdictional rules that most domestic courts presently grapple with.99 Second, a treaty will
improve corporate legal accountability by placing a broad duty of care on both parent
companies and their subsidiaries. As well, it will create a mechanism for making a parent
company directly liable for its subsidiaries’ conduct.100 Third, a treaty will give legal force
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to the current UNGPs’ due diligence framework. Although some developed countries,
including the United Kingdom, Australia, France, and the Netherlands, are already
integrating this framework into their domestic legislation, he argues that a treaty can build
on the progress already made to promote a broad direct duty of care for parent companies
over their subsidiaries.101 Fourth, the treaty could be used to extend the scope of the UNGPs
to protect human rights defenders, whose rights are increasingly violated in the course of
their duties.102 Fifth, the zero draft treaty could create an international agreement on judicial
cooperation, mutual recognition, and enforcement of judicial decisions. This affirms the
obligation and role of domestic agencies to hear criminal and administrative transnational
cases and implement effective sanctions transnationally.103
Giorgia Papalia also argues for a treaty regulation because of the inadequacies of
the provisions of the UNGPs and its lack of enforceability as soft law.104 Considering lack
of states’ commitment and uptake of the UNGPs, Papalia argues that soft law is inadequate
to drive a legal accountability norm transnationally.105 According to her, the UNGPs’
reliance on state and MNCs’ goodwill creates a lopsided BHR compliance regime because
some states and MNCs may not adopt its provisions, giving them an “advantageous
position” over those that are guided by soft law. The zero draft treaty will create a “levelplaying field” among states and MNCs, thereby ensuring that states and MNCs that are
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complying with human rights standards are not disadvantaged by doing so.106 In effect, she
argues that the fundamental nature of human rights standards requires that they be
contained in a binding instrument.107
Papalia argues also that the UNGPs “suffer from ambiguities and legal lacunae that
prevent corporate human rights abuse victims from seeking protection or redress.”108
According to her, the UNGPs’ approach lacks practical utility because it does not provide
concrete guidance to companies, states, and regulatory bodies on when there is a breach of
the UNGPs’ provisions.109 Also, the UNGPs are ambiguous in areas that touch on the home
states’ extraterritorial control of MNCs.110 In effect, the interpretation gaps and ambiguities
on issues of corporate accountability and monitoring controls in the UNGPs make the case
for the treaty framework inevitable.111 She concludes that a BHR treaty will improve upon
the developments in international law that increasingly recognize MNC’s civil and criminal
liability.
Dalia Palombo’s views do not differ from the foregoing. She also argues that a
treaty will be a tool to hold home states accountable for human rights abuses committed
transnationally by subsidiaries of parent companies.112 So also Graham Markiewicz, who
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argues that the zero draft treaty could be a way to strengthen host states’ positions against
the economic and political powers of homes states and MNCs and to ultimately gain a
political advantage in international law.113 Palombo and Markiewicz's arguments point to
the potential of the zero draft treaty to disrupt the global governance power dynamics that
have previously favoured developed countries. Therefore, the move from voluntariness to
binding obligations could be viewed as an economic/political struggle between developed
and developing states for global regulation control.114
In sum, the positivists’ arguments tackle the inadequacy of the UNGPs’ form and
content to hold MNCs accountable in international law and to provide transnational access
to justice for victims of corporate human rights abuses. It appears that the positivists’
approach to the zero draft treaty proposal presumes that states will sign, ratify, and
implement the treaty (depending on states’ political and legal structures) without
considering the political nuances, long-established doctrinal considerations (doctrines of
legal personality and piercing the veil), and developed states’ entrenched interests in BHR
treaty law-making. It must not be belittled that because of their entrenched interests,
developed states may be slow to sign, or ratify the treaty. For example, in dualist states, the
treaty must first be signed, ratified by the executive, and then domesticated by the
legislature, a process that maintains tight scrutiny to ensure that the entrenched interests of
developed dualist jurisdictions are protected and maintained. In developed countries with
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monist structures, the lack of the legislative oversight may even prevent treaty
implementation because there is no check on the powers of the executive. Indeed, Austria,
the Czech Republic, Estonia, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Montenegro, South
Korea, Romania, Macedonia, the United Kingdom, and the US opposed the adoption of the
zero draft treaty by the Human Right Council.115 This list includes major countries (UK,
US, Germany, and France) that are homes to MNCs. It reinforces the argument that
assuming they ratify in the first place, implementation of the treaty may face opposition in
terms of its domestication in these jurisdictions. Although it is arguable that some
developing states also have a dualist model, their motivation to sign and implement the
zero draft treaty will be higher because of the need to ensure corporate accountability in
these regions. Also, the argument that the zero draft treaty will support a direct liability of
parent companies over their subsidiaries’ tortious and civil liabilities may not align with
the domestic application of the doctrines of separate legal personality and piercing the
corporate veil that seek to protect the business interests and support for MNCs’ economic
and capital growth.116
The zero draft treaty also expands the jurisdiction of domestic courts on issues of
domicile and nationality—a proposal that is likely to be politically contested by states
whose participation is essential for the success of the treaty.117 For example, article 9 (1)
(d) of the draft treaty provides that courts should exercise jurisdiction based on claimants’
115
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nationality or domicile. However, in private international law, courts’ exercise of
jurisdiction based on the nationality of the claimant is considered exorbitant because it has
the potential to make forum courts adjudicate on issues or claims that are unconnected with
the forum.118 Also, this rule encourages forum shopping because nationals of any country
can approach the court, regardless of whether the cause of action is connected to the forum
or not. Although French courts (rarely) apply the nationality rule, courts in the United
States and Europe do not apply it.119 The inclusion of this provision in the draft treaty
means that the United States and countries in Europe will be reluctant to accede to this
provision because it has private international law and foreign policy implications for them.
Positivists also downplay the history of a similar instrument in the BHR context
examined in chapter 1 of this thesis—the Draft Norms on the Responsibilities of
Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises (Draft Norms). This
document was abandoned due to, among other things, its political and economic
implications for developed countries.120 Similarly, the arguments do not consider how
difficult it was for John Ruggie to get developed states and MNCs to support the adoption
of the UNGPs by the UN Human Rights Council, given the divergent interests and
dissenting voices by these “spoilers,” as he calls them.121 He had to manage dissenting
voices and politically persuade states to get a unanimous endorsement from the Human
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Rights Council. This was the first time that the Council endorsed a normative text on a
subject that governments did not negotiate themselves.122
The political bickering during the adoption of the UNGPs shows the sharpness of
interest divergence that trails negotiations or discussion on BHR global governance.123 It
is thus obvious, given this precedent from the adoption of the UNGPs that an agreement
on the text of a hard law that touches on the economic and political interests of developed
states will be more difficult, if not impossible. The developed countries are unlikely to
support proposals that put any extra burden of regulation on them. They will also not
relinquish the economic benefits accruing from MNCs that successfully operate in
developing countries for reason of the weak national human rights legislation under which
they operate in these countries. Thus, it was not surprising that most developed states,
including the United States, the European Union, and the business community, opposed
the proposal for the zero draft treaty.124 It is also not surprising that only developing
countries initially supported, and are championing the draft treaty.125 In sum, the positivist
arguments can be likened to visions of light at the end of the tunnel without discerning the
darkness and uncertainties in the tunnel that may well prevent the traveller from getting to
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the end of the tunnel. These arguments, and more, animate the pragmatists' counter views
examined next.
2.3.2 Pragmatists—A Defence of Soft Law
John Ruggie argues that an encompassing human rights treaty, like that sought by
the positivists, is “not only a bad idea; it is a profound deception.”126 Marcia Narine also
claims that the zero draft treaty proposal “is unlikely to pass.”127 Pragmatists hail the
UNGPs as a soft law that bridges the acute governance gaps created by doctrines of
sovereignty, separate legal personality, and the reality of weak governance without
upsetting the international law balance.128 Particularly, Ruggie argues that the broad scope
of human rights involved in the BHR context requires a soft law approach. 129 This is
because it “includes complex clusters of different bodies of national and international
law—for starters, human rights law, labor law, anti-discrimination law, humanitarian law,
investment law, trade law, consumer protection law, as well as corporate law and securities
regulation.”130 Similarly, he notes that the BHR field is embroiled with problems of
diversity, institutional variation, and conflicting interests across and within states.131
Therefore, he argues that even if states sign the zero draft treaty, it will operate at such a
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“high level of abstraction that it would be largely devoid of substance, of little practical use
to real people in real places, and with high potential for generating a serious backlash
against any form of further international legalization in this domain.”132 Also, because of
the negotiations involved in treaty law-making, he argues that if states agree on a treaty, it
will contain provisions short of the current highest voluntary human rights standards
because this is an easy way to get buy-in from powerful developed countries.133 To Ruggie,
such inferior human rights standards contained in a treaty, which are difficult to amend,
enable MNCs to operate with minimum accountability.134
Furthermore, Ruggie argues that the treaty proposal will be embroiled in the same
political skirmishes that bedeviled its predecessors—the Draft United Nations Code of
Conduct on Transnational Corporations (Code) and the Draft Norms on the
Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises (Draft
Norms)—discussed in chapter 1. He notes that the Code was abandoned after 22 years of
negotiation without a consensus.135 Ruggie draws insights from the history of climate
change treaties and their inability to command states’ commitment.136 Other scholars also
point to the history of the International Convention for the Protection of the Rights of All
Migrant Workers and Their Families, which has not been ratified by any of the largest
migrant worker receiving countries, as a lesson for what may happen to the zero draft treaty
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proposal.137 They argue that it is unlikely that developed states that are not signatories to
ILO human rights instruments will support or implement the zero draft treaty. They also
argue that major home states of MNCs will be reluctant to commit to a transnational
regulation of their corporations abroad.138 This is because there is currently no international
instrument that prescribes this regulation.139 Even if the treaty comes to fruition, they argue
that the road leading to states’ consensus on human rights texts is often long and arduous.
Ruggie particularly believes that it is reasonable to build a consensus through a soft law
instrument pending the time a (un) likely BHR treaty emerges. 140 Although he does not
entirely dismiss the possibility of a future treaty, he believes that the UNGPs, as soft law,
can serve as a precursor for the treaty.141
Tori Kirkebo and Malcolm Langford reaffirm that a treaty proposal should be
viewed with circumspection because of the history of the enforcement, observance, and
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compliance with hard laws in international human rights protection.142 They argue that
IHRL treaties are easily forgotten because of lack of commitment from states either at the
ratification or implementation stage,143 more so when “there is little evidence that human
rights treaties, on the whole, have improved the well-being of people, or even resulted in
respect for the rights in those treaties.”144 Therefore, the zero draft treaty may fail too
because it requires commitment and accountability from developed home states that
presently benefit from the accountability gap.145 Altogether, states may not support the zero
draft treaty because it imposes a higher political, economic, and legal cost than the slow
cumulative progress that may or may not coalesce over time via the UNGPs.146
In any event, Pierre Thielbörger and Tobias Ackermann are not hopeful that the
zero draft treaty will close the governance gap. Rather, the treaty runs the danger of failure
in the face of unrealistic expectations.147 Just like Ruggie, they argue that the BHR treaty
is premature because there is no existing consensus on the liability of state and non-state
actors in this regard.148 According to them, treaty discussions will jeopardize, rather than
promote the trust-building process among states, international organizations, and civil
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society groups that the UNGPs started.149 Thielbörger and Ackermann prefer cumulative
progress because it is important to “take the issue one step at a time instead of taking too
many steps at once, stumbling, and potentially tearing the whole process down.”150 They
believe that a treaty proposal is necessary only when the corporate responsibility norm is
globally internalized, which means that state and non-state actors must see corporate
accountability beyond voluntary self-regulation and as a normative expectation.151
Although Thielbörger and Ackermann acknowledge that internalizing corporate
responsibility norms will take a while, they argue so also will treaty law-making. In sum,
they advocate for a bottom-up approach where state and non-state practices, influenced by
the UNGPs, can create a corporate accountability norm, instead of a top-bottom approach
where a treaty imposes obligations on state and non-state actors.152
It is worth highlighting that though the pragmatists believe that a treaty is presently
unwarranted, what they do not address, however, are some of the key positivist arguments
relating to the potential efficacy of the UNGPs. For example, the positivists are sure that
the UNGPs inhere in ambiguity, interpretation gaps, and inadequacy of their provisions on
issues of corporate accountability and monitoring controls. Generally, ambiguity and
imprecision characterize the text of soft laws, including the UNGPs. Since there is no
provision for interpretative mechanisms in the form of courts and tribunals, state and nonstate actors may pick and choose those UNGPs’ provisions that suit their convenience to
observe.153 If soft law is needed to build consensus among international actors before a

149

Thielbörger & Ackermann, ibid at 77. See also Esdaile, supra note 138 at 2.
Thielbörger & Ackermann, ibid.
151
Ibid at 78.
152
Ibid at 79.
153
It could be argued that the OECD National Contact Points that interpret the embedding of pillar 2 in the
revised OECD MNE Guidelines, 2011 can serve as an interpretative tool. However, NCP decisions are often
150

103

possible treaty can be agreed upon in the future, the question is what the fate of victims of
human rights abuses would be under the present soft law regime.154 Would they have to
wait for justice under a treaty that may or may not ever be concluded?
Between both sides of the debate regarding the UNGPs and the zero draft treaty is
a discernable pattern. The positivists focus on the benefits of treaty law without considering
the process leading to the result, while the pragmatists are taken up with the processes and
procedures of reaching a consensus that would lead to concluding an effective treaty. Yet,
they too fail to fully consider the implications of the absence of a justice mechanism for
those who seek justice in the short term. Also, it is arguable that the need for ensuring
corporate accountability and access to remedy for rights abuse victims features on both
sides of the debate, which is about the more efficacious means by which to achieve a
common goal of corporate accountability. A third discernable feature is the inherent
weaknesses of the views on both sides.155 John Ruggie captured this eloquently in his report
to the Human Rights Council. He asserts that “no single silver bullet can resolve the
business and human rights challenge.”156 This is why he proposed “a smart mix of
reinforcing policy measures that are capable over time of generating cumulative change
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and achieving large-scale success—including in the law.”157 In other words, Ruggie
proposes a normative framework where legal and social norms guide businesses and states’
conduct transnationally.158
Taking Ruggie’s proposal at face value, it requires examining the relationship
between social and legal norms in the BHR global governance context. As stated earlier in
this chapter, both hard and soft law contain normative elements. 159 Understanding the
normative underpinnings of a regulatory mechanism helps to improve compliance with law
among international actors. This is also important because historically, norms that originate
from different cultural ideologies have influenced the development and compliance with
transnational human rights regulations.160 Indeed, it has been noted that “the business and
human rights discourse contains a galaxy of norms.”161 However, for actors to comply with
norms, the process of norm-making must include essential elements. This point is further
examined in the next section.
2.4 An Interactional Account of Social and Legal Norms
Clearly, this thesis must move beyond the debate about whether a soft or hard law
is a better form of global governance regulation. It must answer the question of how to
construct a regulatory framework that generates compliance from actors, regardless of the
form of the regulatory instrument. This thesis adopts Brunnée and Toope’s interactional
157
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approach to international law-making to substantiate its claims. Brunnée and Toope argue
that what makes hard or soft law is their ability to generate compliance, not through raw
power, political or economic muscling, or central authority, but by the moral force of
shared normative understandings that appeal to and inform the rational autonomous choices
that actors would make.162 This thesis chooses an interactional approach for two reasons.
First, an interactional framework is not contingent on states’ political commitment, but on
the internal and autonomous choices of international actors that are based on shared
understandings. Second, an interactional framework embraces norm diversity and
application, and this aligns with the theme of this thesis.163
It is noteworthy that Brunnée and Toope’s theory is based on Lon Fuller’s theory
of morality of law.164 They extend Fuller’s theory (which is state-centric) to international
law. Fuller argues that what distinguishes law from other types of social ordering is not the
form of the legal instrument but adherence to a criterion of legality: the law must be
promulgated, non-retroactive, clear, non-contradictory, not asking the impossible,
consistently applicable to various situations, and maintain congruence between the rule as
announced and their actual administration. Fuller argues that norms that satisfy the
requirements of legality stand a higher chance of being obeyed. When norms meet the
criteria of legality and are applied by actors, Fuller says there is “a practice of legality.”165
Fuller argues that the practice of legality (adherence to the requirements of legality),
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generates compliance among actors to whom the law is addressed. 166 He was more
concerned with the procedural requirements to satisfy the inner morality of law. According
to him, an inner morality of law is not concerned with the substantive aims of legal rules
(which is enforcement), but with how a system of rules which govern human conduct is
constructed and administered.167
Fuller justified his theory on the basis that a practice of legality creates an
interaction between the state and citizens. He argues that compliance with the law is borne
out of the interaction within the legal system. This is because the state fulfils citizens’
expectations of making a law under the criteria of legality stated above.168 Conversely, the
state expects that citizens will comply with the law, not necessarily because of any
compulsion, but because the law satisfies the criteria of legality. In my view, compliance
with the law, as Fuller described it, is based on shared expectations, a relationship that
Fuller described as horizontal reciprocity between lawgivers and citizens.
Brunnée and Toope’s extend Fuller’s theory to international law. Their theory is
based on the premise that “the distinctiveness of law lies not in form or enforcement but
the creation and effects of legal obligation.”169 This resonates with Lon Fuller’s inner
morality of law that is concerned with the process of law-making. They note that in
international law, norms are not dictated by the sovereign, central authority or lawgivers.
Norms arise as a matter of reciprocity between international actors. 170 They define
reciprocity to arise in situations where international actors (notwithstanding their diverse
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interests) socially interact and collaborate to exchange ideas, opinions, and practices, such
that the interactions generate a new understanding of previous concepts or norms. They
argue that the interactions produce “shared understandings” about concepts, norms,
practices, and values. In effect, the central theme of their argument is that legal norms (or
law) should be a product of social norms that are intersubjectively constructed and held
among actors.171 In sum, international law should be a product of social interactions among
state and non-state actors.
Like Fuller, Brunnée and Toope also discuss the reasons for compliance with
international law.172 They argue that international actors comply with laws because such
laws resonate with the prior normative values that they hold. Therefore, an international
law-making enterprise requires an exchange of ideas and norms, such that international
actors feel a sense of commitment to the law when it is adopted. In effect, in an interactional
account, participation from international actors is a crucial element in securing compliance
with the law. Brunnée and Toope give an example of the World Trade Organization (WTO)
disputes regime.173 They argue that the resistance of most developing nations to the trade
regime negotiated under the WTO can be explained by the absence of shared norms
between developing and developed states. They note that less influential states believe that
they are not true participants in the WTO negotiations, but rather are bystanders in disputes
between them and more influential nations, which are usually to the benefit of developed
states.174 In sum, the inclusion of international actors in law-making efforts determines
whether they see the law as legitimate or not.
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Where norms are not socially constructed and intersubjectively held, the result is
illegitimate law—situations where a treaty, though concluded as formally binding
obligation on parties, fails to generate the necessary sense of obligation or commitment
from the parties to elicit their compliance.175 As evident in the argument of the pragmatists
reviewed in the previous section, the inability of international human rights treaties to
command commitment from states and non-state actors is a common occurrence in the
human rights field. An interactional approach would enable us to understand the strategies
by which to ensure effective law-making in the future. This thesis argues that a BHR global
governance framework needs “…a distinctive form of legitimacy [that] is internal to
international law; [and] not an external measure of political value or preference.”176
Brunnée and Toope also answer the question as to when social norms become law,
or when soft law hardens. In their view, social norms become legal obligations when they
meet the requirements of legality as set out by Fuller.177 As well, law is authoritative only
when it is mutually constructed among actors who constantly communicate through a
specific process.178 In effect, a social norm hardens when actors continuously observe it
because they share the underlying values of the norm, rather than an externally imposed
duty that is matched by a sanction of non-compliance.179For example, Makau Mutua
criticizes how international law developed human rights norms after the second world war
in a way that exhibits normative gaps and cultural biases against Africans.180 He notes that
the exclusion of Africans from the norm-making process in international law undercuts the
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legitimacy of international human rights norms as presently constituted. Given Mutua’s
critique of contemporary human rights norms, it is important to examine whether TWAIL
scholars will embrace the interactional approach that Brunnée and Toope propose in the
development of a corporate responsibility to respect human rights norm. Their proposal
raises many questions, one of which is whether the present international law structure
makes any form of interaction possible. In effect, is the promise of interaction among
diverse views, not a façade for maintaining international law or western nations’
dominance perpetuated by the thoughts of universalism? The next sub-section describes
how TWAIL scholars would view an interactional approach. It describes two generations
of TWAIL scholarship to situate this thesis within one of the generations of TWAIL that
accommodates Brunnée and Toope’s interactional account.
2.4.1 An Interactional Account—A TWAIL Perspective
As stated in chapter 1, transnationally, TWAIL scholars (TWAILER-ers) are
concerned about the fairness of norms, processes, institutions, and practices to Third World
Peoples.181 They advocate for voices that are not institutionalized, especially poor women,
farmers, and traders—subordinated groups—who do not have voices in the international
global order.182 They also oppose the complicity of Third World states with global powers
to silence the voice of Third World Peoples.183 In effect, TWAIL scholarship advocates for
the democratization of international law so that all voices can be heard and considered in
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the reconstituted world order.184 To reconstitute the global legal order, TWAIL-ers focus
on the hierarchical systems that entrench economic and political disparity between the
Global North and the Third World Peoples.185
TWAIL is both a political and intellectual movement because it focuses on the
relationship between law and politics on the one hand, and law and economics on the other
hand.186 Since its first conference in 1997,187 TWAIL-ers have written on diverse areas,
which include contemporary empire,188 origins of international law,189 international
environmental justice,190 culture and gender,191 human rights,192 interpretation,193 Third
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World resistance,194 and bio-piracy.195 This literature uses methodological tools that
include historical and doctrinal analysis. The historical method emphasizes the effect of
colonialism in Third World countries, while the doctrinal method exposes doctrines and
practices that have profound implications for the distribution of power between the North
and South divide.196 These sets of scholarship are broadly classified into two strands:
TWAIL I, which is produced by first generational post-colonial lawyers, and TWAIL II,
which broadly follows and elaborates on TWAIL I.197
TWAIL I projects are characterized by their reluctance to repudiate international
law and their commitment to helping in producing a “universal” international law.198
Scholars in this strand argue that Third World countries are not strangers to processes of
international law and that pre-colonial societies have well-structured legal systems that
could be used for the benefit of the international community.199 Notwithstanding the
exclusion of Third World Peoples, scholars in this strand argue that, through institutions
like the United Nations, the content of international law could still be transformed for the
benefit of Third World people.200 Furthermore, TWAIL-ers in this group argue for the
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entrenchment of sovereign equality of states and non-interventionism in newly independent
states.201 They note that political independence is not enough in the absence of economic
independence from colonial structures. In sum, scholars in this group seek to contribute to
the universalization of international law without questioning its foundation.202
TWAIL II scholarship reformulates the analytical tools of TWAIL I in a dynamic
and reactive international law setting. Scholars in strand II critique the processes and
language of international law.203 They particularly consider the interests of marginalized
groups within Third World states, including women, peasants, workers, minorities, and
how they had been generally excluded and marginalized by international law.204 Scholars
in this strand also consider how Third World countries embrace international law to their
disadvantage because they contend that colonialism is central to the formulation of
international law.205 In their view, legal doctrines contribute to the entrenchment of
international law, which is a product of colonial history and domination. TWAIL-ers in
this group particularly oppose international law’s “gospel” of universalism that seeks to
assimilate non-Europeans into a universalist system founded on doctrines like sovereignty
and rule of law.206
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They also turn their attention to how the knowledge about international law is
processed and produced.207 They recognize that this is another method of domination from
the Global North because western scholars control, manipulate, or spin the knowledge that
is produced to promote western dominance.208 They argue that it is only when knowledge
about the lived experiences of Third World Peoples are discussed that western domination
can be obliterated in international law.209 Therefore, to reconstruct international law that is
based on different experiences and background, TWAIL-ers in this group attempt to first
decolonize and deconstruct the narratives of Third World Peoples as backward and barbaric
people who need to be incorporated and integrated into the civilized world.210 Thereafter,
they seek to reconstitute the Third World narratives not as a pupil of Europe or North
America but as a people of power, knowledge, and influence who can influence global
affairs, and particularly international law.211 In sum, TWAIL II scholarship constructs
methodological and normative alternatives that transcend international law’s colonial
inequalities structures.212
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This thesis belongs to the TWAIL II scholarship because it is concerned about
creating normative alternatives to the dominant understanding of the CR2R norm. It seeks
to construct normative alternatives to interpret the UNGPs in a way that incorporates views
of the Third World Peoples. From the debate on the process leading to the development of
the UNGPs in chapter 1, it can be gleaned that the critics of the UNGPs are concerned that
the standard seeks to maintain the imbalance and status quo between the Global North and
Global South divide and favour the liberal market agenda and global policies to the
detriment of Third World Peoples.213 These reflect some of the central themes in TWAIL.
TWAIL II scholars are also likely to resist claims that the UNGPs are a “global
authoritative standard”

214

because this claim seeks to perpetuate universalism of

international law.
Like TWAIL-ers, this thesis also resists international law’s quest to assimilate other
non-western cultures by universal standards. This is because human rights standards cannot
be neutrally interpreted; they are interpreted through prisms of colonialism, power, politics,
and history in different regions. However, international law’s universal narrative is
important to shape the contours of a regional or context-specific approach to problems of
international law.215 Universalism, however, should not necessarily mean assimilation.
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Therefore, each region must fashion out the policy implications of universal standards to
their socio-economic and political progress.216
This approach has some benefits in the international human rights context. First, it
considers the history of colonialism in Africa to develop solutions and remedies to human
rights abuses in Africa. Second, it accommodates both local and universal insights in
assessing the causes of human rights abuse. This enables scholars to proffer a balanced
view of the problem and maximizes the chance of success of a rights-based framework that
addresses the concerns of rights bearers and rights holders. Third, it is an inclusive
governance system that encourages the collective responsibility of all stakeholders in
international law without discriminating between strong and weak actors because each
stakeholder is valued for its unique contribution. Fourth, it inspires legitimacy because it
is premised upon inclusivity, fairness, openness, and dialogue. However, the actualization
of the benefits of a contextualized approach is hinged on the dislocation of power
imbalance in international human rights law. One way of doing this is to provide
alternatives based on the lived realities of those who would be affected by the application
of international law.217 The nature and characteristics of the UNGPs as soft law offer an
opportunity to provide these alternatives.
As stated earlier, soft law can serve as a decolonization tool because its contents
are usually vague, giving room for contextualization and adaptation. The UNGPs lends
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itself to such contextual interpretations because of its vague terminology. The SRSG’s most
controversial proposal—corporate responsibility to respect human rights in Pillar II—was
worded in abstract and neutral terms. For example, the SRSG framed corporate obligations
using words like “societal expectation,” “social licence,” “social norm,” “courts of public
opinion,” “specialized economic organs,” and “responsibility to respect human
rights.”218As noted in chapter 1, although the SRSG is criticized for using these words to
avoid fall-out from business organizations and western states, as well as manage objections
from dissenting voices and objections from NGOs and Third World countries,219 there is
still an opportunity to re-interpret or contextualize its meaning through a constructivist
method. This thesis embarks on a constructive exercise in chapter 4 to show how Third
World Peoples’ conception of respect for human rights can shape a soft law that has an
impact on them.
Essentially, this thesis shares TWAIL II Scholarship’s goal of reconstructing
international law. As noted in chapter 1, a TWAIL constructivist methodology puts Third
World Peoples at the center of international law to discover their contributions to global
governance, which ultimately frees them from the dominance of international law. Lessons
from Brunnée and Toope’s interactional account demonstrate the need for interaction
between international law and Third World Peoples to facilitate the exchange of ideas. The
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reciprocity and cross-fertilization of norms between the Third World Peoples and products
of international law like the UNGPs are possible because, apart from its soft law status, the
UNGPs are designed to be a focal point upon which other ideas and actions can
converge.220 In sum, universal human rights standards should only serve as a template and
not a finished product. Ruggie admitted this when he noted that the endorsement of the
UNGPs by the Human Rights Council will mark the end of the beginning of corporate
responsibility discourse.221
To increase the acceptance or legitimacy of the UNGPs in the Third World, this
thesis examines opportunities for norm reciprocity between different levels of governance
(the global and local) in the BHR context. Subsequent chapters of this thesis show how the
implementation of the UNGPs can benefit from an intercultural exchange and
communication that may generate compliance, especially from the Third World Peoples’
perspective.
Generally, the UNGPs are discussed among big law firms, the elites, state
representatives, and business communities.222 Even the consultative process of the UNGPs
has been described as “too international, elitist and too far away from the actual corporatecommunity constellations that it was set out to govern.”223 These criticisms prevent
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discussion on what corporate responsibility and access to remedy would look like from
local communities’ standpoints. In effect, confining interaction on this to elite global actors
hides the potential that local communities’ norms or understanding hold to contribute to a
“practice of legality” regarding corporate responsibility for their human rights violations.224
In chapter 4, this thesis examines this often-neglected issue by examining the Afrocentric
norm, Ubuntu, that has the potential of normatively shaping corporate responsibility in
Africa and internationally. Chapter 4 advances a normative reconstruct of the UNGPs along
cross-cultural and diversified lines. This is because norm-sharing must not only occur at
the horizontal level among states, MNCs, INGOs, transnational social networks, and
human rights defenders; it must also occur at a vertical level between local norms and
global norms. This thesis argues that a vertical—horizontal shared understanding increases
the potential for internalizing the corporate responsibility norm that the UNGPs advocates.
To make this claim, this thesis tackles the themes of exclusion, diversity, western neoliberalism, neo-colonialism, and relativism as these relate to the adoption and
implementation of Pillar II of the UNGPs. To increase the level of commitment of local
and global actors to the norms provided in the UNGPs, there must be increased interaction
among diverse norms, thoughts, understandings, and knowledge.
2.5 Conclusion
This chapter has examined the debate on the use of hard and soft laws in global
governance. It noted that through treaties, known as hard law, constitute one of the
traditional sources of international law, there is increasing use of a non-traditional source
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in form of codes, standards, and agreements which are generically referred to as soft law.
Soft law emerged after the Second World War because of the structural inadequacies of
international law that disabled its response to the increasing complexity of post-war state
relations. This chapter examined the strengths and weaknesses of both hard and soft laws
in global governance. It was noted that notwithstanding the increasing adoption of soft laws
in international law, some scholars oppose its use, labeling it as normatively confusing and
functionally redundant. However, despite its criticisms, this thesis does not believe that
soft law is redundant. Rather, it points out that depending on the context in which it is used,
soft law could be a potent tool for a reconstructive exercise like the one undertaken in this
thesis.
Turning to the debate within the BHR context, this chapter examined arguments on
the relative strengths and weaknesses of the zero draft treaty that aims to provide a treaty
framework in place of the existing UNGPs’ soft law approach to demanding and regulating
corporate accountability. It was argued that a global governance regime that takes an
exclusive hard or soft law approach would be fundamentally flawed. It argued for the
adoption of an interactional approach that considers the normative underpinning of law,
whether hard or soft. Its focus is that social and legal norms must constitute the normative
foundations of hard and soft laws, and that an understanding of the interactions of these
norms is necessary to move beyond the soft and hard law debate. This is the way to create
international law that generates commitments from actors. Brunnée and Toope’s
interactional theory facilitates understanding how shared views of norms ensure such
commitments from international actors with diverse interests. The chapter concluded that
international law-making must not only occur at the horizontal level among states, MNCs,
INGOs, transnational social networks, and human rights defenders; it must also occur at a
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vertical level between local norms and global norms. It proposes that such a relationship
can be facilitated through TWAIL constructivism.
The next chapter advances this discussion on norms. It takes an international
relations’ constructivism approach to examine how social norms develop and spread
through a mutually constructed framework to regulate state and non-state actor conduct. It
examines the conditions for the creation and spread of social norms into internalized
standards of conduct in international relations. It points out that the spread of norms across
jurisdictions—norm

diffusion—can

be

achieved

via

two

approaches:

norm

cosmopolitanism and norm congruence. It analyzes the UNGPs through norm diffusion
thinking and argues that the SRSG adopted a cosmopolitan approach that encouraged norm
diffusion along horizontal lines between elite international networks, not a congruence
approach that dovetails local and global frameworks to encourage norm diffusion between
global and local norms. The latter would have facilitated shared understandings among the
diversified groups affected by the subject-matter of the UNGPs.
The next chapter concludes that the UNGPs’ cosmopolitan approach denies the
potential of local norms to contribute normatively to shaping corporate accountability. This
is why it is difficult to argue that the UNGPs are legitimate in the eyes of those whose
norms are marginalized in its construction—Third World Peoples.
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Chapter 3: The C2R2 Norm—An Analysis through Norm Cycle and Norm Diffusion
Theories
3.0 The Theory of Norm Dynamics
This chapter engages with the international relations theory of norm dynamics through the
works of Martha Finnemore, Kathryn Sikkink, and Amitav Acharya. As already said, a
norm is a “standard of appropriate behavior for actors with a given identity.”1 Chiekel
defines norms as “shared expectations about appropriate behavior held by a collectivity of
actors.”2 These definitions reflect that a norm is held within a reference or identified group.3
The discussion in the previous chapter showed that for a norm to be social, it must be shared
by other people and partly sustained by their approval.4 This chapter further examines the
importance of social norms in international law-making.
Social norms perform various functions. For example, they are used to “make
demands, rally support, justify action, ascribe responsibility, and assess the praiseworthy
or blameworthy character of an action.”5 In international law, social norms provide
solutions to coordination problems, reduce transaction costs, and provide a language and
grammar of international politics.6 Social norms are, however, different from rules, legal
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norms, or maxims.7 James Fearon explains that while rules take the form ‘‘do X to get Y,’’8
social norms take a different form: ‘‘Good people do X.’’9 In effect, while compliance with
rules and maxims are motived by outcomes, social norm observance is usually influenced
by emotion.10
Social norms have constitutive and constraining aspects. They are constitutive
when they create a class of actors or actions and determine actors’ identities and interests.11
Social norms create meaning through the construction of intersubjective (collectively held)
understanding of who and what things are.12 Their meanings are value-laden, such that
actions of identified actors are judged against the values that are intersubjectively held.
This is because social facts are classified with the values (created by a constitutive norm)
in order that they can be judged as good or bad.13 In sum, constitutive norms “define an
identity by specifying the actions that will cause others to recognize that identity and
respond to it appropriately.”14 For example, traditionally, if someone raises their arm
during an auction, such conduct is recognized by others as bidding.15 The norm creating

7

See Jon Elster, “Norms of Revenge” (1990) 100:4 Ethics 862 at 864-866.
For example, Posner’s definition characterizes norms in terms of rules that are obeyed for fear of
punishment. He defines norms “as rules that distinguish ‘desirable and undesirable behavior’ and give a third
party the authority to punish a person who engages in the undesirable behavior.” See Eric Posner, “Law,
Economics, and Inefficient Norms” (1996) 144:5 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 1697 at 1699.
9
James Fearon, “What is Identity (as we now use the word)?” (1999) [unpublished, archived at Department
of
Political
Science,
Stanford
University,
1999]
1
at
27,
online:
Stanford
University<https://web.stanford.edu/group/fearon-research/cgi-bin/wordpress/wpcontent/uploads/2013/10/What-is-Identity-as-we-now-use-the-word-.pdf>.
10
Elster, supra note 4 at 100.
11
Carla Winston, “Norm Structure, Diffusion, and Evolution: A Conceptual Approach” (2018) 24:3
European Journal of International Relations 638 at 640.
12
Ronald Jepperson, Alexander Wendt & Peter Katzenstein, “Norms, Identity, and Culture in National
Security” in Peter Katzenstein, ed, The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identities in World Politics
(New York, Columbia University Press, 1996) 54.
13
Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University
Press,1999).
14
Ted Hopf, “The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations Theory” (1998) 23:1 International
Security 171 at 173.
15
See Natalia Criado et al, “Reasoning about Constitutive Norms in BDI Agents” (2014) 22:1 Logic Journal
of the IGPL 1 at 2.
8

123

auctioneering sets a particular conduct that is recognized by others and responded to
appropriately.
Conversely, social norms are restraining when they define “acceptable”
justifications for certain behavior.16 A society may constrain a certain behaviour to address
a defined problem. However, the acceptance of a constraining norm is dependent on how
the public accepts it, and this speaks to its legitimacy.17 Riise notes that actions are justified
by reference to widely held values.18 This is because it is impossible to justify one’s
behaviour on self-interested grounds.19 A constitutive norm that prescribes justification for
acceptable conduct may also be constraining. For example, cut-throat competitiveness in
the market may be constrained by strict adherence to norms of honesty.20 Therefore, a
constraining norm, sometimes, relies on the value created by a constitutive norm to limit
behaviour or guide response to a problem.21 The synergistic relationship between
constitutive and constraining functions of norms is referred to as norm-building. Normbuilding is “the process of constructing a bridge between the constitutive and the constraint
functions of norms such that a combined statement is reached: ‘Given this problem, my
values dictate this behavior.”22
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This chapter refers to norms as values that govern human behaviour—social
norms.23 The study of social norms has been a major devotion of social constructivists in
international relations.24 They understand that state conduct is usually influenced by the
soft powers of ideas, values and norms, and not necessarily by the distribution of political
power.25 They consider norms to be important because they influence and motivate actors
toward guided behaviour.26 For example, Vaughan Shannon notes that the norm of military
non-intervention has been an important influence on most developed states’ conduct when
there is a crisis in another state.27 As well, the norm is a justification for international
organizations (for example, the United Nations) to rebuke states for non-compliance. Not
only are social constructivists interested in the influence of norms, but they are also
interested in their origin and development. Indeed, it has been noted that “[t]o state that
norms matter is no longer controversial; scholars are now concerned more with how, when
and why norms emanate and evolve.”28 In sum, the social constructivism approach to
international relations contributes to new theoretical insights regarding the emergence and
influence of norms.
This chapter’s examination of social constructivism’s theory of norms begins with
the concept of the cycle of norms as postulated by Finnemore and Sikkink. This theory

23

This is different from legal norms that are standards of behaviour defined in terms of rights and obligations.
See Stephen Krasner, “Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening Variables”
(1982) 36:2 International Organization 185 at 186; Posner, supra note 8.
24
The term “social constructivism” was first used by international relations scholar, Nicholas Onuf. See
Nicholas Onuf, The World of Our Making (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1989). Alexander
Wendt is also a leading proponent of social constructivism. See Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of
International Politics (Cambridge, UK, Cambridge University Press, 1999).
25
See generally Annika Björkdahl “Norms in International Relations: Some Conceptual and Methodological
Reflections” (2002) 15:1 Cambridge Review of International Affairs 9.
26
Ibid.
27
Vaughan Shannon, “Norms are What States Make of Them: The Political Psychology of Norm Violation”
(2000) International Studies Quarterly 293 at 307.
28
Björkdahl, supra note 25.

125

explains how a norm develops and crystalizes to be an internalized or universal norm.
However, Finnemore and Sikkink do not explain the factors that cause norms to move from
one cycle to another. Riise and Sikkink attempt to fill this gap by explaining how
transnational networks contribute to the development of norms in their spiral model
theory.29 They argue that transnational social agents, like international organizations and
international NGOs (INGOs), contribute to norm adoption from the international to the
domestic level.30 However, they still overlook domestic (local) factors that influence the
adoption or internalization of norms. The chapter also draws on Acharya’s work to explore
how conditions in local contexts influence norm diffusion and adoption. Specifically, this
chapter examines how the congruence theory as explained by Acharya, enables us to
understand how different domestic (local) actions shape and modify international norms.
Drawing from these theories, this chapter examines how the UNGPs’ concept of corporate
responsibility to respect (CR2R) is developing, and the potential of local actors and norms,
especially in Africa, to resist or support the CR2R norm to the extent of its
resemblance/assimilation to local pre-existing norms and structures.
The chapter is divided into three broad parts. Part I discusses Finnemore and
Sikkink’s norm cycle. It specifically examines the characteristics of each stage of the cycle
and the condition precedent for a norm to proceed from one stage to another. However,
since Finnemore and Sikkink do not explain why and how norms diffuse, Part II engages
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with the theory of norm diffusion, identifies and distinguishes between two theories of
norm diffusion—the cosmopolitan and congruence theories. The former emphasizes
transnational networks, while the latter focuses on local actors and norms’ influence on the
international normative order. Part II also explains variants of the congruence theory—
localization and subsidiarity—as explained by Amitav Acharya. The variants explain the
role of local actors in the contestation or support for international norms. Part I and Part II
of this chapter are, therefore, descriptive, and explanatory as they lay the background for
Part III and subsequent chapters in this thesis. Part III explains the development of the
UNGPs’ norm of corporate responsibility to respect (CR2R) in light of Finnemore,
Sikkink, and Acharya’s theories of norm cycle and congruence. It particularly examines
the role of the (former) SRSG, John Ruggie and his team, as norm entrepreneurs in the
universalization of the CR2R norm. Part III identifies that the UNGPs are at the cascading
stage in the norm cycle theory. It also classifies the SRSG’s norm diffusion strategy as a
cosmopolitan rather than a congruence approach. It concludes with a note that the UNGPs,
when understood or implemented through a congruence approach, show local actors and
norms to be either potential “disruptors” or “supporters” of CR2R internalization and the
implementation of the SRSG’s agenda and vision.
Part I—Norm Cycle
3.1.1 Stage 1—Norm Emergence
Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink explain that norms exist in a patterned “life cycle”
consisting of three stages: norm emergence, norm cascade (norm acceptance), and norm
internalization.31 The first stage—norm emergence—occurs when a group of actors, called
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“norm entrepreneurs,” convinces a group of states and non-state actors (norm leaders) to
embrace new norms.32 This stage is characterized by persuasion and conviction borne out
of norm entrepreneurs’ strong feelings or position about acceptable behaviour in their
community.33 Norm entrepreneurs can take many forms: they may be non-governmental
organizations (NGOs), grassroots organizations, international organizations, legal experts,
UN representatives, and academics.34 Norm entrepreneurs are important for norm
emergence because they call attention to issues or even create issues by using names and
languages that (re)interpret and (re)name them—this is called framing.35 However, framing
is not accepted without contestation within a larger framework of existing norms.36 This is
because norms “emerge in a highly contested normative space where they must compete
with other norms and perceptions of interest.”37 Therefore, norm entrepreneurs promote
norms within the context of the “appropriate standard” of conduct defined by prior norms.38
At the stage of norm emergence, norm entrepreneurs are motivated by several
factors, which include empathy, altruism, ideology, and ideational commitment.39 In other
words, norm entrepreneurs promote new norms, usually not because of their gain or benefit
but because of their strong desire to see others do well, even if the well-being of others is
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detrimental to the interest of the norm entrepreneur.40 However, it is difficult to determine
the underlying reasons to promote a norm beyond empathy, altruism, and ideational
commitment. Some norm entrepreneurs may promote a norm to create a mark or score
some academic achievement. Whatever the reason for norm emergence, norm
entrepreneurs aim to create an acceptable standard of behaviour that distinguishes between
“good” and ‘bad” outcomes.
At the international level, norm entrepreneurs use international organizational
platforms to promote new norms because these organizations may be major influences in
the emergence of a new norm.41 Standing international organizations like the UN and
World Bank are platforms that norm entrepreneurs use for various reasons, like good
organizational structure, leverage with member states, and expertise/information in specific
areas that can convince actors.42 International organizations also provide norm
entrepreneurs with tools to secure the support of states through persuasion or, sometimes,
coercion in the case of weak states.
For a norm to reach the second stage (norm cascade), it must be institutionalized in
specific set rules of international organizations.43 An institutionalized norm contributes to
the possibility of norm cascade because it clarifies what the norm is and what constitutes a
violation. It also sets out the procedures by which norm leaders coordinate disapproval and
sanctions for norm-breaking.44 Norm leaders’ persuasion of other actors to adopt a new
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norm at this stage leads to a “tipping point.”45 A norm cycle reaches a tipping point when
a critical mass of states adopts a norm.46 Although the number that qualifies to be a critical
mass is debatable, Finnemore and Sikkink suggest that if 1/3 member states of an
organization adopt a norm, they can be called a critical mass. 47 Also, the relative strength
of states may contribute to determining whether there is enough support for a norm to reach
the tipping point.48 Finnemore and Sikkink define “critical states” as “those without which
the achievement of the substantive norm goal is compromised.”49
3.1.2. Stage 2—Norm Cascade
A norm cascade occurs after the tipping point. Norm cascade is characterized by
imitation, which occurs when norm leaders attempt to socialize other states (or actors) to
adopt a norm—that is, to become norm followers.50 This often results in cascading or
trickling of norms throughout the rest of an identified population. Socialization involves
the “induction of new members…into the ways of behavior that are preferred in a
society.”51 Thomas Risse and Sikkink explain that the goal of socialization is to internalize
a norm so that external pressure is no longer needed to ensure compliance.52 Since the
international community comprises a group of states and non-state actors, the socialization
process is a way to understand socio-political interaction among them. In effect, further to
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the works of norm entrepreneurs, a critical mass of states and non-state actors who believe
in a norm socialize others into adopting the norm.
States adopt norms at this stage for different reasons, such as legitimization,
conformity, and esteem.53 These factors are products of what Francisco Ramirez calls peer
pressure among states.54 Legitimization occurs when states feel the need to adopt a norm
to obtain the approval of other states or to become members of a community. For example,
in cases of human rights, some scholars classify some western states as a community of
“democratic liberal states” who are seen as the epitome of freedom, democracy, and the
rule of law.55 States not belonging to this category are classified as non-liberal states.56
Therefore, a state seeking international legitimation and domestic acceptance may be
socialized into adopting norms promoted by liberal states.57 This is because adopting such
norms may help to define its identity as a liberal state.58
Conformity and esteem focus on how states see themselves. States may adopt a
norm because of the need to fulfill the psychological need of a sense of belonging.59 In
other words, the desire to gain or defend one’s pride and reputation can explain norm
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following.60 Therefore, these factors are linked to how states’ representatives feel about
themselves and how they want other states to perceive them. 61 Finnemore & Sikkink give
an example of an instance where states care about norms associated with liberalism because
being a “liberal state” is part of their identity and it is something they take pride in, or an
identity from which they gain their self esteem.62 Indeed, it has been noted that social norms
are sustained, in part, by “feelings of embarrassment, anxiety, guilt, and shame that a
person suffers at the prospect of violating them.”63 Norm leaders adopt tools that include
naming and shaming to inspire a sense of pride or self-esteem on the one hand, and guilt
and shame on the other hand to achieve norm cascade.64
3.1.3. Stage 3—Internalization
The third stage occurs when norms acquire a taken-for-granted quality and are no
longer a matter of broad public debate—that is, a norm crystalizes as a generally accepted
standard of conduct within an identified population.65 Rommetveit describes
internalization as “the subtle change occurring when an enduring social pressure exerted
by a norm-sender gradually is felt or experienced by the norm-receiver as an obligation
toward himself.”66 At this stage, conformity to a norm is not questioned or debated because
it is deemed a near-universal norm. For example, many western norms about market
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exchange, individualism, sovereignty, and the rule of law have gained prominence in the
international community to the extent that states’ conformity with these norms is deemed
to be normal behaviour.67 After the internalization stage, norms may be supplemented or
replaced by domestic law.68 Indeed, it has been noted that “norms often precede laws but
are then supported, maintained, and extended by laws.”69 However, this does not mean that
all norms must be supported or supplemented by law.
Part II
3.2. Theory of Norm Diffusion
Although Finnemore and Sikkink’s norm cycle theory helps to understand the
development or origin of norms, they do not explain the factors that contribute to the
reception or rejection of a norm within the dynamics of political and international relations.
Scholars, especially political scientists, sociologists, and international relations experts,
identify and fill this gap with the study of causal mechanisms and processes through which
norms and ideas spread.70 Their work engages with the theory of norm diffusion. The word
“diffusion” is used synonymously with words like “spread,” “trickling down,” and
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“translation.”71 Generally, diffusion is the “transfer or transmission of objects, processes,
ideas, and information from one population or region to another.”72 Concerning
international relations and policy choices, Simmons explains that “[i]nternational policy
diffusion occurs when government policy decisions in a given country are systematically
conditioned by prior policy choices made in other countries.”73 This definition emphasizes
the interdependence of states in the process of making policy choices. States make
“uncoordinated, but interdependent” choices through causal mechanisms that include
coercion, competition, learning, and emulation.74
There are two approaches to studying norm diffusion— moral cosmopolitanism and
norm congruence.75 Moral cosmopolitanism is the propagation and promotion of
“universal” moral norms by transnational actors either through agencies like states or
transnational

networks

like

NGOs

and

international

organizations.76

Moral

cosmopolitanism has three main features. First, it is promoted as a universal or
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cosmopolitan idea. Examples are the campaign against land mines, intervention against
genocide, struggle against racism, ban against chemical weapons, and promotion of human
rights.77 Second, a cosmopolitan norm is promoted by transnational agents—individual
“moral entrepreneurs” or social movements–with little emphasis on the reaction of
domestic actors.78 Third, the literature on moral cosmopolitanism relies on moral
proselytism to convert norm followers, and any resistance to the moral persuasion or
conversion to adopt a norm is labeled immoral or illegitimate.79
Moral cosmopolitanism is criticized for giving causal primacy to “international
prescriptions” while ignoring the expansive appeal of “norms that are deeply rooted in
other types of social entities—regional, national, and subnational groups.”80 Acharya
argues that the distinction between norms that originate internationally and those
originating from local contexts sets up a dichotomy between “good” global norms and
“bad” regional or local norms.81 For example, Ellen Moyer, in a research project funded
by the European Commission, argued that it is presumed that “African gender norms and
sexual practices are static, conservative, and ‘backward.”82 She notes that this stereotype
hides the fact that there is also unsolved gender inequality in developed states. She contends
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that without understanding the cultural contexts of local norms, it is inaccurate to label
them as bad or backward. Similarly, cosmopolitanism is criticized for elevating the role of
transnational actors over local actors.83 Critics conclude that, by emphasizing the
importance of international agencies, norm cosmopolitanism limits the potential of norm
dynamics to be shaped by different conditions and processes.84
Conversely, congruence theory examines norm diffusion “beyond international
prescriptions and stresses the role of domestic political, organizational, and cultural
variables in conditioning the reception of new global norms.”85 This theory focuses on the
domestic reception of global norms—that is, the cultural fit (or congruence) between
existing local cultural norms with an internationally developed norm. 86 This is similar to
Susanne Zwingel’s concept of translation where norms are influenced by different cultural
and socio-economic contexts.87
Acharya introduces concepts like framing, grafting, and localization in the process
of norm congruence.88 Framing and grafting are principles of re-interpreting or rerepresenting a norm in a local context by norm advocates who may not necessarily be local
agents.89 Framing is the process where norm advocates “highlight and create issues by
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using languages that names, interprets, and dramatizes them.”90 Framing is important
because “the linkages between existing norms and emergent norms are not often obvious
and must be actively constructed by proponents of new norms.”91 Therefore, framing,
through its re-interpretative tool, has the potential to create similarities between global and
local norms. Grafting, on the other hand, is used by norm advocates to “institutionalize a
new norm by associating it with a pre-existing norm in the same issue area, which makes
a similar prohibition or injunction.”92 This is different from radical transplantation or norm
displacement because grafting only encourages incremental norm transplantation in an
issue area.93
Localization goes further than framing and grafting. Acharya defines localization
as “the active construction (through discourse, framing, grafting, and cultural selection) of
foreign ideas by local actors, which results in the former developing significant congruence
with local beliefs and practices.”94 It resonates with the notion that norms have to be remade
in the vernacular to have any meaning.95 For example, a global norm on patentability is
contained in The Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of International Trade (TRIPS).96
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Article 27 (1) of the Agreement provides that “patents shall be granted in all fields of
technology, provided that they are new, involve an inventive step and are capable of
industrial application.” This provision commodifies the patent system. It promotes a free
market economy in favour of multinational pharmaceutical companies who may claim
monopoly of an invention notwithstanding that the source is from traditional knowledge or
local pharmaceutical industries. However, local actors in Brazil contested and reframed
Article 27. Through a process of localization, they infused nationalistic requirements that
protect the interest of local pharmaceutical companies into the norm.97 This resulted in a
legislation that, although retained some portions of the original norm, safeguarded the
interest of local pharmaceutical companies in Brazil.98 The actions of local actors created
a congruence between local interests with a global norm.
Traditionally, constructivist scholarship on norm diffusion privileges the study of
the activities of “transnational moral entrepreneurs” over “insider proponents.”99
Transnational moral entrepreneurs have been described as those with the ability to
“mobilize popular opinion and political support both within their host country and abroad,”
“stimulate and assist in the creation of like-minded organizations in other countries,” and
“play a significant role in elevating their objectives beyond its identification with the
national interests of their government.”100 However, the localization approach is a shift in
the understanding of norm entrepreneurship from “outsider proponents” committed to
understanding and promoting universal or transnational moral agenda to “insider

97

See generally Thomas R. Eimer, Susanne Lütz & Verena Schüren, “Varieties of Localization: International
Norms and the Commodification of Knowledge in India and Brazil” (2016) 23:3 Review of International
Political Economy 450.
98
Ibid at 468.
99
Merry, supra note 95 at 1.
100
Nadelmann, supra note 79 at 482.

138

proponents” committed to congruence between universal and prior and pre-existing
cultural norms.101 Localization actors include individuals, NGOs, social groups, and local
communities.
Localization is a systematic and dynamic process where existential compatibility
between local norms and foreign norms are prioritized for norm adaptability.102 The prior
existence of a local norm in a similar issue area as that of a foreign norm makes it easier
for local actors to subject the foreign norm to some pruning, adjustments, framing, and
grafting to fit into a specific cultural and socio-economic context.103 In other words,
without losing its attributes, the foreign norm is adapted into a cultural, local, and specific
context, without the local community losing its identity as well.104 Bosch describes the
outcome of localization as a situation in which “the foreign culture gradually blend[s] with
the ancient native one so as to form a novel, harmonious entity, giving birth eventually to
a higher type of civilization than that of the native community in its original state.”105
Acharya approaches measuring outcomes from a different angle when he says
“[l]ocalization is indicated when an extant institution responds to a foreign idea by
functional or membership expansion and creates new policy instruments to pursue its new
tasks or goals without supplanting its original goals and institutional arrangement.”106
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Zimmermann takes a middle course between total loss of identity and total rejection of a
norm through her embedding approach. According to her, “[e]mbedding describes a
localization type where the adopted [norm] and its implementation is mostly in line with
international standards but where the dominant frames and practices differ from an
interpretation in the transnational community.”107 Acharya concedes that localization may
be the first step in a norm displacement process, which means that local norms may be
displaced by a foreign norm that has been fitted into local contexts and adopted by
elitists.108
Localization progresses in four stages. The first stage (pre-localization) occurs
when local actors resist new external norms because of doubts about their application and
utility, and the fear that the norm may undermine existing local identity, beliefs, and
practices; the second stage (entrepreneurship and framing) occurs where local actors reinterpret a foreign external norm in a manner that brings out its value to the local audience;
the third stage (grafting and pruning) occurs when both norms (local and foreign) are
adjusted and reconstructed to accommodate each other, such that they synergistically
operate on a common ground for the benefit of the local audience; the last stage
(amplification and “universalization”) occurs when new instruments and practices are
established from the synergistic and mutual normative framework between local and
foreign norms in which local influence remains dominant and visible.109 Zimmermann
concludes that “…localization is at least recognized as having the potential to produce
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outcomes of a more legitimate, more stable, and locally more appropriate kind.”110 An
example is Brazil’s localization of the TRIPS norm described above. The resistance by
local actors because of the effect of the foreign norm on local pharmaceutical companies
started the localization process. The second stage was the reframing of Article 27 to reflect
the socio-economic realities in Brazil. The third stage was the grafting of both global and
local norms. For instance, although a patent could still be granted to MNCs in Brazil, the
patent can only be granted if the technology will be applied within Brazil. This prevents
indigenous ideas from being exported to foreign countries and ensures that Brazilian enjoys
the benefit of indigenous knowledge transformed into patents. This is an incentive for
economic growth of local pharmaceutical companies because they can partner with MNCs
without the fear of MNCs obtaining exclusive patents, exporting the patents, and then
reselling them to local pharmaceutical companies at exorbitant costs. Admittedly, the
localized norm has not reached the fourth stage of influencing global norms.
Akin to the localization theory is the subsidiarity theory espoused by Acharya.111
Acharya developed the subsidiarity theory in response to the lack of literature on how
norms diffuse from a Third World perspective.112 Subsidiarity theory enables international
relations scholars and social constructivists to view norm making and diffusion as a
bottom-up process “in which weak local actors can challenge and influence global
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normative processes, rather than a largely top-down one.”113 Theresa Reinold describes
subsidiary scholarship as “a default preference for locating governance at the lowest
possible level –that is, the level which is closest to the individuals affected by the decisions
of the governing body.”114 To compensate for the legitimacy deficit of global governance
institutions, subsidiary norms make individuals the primary unit of normative concern. 115
Therefore, subsidiarity theory is a challenge to the western framing of norm dynamics and
diffusion as an institutionalized process. For example, one of the subsidiary norms from
Latin America is the doctrine of uti possidetis juris.116 This doctrine recognized the rights
of colonies to retain their boundaries after independence. Upon independence, the colonies
have the right to maintain their existing boundaries. This norm, with its origin in Latin
America, later influenced and supported a global norm on territorial sovereignty which is
mostly adopted in other regions, including Africa and Asia.117
Acharya defines subsidiarity as a “process whereby local actors create rules with a
view to preserve their autonomy from dominance, neglect, violation, or abuse by a more
powerful central actor.”118 This principle in international relations is inspired by AnneMarie Slaughter. She defines subsidiarity as “a principle of locating governance at the
lowest possible level—that [is] closest to the individuals and groups affected by the rules
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and decisions adopted and enforced.”119 In international relations, the subsidiarity principle
featured in the universalism and regionalism debate at the time of the drafting of the United
Nations Charter in 1945.120 In sum, subsidiarity stresses the importance of local autonomy
in Third World countries’ decisions on how and when to adopt a foreign norm.121
Third World countries develop subsidiary norms for two reasons. First, they
develop subsidiary norms to challenge their exclusion and marginalization from global
norm-making processes.122 Indeed, global institutions dominated by strong global actors
do not always reflect the ideas, interests, or views of weaker states. 123 Subsidiary norms
are used as a response to multilateral organizations’ dominance in the distribution of power
in global governance, a situation that may be classified as tyrannous.124 For example, Latin
American states developed the Drago doctrine to challenge the US and Europe’s position
that they have a right to intervene to force states in Latin America to honour their sovereign
debts.125 Named after Argentine Foreign Minister, Luis Drago, the norm resists the
intervention of superpowers in contractual matters between a debtor and creditor. Second,
developing countries develop subsidiary norms in response to “great power hypocrisy.”126
This arises when these countries “see the violation of their cherished global norms by
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powerful actors and when higher-level institutions tasked with their defense seem
unwilling or incapable of preventing their violation.”127 For example, the Calvo doctrine
was developed in South America in response to foreign intervention and exploitation via
the rules of international investment law.128 The Calvo doctrine developed into a foreign
policy doctrine that ensured that jurisdiction in international investment disputes lies with
the country in which the investment is located.129 In effect, subsidiary norms may arise
from the need to limit the scope and application of global norms that are selectively applied
and implemented by stronger western states against weaker states. 130 Ibironke OdumosuAyanu depicts such bottom-up constructivism when she explored how Third World
Peoples’ interaction with the investment system contributes to the re-construction of the
investment dispute settlement system.131 The interaction of Third World Peoples with the
investment law system is a manifestation of subsidiarity because they seek to reconstruct
the system to consider their unrepresented interests in international investment law.
Norm subsidiarity is different from norm localization in terms of its contribution to
the global normative order. Although localization serves as a reference point for identifying
and distinguishing the essential aspect of norm subsidiarity, the motives driving both
concepts are different.132 First, localization is “inward-looking” because it involves making
foreign ideas consistent with prior local norms while subsidiarity is “outward-looking”
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because it focuses on the relations between local actors and external powers in terms of the
local actors’ fear of dominance by external powers.133 Second, in localization, local actors
are norm-takers while in subsidiarity, local actors can be norm-makers or norm rejecters.134
Third, in localization, foreign norms are imported for local usage only, while in
subsidiarity, local actors may “export” or “universalize” locally constructed norms; the
local norm may support or amplify an existing global norm against the parochial ideas of
powerful actors.135 Fourth, in localization, local agents redefine foreign norms, which they
take as “good” and “desirable” but not consistent with prior local norms, while in
subsidiarity local agents reject foreign ideas (of powerful central actors), which they
consider not worthy of adoption, emulation, or borrowing in any form. 136 Fifth, norm
localization applies to all actors regardless of size or economic power, while norm
subsidiarity is specific to the “periphery” of smaller, weaker actors whose definition is
often challenged.137 However, notwithstanding their differences, subsidiarity and
localization are complementary concepts and, indeed, countries apply them
simultaneously.138
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Subsidiary norms have two effects on the international norm-making process. First,
they may have a “challenging/resisting effect.”139 Local actors may develop a norm to resist
norms promoted by great powers and institutions which seek to displace existing cultural
practices and ideas.140 Local actors, in this case, claim the right to deal with their issues
without external intervention or influence.141 The Drago doctrine described above in Latin
America is an example of a norm that resists the dominance of superpowers. Second,
subsidiary norms may have a “supportive/strengthening effect.”142 If an existing global
norm is deemed legitimate via consensus and participation throughout all levels of
authority, from the international to the community,143 local actors may support such norms.
For example, the humanitarian intervention norm is supported by the African Union’s norm
on peace and security which allows a state, through the use of military force, to protect the
human rights of the population in another state in cases where the violating state refuses to
comply with human rights standards.144 In sum, a subsidiary norm can show resistance to
the global normative order, or it may support it.
Acharya explains that combining “localization” and “subsidiarity” culminates in
norm circulation,145 a two-way norm diffusion process where local norm agents influence
the global normative order and vice versa. Here, the norm is first contested, reframed,
grafted, and reconstituted to fit prior cognitive identities (localization) and then processed
139
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through a feedback channel to the global normative system (subsidiarity).146 He explains it
as follows
…the initial norm goes through a period of contestation, leading to
its localization or translation. This might create a
feedback/repatriation effect which might travel back to the point of
origin of the norm in the transnational space and lead to its
modification or qualification. At the same time, locally-constructed
norms in similar issue areas (including those in the West or nonWest) might be exported to the transnational space and acquire a
global resonance, thereby modifying the definition or promotion of
the more globally prominent norm/s in similar issue areas.147
Norm circulation is usually inevitable in the norm cycle process because norms are
seldom likely to be adopted wholesale. Therefore, the norm circulation process involves
broad participation of normative agencies and actors for its actualization and smooth
running. Norm actors may be Western, non-Western, global, local, states, non-states, and
social movements.148 Acharya illustrates this point by referencing the development of the
United Nations’ Principles of Responsibility to Protect (R2P) norm. He identified the
African origin of some of the ideas informing the R2P norm and argued that this influenced
the normative scope of the R2P to the extent that the norm was “qualitatively different in
origin and inspiration” from the older 1990s era of humanitarian intervention norm.149 The
modified scope and implementation of the R2P norm show a norm circulation between
Western and non-Western normative channels. The interaction between the domestic and
the global system for norm circulation may be understood through a relational theory of
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the transnational legal process.150 A relational theory in international relations posits that
the identities and roles of social actors are shaped by relations.151 It sees the world as
“composed not of self-subsistent and pre-constituted actors, but of interwoven and dynamic
relations.”152 Sara Seck, drawing an analogy from the relationship between human beings
and the ecosystem, argues that states must not be seen as autonomous bounded entities, but
as relational beings that are interconnected and interdependent with a responsibility and
duty to maintain international cooperation.153 If states share a common purpose, as Seck
argues, norm circulation among states will be without transnational boundaries until they
are universalized. In a relational approach to understanding norm circulation, state and nonstate actors may be resistant or receptive to a norm-based on their relationships with one
other. As Qui Yaqing noted, “[i]n an interrelated world, the totality of relations is very
much like an intangible hand that orients an actor toward a certain action.”154
Yaqing explains that interaction among global actors can be a system of “relational
governance.”155 He defines relational governance as “a process of negotiating
sociopolitical arrangements that manage complex relationships in a community to produce
order so that members behave in a reciprocal and cooperative manner with mutual trust
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evolved over a shared understanding of social norms and human morality.”156 The
definition distinguishes between government (rule-based governance) characterized by
most international relations theory, and governance inspired by a Confucian theory of
relationality and supported by social theory.157 It reflects a process of negotiation among
actors, which is inspired by the concept of shared responsibility instead of handed-down
rules that characterize a traditional view of government.158 Also, it reflects a dynamic and
evolving process of making arrangements among actors, instead of a static nature of
rules.159 It should, however, be noted that trust is an essential ingredient for a working
relational structure.160
“Process” is another key concept in a relational theory of norm circulation.161 This
is because the process of making a norm is essential to determining its resistance and,
ultimately, its circulation.162 Acharya notes that “[n]orm circulation occurs when the less
powerful actors feel marginalized in the norm creation process or feel betrayed by the abuse
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of the norm by the more powerful actors in the implementation stage.”163 In effect,
participation in the process of making norms is not enough for developing countries
because, sometimes, norms are partially implemented in favour of powerful countries.164
The marginalization of less powerful states and impartial norm implementation goes to the
root of the “trust factor” in relational governance. For example, Mutua argues that
notwithstanding African participation in the making of some of the founding documents
on human rights, including the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the documents do
not include the historical, ideological, and cultural narratives in Africa.165 This causes
distrust of the human rights movement, which consequently (partly) generated scholarship
on cultural relativism. The distrust of a norm-making process plays a significant role in
norm resistance and, ultimately, motivates less powerful states to find ways to influence
the global normative order.166 The point here is that the legitimacy and acceptance of the
norm-making processes is a critical determinant in the life cycle of a norm and the level of
local resistance.167
In effect, local actors’ acceptance of the norm process has an important influence
on its effectiveness at the internalization stage.168 If the process is fair, transparent, and
participatory, it potentially increases the chance for actors, especially local actors, to
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(rightly) claim ownership of the norm and, ultimately, reduce the potential for contesting
and resisting the norm’s emergence and establishment.169 For example, the R2P is hailed
by some African scholars as bearing an African mark.170 Indeed, it has been noted that “the
responsibility to protect is in many ways an African contribution to human rights.”171 This
approbation is associated, among others, for the central role of African countries in the
International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) roundtable
consultations held, especially in Maputo, Mozambique in 2001. It also reflects the key roles
that Africans including Francis Deng, Mohamed Sahnoun, Boutros Boutros-Ghali and Kofi
Annan played in conceptualizing the norm.172 The perception of African inclusion in the
R2P norm-making process reduces the contestation and resistance to the norm in Africa.
In sum, in contrast to the cosmopolitan theory, the congruence theory explains that
local (domestic) factors influence contestation or support for norm internalization.
Localized and subsidiary norms play mutual and overlapping and reinforcing roles to
modify, graft, reframe, or reject foreign norms. It is, therefore, important to examine the
prospect of norm internalization beyond the efforts of transnational networks. It is
imperative to see it as a function of relations between the local and global levels of
governance.173
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The next part discusses the UNGPs in this light. It provides a concrete example of
Finnemore and Sikkink’s norm cycle theory by examining how the UNGPs’ CR2R norm
is developing as a business and human rights norm capable of eliciting measurable
compliance.
Part III
3.3 The Corporate Responsibility to Respect Human Rights as a Norm
The UNGPs embody the corporate responsibility norm in Pillar II. As stated in
chapter 1, this norm provides that corporations should respect human rights not because of
any legal obligation, but because it is a social norm.174 Pillar II lists requirements to comply
with the norm in Principles 13 through 23. Principle 13 provides that the responsibility to
respect human rights requires that MNCs should avoid causing or contributing to human
rights abuse through their own activities but in case human rights abuse occurs, they should
redress it. Also, the Principle states that MNCs should prevent or mitigate human rights
abuses that are directly linked to their products, services, or business relationships,
notwithstanding that they did not contribute to the abuse.
Principle 15 provides that to comply with the norm, MNCs need to know and show
that they respect human rights. To do this, they should have policies that expressly show
their commitment to the CR2R norm. Also, they should put in place a human rights due
174
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diligence (HRDD) process to identify, prevent, and mitigate human rights abuses.
Similarly, MNCs should create processes that enable the remediation of any human rights
abuse they cause or to which they contribute. The requirements for policy commitment,
HRDD, and remediation of harm are further elaborated in Principles 16 through 22. For
example, Principle 17 defines the essential parameters of the HRDD to include
considerations about the size of the company and the duration of the HRDD exercise.
Principles 18 through 21 discloses the essential components of HRDD, which include
MNCs’ responsibility to identify actual or potential impacts of human rights abuse and to
prevent and mitigate the abuse identiﬁed.175 Also, MNCs should effectively integrate the
results of the HRDD exercise across the whole of the business and the response should be
tracked and communicated to affected stakeholders. Principle 22 provides that in a case
where MNCs identify that they have caused or contributed to human rights abuse, they
should “provide for or cooperate [with other actors] in the remediation through legitimate
processes.”
Principle 14 provides that the norm applies to all companies, regardless of the “size,
sector, operational context, ownership, and structure.”176 Principle 23 states that in all
contexts, MNCs should “comply with all applicable laws and respect internationally
recognized human rights, seek ways to honour the principles of internationally recognized
human rights when faced with conflicting requirements, and treat the risk of causing or
contributing to gross human rights abuses as a legal compliance issue wherever they
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operate.” The UN Working Group on business and human rights clarified this to mean that
a corporate responsibility to respect human rights exists even when the state in question is
unable or unwilling to fulfil its own human rights obligations.177
The normative influence of the UNGPs promoted by Ruggie, a social constructivist,
contributed to the evolution of the corporate responsibility to respect human rights as a
social norm.178 Although this normative project was initiated by an African, the then UN
Secretary-General, Kofi Annan,179 it was executed by Ruggie. As part of the normative
enterprise, Kofi Annan’s philosophical views could have influenced the choice of Ruggie
for the business and human rights project. Annan is described as a global leader, diplomat,
and “a great son of Africa.”180 His address at Davos reflected his philosophical principle
regarding globalization when he proposed collaboration between the UN and the CEOs of
Corporations to give a human face to the global market. It has been argued that Annan, in
his Davos speech, planted the seeds for the modern corporate sustainability movement.181
Indeed, Ruggie describes Annan as his mentor and “favourite boss.” Ruggie also describes
the field of business and human rights as Annan’s legacy.182 Annan, unlike Ruggie, is an
economist, having obtained degrees in Economics from the Graduate Institute in Geneva
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and MIT’s Sloan School of Business. Notwithstanding his background, Annan considers
human dignity as an integral part of business strategies and practices. He is a strong
supporter of poverty eradication and human rights promotion.183
As the driving force behind the UNGPs, Ruggie’s goal is to provide a framework
that sets out criteria upon which economic actors (corporations) can be embedded in
transnational social norms and institutional practices that promote corporate
responsibility.184 This is based on the belief that normatively, corporations must reorient
from a focus on capitalist and private property accumulation to become socially
constructed entities legitimized by societal licence from the community that they operate
in.185 Ruggie may be classified as an entrepreneur of the CR2R norm because his efforts in
finalizing the Global Compact and the UNGPs are significant in its emergence.186 Although
Ruggie’s motive is unclear, it is arguable that it may have been an ideational commitment.
Finnemore and Sikkink note that an ideational commitment is one of the motivations of
norm entrepreneurs, and it occurs when they “promote norms or ideas because they believe

183

See The Interview of Kofi Annan and John Ruggie at the annual conference of the International Bar
Association
held
on
6
October
2018,
online:
Kofi
Annan
Foundation
<www.kofiannanfoundation.org/videos/business-and-human-rights/>. Also, see generally George Kell, “In
Memory of Kofi Annan: Father of the Modern Corporate Sustainability Movement” (19 August 2018), online
Forbes
Magazine<www.forbes.com/sites/georgkell/2018/08/19/in-memory-of-kofi-annan-father-of-themodern-corporate-sustainability-movement/#697cf7f354b1>.See also James Traub, The Best Intention: Kofi
Annan and the UN in the Era of American World Power, 1st ed (New York: Macmillan, 2007).
184
Ruggie, supra note 174.
185
Ibid at 4. See also Kate Macdonald, “The Socially Embedded Corporation” in John Mikler, ed, The
Handbook of Global Companies (Chichester, UK: Wiley Blackwell, 2013) 371.
186
See John Ruggie, “Business and Human Rights: The Evolving International Agenda” (2007) 101:4
American Journal of International Law 819. The UNGPs and UNGC are two of many parallel initiatives that
develop similar but distinct models on corporate accountability. See the OHCHR, “The UN Guiding
Principles on Business and Human Rights: Relationship to UN Global Commitments” (June 2014), online:
OHCHR<https://d306pr3pise04h.cloudfront.net/docs/issues_doc%2Fhuman_rights%2FResources%2FGPs
_GC+note.pdf>. However, on issues of competing interpretation on the scope of social responsibility between
the UNGPs and similar initiatives, for example, ISO 26000, see Stepan Wood, “The Case for Leverage-Based
Corporate Human Rights Responsibility” (2012) 22:1 Business Ethics Quarterly 63.

155

in the ideals and values embodied in the norms, even though the pursuit of the norms may
have no effect on their well-being.”187
To be clear, the SRSG never acted alone during the period of his mandate. Apart
from expert consultations and workshops that featured experts from fields including
corporate law, human rights, climate, and the environment,188 the SRSG also
acknowledged the contributions of particular individuals, including Christine Bader,
Rachel Davis, Gerald Pachoud, Caroline Rees, Andrea Shemberg, John Sherman, Lene
Wendland, Vanessa Zimmerman, Amy Lehr, Michael Wright, David Vermijs, Jonathan
Kaufman, Larry Catá Backer, Andrew Clapham, and Mark Taylor.189 The coalition of
individuals and corporate bodies (including law firms, corporations, and intergovernmental
organizations) that collaborated to draft of the UNGPs could technically be described as a
social movement in which the SRSG, acting under the mandate of the UN Human Rights
Council (UNHRC) and enjoying the support of his boss, Kofi Annan, acted as a focal point
to navigate and negotiate the endorsement of the UNGPs by the UNHRC. In effect, though
the SRSG is referred to as a norm entrepreneur in this thesis, the story of the UNGPs’ norm
entrepreneurship is incomplete without acknowledging the contribution of those without
whom the SRSG would not have carried out his mandate.
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Employing the norm cycle theory in relation to the UNGPs, one could say its
introduction enables the emergence of the CR2R norm in the business and human rights
context.190 This view fits with Winston’s characterization of a norm. Winston explains that
[f]irst, a norm presupposes a problem, which is the issue to be
addressed. Second, the norm includes a value. It is the enjoyment or
attainment of something “good” or the avoidance of something
“bad” and, as such, gives moral weight to the problem. Third, a norm
enjoins a particular behavior: the action to be taken to address the
given problem that allows the actor to better express or practice the
value. In short, a problem inhibits the full enjoyment of a value and
necessitates a corrective behavior.191
The SRSG describes the problem in the business and human rights context as an
economic crisis that is characterized by “the widening gaps between the scope and impact
of economic forces and actors, and the [in]capacity of societies to manage their adverse
consequences.”192 The SRSG identified the embeddedness of businesses in transnational
social norms and institutional practices that promote corporate responsibility as the value
derived for solving the problem.193 Business embeddedness in a corporate responsibility
culture is meant to reduce the risk of MNCs contributing to human rights abuses in the
process of wealth maximization—this is both a moral and social value. The third
characteristic of a norm, therefore, enjoins corporations to respect human rights through
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the exercise of HRDD.194 HRDD enables corporations to identify risks and to prevent or
remedy those arising from their business or related activities.195 In effect, the UNGPs
prescribe HRDD practice as one of the ways to close the governance gaps (problem) in
order to reduce incidents of business and human rights abuses (enjoyment of value).
At the norm emergence stage, Ruggie characteristically used the tool that most
norm entrepreneurs employ—framing.196 He calls it a “multi-perspective framing” that
uses three pillars of the UNGPs to draw on different but mutually reinforcing governance
structures.197 According to his 2008 Report, the first pillar—states’ responsibility to protect
human rights—draws on the system of public governance and law at international and
domestic levels to reiterate the states’ obligations under international human rights law.198
The second pillar, through a system of civil governance, involves persons adversely
affected by business enterprises and those acting on their behalf. Those harmed by the
activities of business enterprises employ various social compliance mechanisms, such as
campaigns, lawsuits, and engagement with firms.199 The third pillar, corporate governance,
unevenly draws on the first two pillars because it frames the corporate responsibility to
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respect human rights in terms of societal expectation and social compliance.200 In effect,
the UNGPs’ normative framework draws on systems of public governance, civil
governance, and corporate governance to frame the role of states, NGOs, and businesses
in human rights protection.201
This framing is significant because the three systems of governance are expected
to play mutually reinforcing roles to cause a cumulative change in the existing neo-liberal
market system that focuses on profit maximization. Also, the framing is significant because
it avoids the contestation and long-standing debate on whether corporations can be dutybearers under international human rights law.202 As stated in chapter 1, Ruggie did not
follow Draft Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other
Business Enterprises203 which imposed obligations on MNCs under international because
he believed that corporations are not subjects under international law. Rather, Ruggie
framed his project as a norm that is based on recognized international human rights
instruments through which state and non-state actors could imbibe a corporate
responsibility culture. In sum, the framing of three mutually interconnected governance
systems enabled the SRSG to propose a normative change in the role of corporations in
society.
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As discussed in Part I, Finnemore and Sikkink explain that for a norm to reach the
second stage (norm cascade), it must be institutionalized in specific rules of an international
organization.204 The SRSG ensured that beyond his clarification of existing human rights
standards and instruments, which were his original mandate from the UN, he developed
“Guiding Principles” to guide business and state conduct. Upon his request, and backed by
states, the Human Rights Council extended the SRSG’s mandate to “operationalize” the
recommendations made in his final report during his first mandate period from 20052008.205 The SRSG’s strategy to codify the Principles with commentaries is significant in
the norm cycle because it sets out the scope and limits of the CR2R norm.
The codification of the UNGPs is instrumental to reaching its tipping point and for
its progress to the next stage of the norm cycle—norm cascading. According to the SRSG,
he influenced and collaborated with standard-setting bodies beyond the UN machinery,
like the OECD, International Finance Corporation (IFC), International Standard
Organization (ISO), UNCITRAL (investor-state arbitration rules), and the European
Union. As well, professional organizations, such as the International Bar Association,
incorporated UNGPs provisions into a Practical Guide for business lawyers.206 All these
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are an indication of the UNGPs’ norm cascading effects. The OECD incorporated CR2R
into its 2011 revised Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises (OECD MNE). It is
noteworthy that before 2011, the OECD MNE lacked a human rights chapter.207 Also, the
International Standard Organization aligned the human rights chapter of its social
responsibility standard (ISO 2006) with the UNGPs.208 Indeed, the UNGPs has influenced
human rights developments in different fields, including transnational human rights
litigation,209 international investment law,210 trade,211 and labour law.212
Karin Buhmann notes that the key to the institutionalization (norm cascade) of the
UNGPs’ norm is the legitimacy of the process through which it was developed.213 She
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argues that the SRSG used a reflexive process to promote the UNGPs. Reflexivity,
according to her, is “a process oriented legal theory and regulatory strategy which counts
on multi-stakeholder development of norms through exchanges that allow stakeholders to
learn about the needs or expectations of other social groups or stakeholders.”214 Karin
Buhmann’s characterization of the exchange between stakeholders (businesses, civil
societies, and governments) reflects the interactional theory discussed in Part II above.215
The UNGPs relied on a relational process that allowed stakeholders to exchange
information and influence one another in the process of building shared expectations about
the appropriate behavior of states and corporations in business and human rights context.216
The architectural design of the UNGPs is also influential for its cascading effect.
As stated in chapter 1, the SRSG designed the UNGPs to be a smart mix of regulation,
oscillating between public law (international law for states) and private law (domestic law
for MNCs).217 This framework, which Buhmann characterized as “Transnational Business
Governance Interactions,” recognizes the relationship between states and organizations
created by states—non-state actors.218 However, the UNGPs’ approach goes beyond the
stakeholders’ relations because it constructs a polycentric governance system that guides
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the relations between two systems of governance—private and public—which has
previously been kept in water-tight compartments in international law.219 Unlike the UN
Sub- Committee’s Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and other
Business Enterprises with regards to Human Rights,220 the SRSG, with the help of his team,
was able to promote the UNGPs beyond the norm emergence stage by creating sharedvalues among stakeholders in business and human rights context. He also created a flexible
regulatory process that transcends traditional systems of governance. Indeed, it has been
noted that
[t]he UN Framework was accepted [by the UN Council] partly due
to the innovative and inclusive multi-stakeholder process, partly
because the insistence by the SRSG to refer to it as a ‘policy
framework’ although in effect much of its contents has a soft law
character. The novel transnational business governance framework
offered by this approach allowed for agreement [by states] across
past antagonism and across the intellectual and political boundaries
of state-centrist international law.221
It is important to distinguish between two non-state actors—NGOs and Business
Associations—that the SRSG employed. Traditionally, an NGO is a not-for-profit social
organization that is independent of the state where it is created.222 NGOs differ in political
goals and strategies. They can either work in the interest of close-group members, grassroot
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movements, or general advocacy groups focusing on issues like the environment, human
rights, and climate.223 Industry Associations, on the other hand, are also not-for-profit
organizations but they act as service providers and political voices for their for-profit
members.224 Their structures differ from NGOs because unlike NGOs that rely on
donations and grants, business associations are clubs with access restricted to corporate
members paying fees and expecting services in return.225 Due to their close ties with an
industry, business associations can mediate between two companies, act as a voice for
companies in an industry, and be a lobby group for its members in the international
arena.226
The major differences between business associations and NGOs relate to their size,
and scope of interest. While the membership of an NGO is not limited by artistic or
business affiliation, membership of business associations is restricted to companies in a
shared industry.227 Also, while NGOs represent a range of interests, and may sometimes
serve as political or social groups business associations are often restricted to the concerns
of their members, without necessarily representing any general political or social interest.
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However, NGOs and business associations are subject to the same concerns, which include
management transparency, legitimacy, internal competition, and public organizations and
institutions.228
However, large western-based NGOs that Mutua calls International Nongovernmental Organizations (INGOs) share striking similarities with business associations
because of their influence in policy debates, 229 and their potential to further the interests
of their members or the states in which they are registered or incorporated—this speaks to
absence of their neutrality. Specifically, in their relationship with (western) states, INGOs,
like business associations or large businesses, may play an active or passive role in support
of a western state’s ideology. For example, Amnesty International has been criticized for
its refusal to condemn South Africa’s Apartheid because “the biggest economic and
political supporter of the criminal apartheid regime in South Africa was the British
government, followed by the United States government.”230 In effect, both businesses and
INGOs may show bias for an ideology or political agenda that may be state-driven.231
Therefore, it may be difficult to draw a bright line between transnational networks—
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business associations and INGOs—and states because, sometimes, they may share the
same economic or political agenda or ideology.232
The UNGPs is presently diffusing among several states, corporations, intergovernmental and standard-setting organizations.233 For example, some countries have
published National Action Plans (NAPs) to implement the provisions of the UNGPs.234
The United Kingdom and the Netherlands are the first two countries to develop NAPs in
2013, two years after the UN endorsement of the UNGPs.235 This is significant at the norm
cascading stage because both countries are homes to MNCs that have been accused of
human rights violations in developing countries, including Nigeria.236 In quick succession,
Denmark, Finland, Lithuania, Sweden, Norway, Colombia, and Switzerland published
their NAPs in 2014, 2015, and 2016.237 Other countries that have done so include Italy, the
USA, Germany, France, Poland, Spain, Belgium, Chile, the Czech Republic, Ireland,
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Luxemburg, Republic of Slovenia, Kenya, and Thailand.238 The number of countries that
have implemented the UNGPs represents a “critical mass of states,” as Finnemore and
Sikkink put it.239 It is also important to note that most of the states in this group are from
Europe.
Furthermore, several states have enacted legislation that draw on the UNGPs’ due
diligence provisions. For example, the United Kingdom enacted its Modern Slavery Act in
2015,240 France enacted its Due Diligence Law in 2017,241 Australia enacted the Modern
Slavery Act in 2018,242 and the Netherlands enacted its Dutch Child Labour Due Diligence
Law in 2019.243 The ILO had a Declaration containing provisions on human rights before
the mandate of the SRSG was issued to him244. If anything at all, the SRSG borrowed from
some of the ILO initiatives. He also used the ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles
and Rights at Work as one of the benchmarks against which compliance with human rights
must be measured.245
238
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Beyond legislation, states and organizations have issued guidance to their
corporations at home and abroad. For example, a Chinese mining association affiliated with
the Ministry of Commerce advised the overseas operations of its members to “ensure that
all operations shall be in line with the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human
Rights during the entire life-cycle of the mining project”.246 In 2016, the International Bar
Association also issued guidance on what the UNGPs mean for business lawyers.247 The
UNGPs has also influenced developments in the sports industry,248 and private dispute
resolution processes in the form of business and human rights arbitration.249
Beyond state legislation and organizational guidelines, some corporations have also
begun to align their practices with the UNGPs’ recommendations.250 Although it is difficult
to monitor its implementation in the corporate sector, there are discernable patterns of
UNGPs influence on corporations’ attitudes toward respect for human rights. For example,
in 2016, Nestle published its UN Guiding Principles’ Reporting Framework Index of
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Answers.251 The answers reflect the company’s approach to respect for human rights,
especially as it relates to child labour, workers' safety and health, environment, land
acquisition, and access to grievance mechanisms.252 Unilever, in its 2015 Report, states
that the company is applying the UNGPs to underpin its standard of corporate behaviour.253
Also, Coca-Cola’ Policy Statement says: “[w]e strive to respect and promote human rights
in accordance with the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights in our
relationships with our employees, suppliers and independent bottlers.”254 These examples
show the diffusion of the UNGPs beyond UN membership, the institutional sphere of origin
of the UNGPs. The examples signify the cascading effect that the UNGPs is having in
private and public circles. It has been noted that “…if ever we have witnessed a norm
cascade, to quote the constructivists, the last decade surely represents one in the BHR
space.”255
Worthy of note are the activities of Shift, a not-for-profit organization
headquartered in New York, and which comprises experts who promote the provisions of
the UNGPs among corporations so they may build a culture of business practice where
human dignity is respected.256 Ruggie was the Chairman of the Board of Trustees of this
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NGO. Members and co-founders of the Organization, including Rachel Davis, John F
Sherman, and Caroline Rees, were active participants in the drafting of the UNGPs.257 Shift
works closely with MNCs, governments, trade unions, and intergovernmental
organizations to develop a reporting framework and to translate the UNGPs into realitychanging practices. In effect, they are a part of institutions that promote the work of the
SRSG after the completion of his six-year mandate.
Educational institutions are also playing a strategic role in norm diffusion. For
example, Harvard Business School contributes to the promotion of the UNGPs. Apart from
engaging with the debates during the drafting of the UNGPs, through its Business and
Human Rights Clinics, the school embarks on projects and research to bridge the business
and human rights gap.258 In fact, the Harvard Kennedy School of Government received
grants to facilitate research during the mandate of the SRSG.259 Also, a Teaching and
Business and Forum was established by Adjuncts at Columbia University which now
includes members from institutions around the world.260 The educational activities that
these institutions undertake promote continuous learning, which is an important component
of norm diffusion.
The SRSG attributes the diffusion of the CR2R norm to the distributed network
strategy that he employed.261 The transnational network includes mainly constituted
international agencies beyond the UN, like the OECD, ISO, IFC, the European
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Commission, and FIFA, who served as norm agents.262 Ruggie argues that the advantage
of using these agents is that they spread norms faster and more widely than they would
ordinarily spread.263 This strategy validates Acharya’s identification of the moral
cosmopolitan aspect of the theory of norm diffusion.
As noted in Part II, the moral cosmopolitanism theory of norm diffusion, as opposed
to the congruence theory, focuses on the propagation and promotion of “universal” moral
norms by transnational actors either through agencies like states or transnational networks
like NGOs.264 The SRSG’s cosmopolitan approach to the cascading of the UNGPs may be
limited if a congruence approach that emphasizes the role of local actors and prior local
norms in the same process is not properly acknowledged and accommodated. Acharya’s
congruence theory tells us that to gain legitimacy among local actors and weak African
states, the UNGPs must fit into pre-existing local norms and culture. In other words, a
congruence approach to the CR2R norm is important if the UNGPs is to reach the last stage
of the norm cycle—internalization. The reframing of the CR2R as a localized or subsidiary
norm is important because of the shortcomings of the process of its formulation and its
scope as a norm. As discussed in Chapter 1, these weaknesses are highlighted by scholars,
local communities, and NGOs. They are further elaborated in the next chapter.
3.4.

Conclusion
This chapter’s focus on Finnemore and Sikkink’s theory of the norm cycle,

specifically the characteristics of each stage of the cycle—norm emergence, norm cascade,
norm internalization, and the conditions that cause a norm to proceed from one stage to
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another—points out also that these theorists fail to explain why and how norms diffuse. As
discussed, this gap is filled in by resort to the theory of norm diffusion. The theory
highlights that norm diffusion is both cosmopolitan and one of congruence. The former
emphasizes transnational networks, and the latter focuses on the influence of local actors
and local norms on norm diffusion. The discussion highlights that congruence is expressed
in localization and subsidiarity and emphasizes that these are significant regarding
local/domestic contestation and/or support for assuring the legitimacy of international
norms or rejecting them as such.265 The application of these ideas to the development of
the UNGPs’ norm of corporate responsibility to respect (CR2R) allowed me to establish
that the efforts of the SRSG, Ruggie with his team as norm entrepreneurs, advanced the
universalization of the CR2R norm, which is presently cascading. This chapter also
classified the SRSG’s norm diffusion strategy as cosmopolitan, not one of congruence, and
noted that a congruence approach would better enhance the legitimacy of the CR2R norm
and tip it more quickly towards norm internalization. This implies that the congruence
approach has greater potential to minimize the impact of local actors/norms as “disruptors”
and enhance their roles as “supporters” of the CR2R norm.
The next chapter draws on insights from the congruence approach to interpret the
CR2R norm. It emphasizes the significance of a bottom-up approach to its diffusion and
shows that failure to do so may well have been the missing link in its internalization after
a decade of its endorsement by the United Nations Human Rights Council. Chapter 4
focuses on how the prior local African norm of Ubuntu can aid the interpretation of the
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CR2R norm and localize it to drive a shared understanding between local farmers in the
Global South and Executive Directors in the Global North.
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Chapter 4: Localizing the UNGPs—An Afrocentric Approach to Interpreting the
CR2R Norm
Part I
4.0. Afrocentrism
This chapter presents an alternative epistemic analysis of the corporate responsibility to
respect human rights (CR2R) norm. It applies the norm diffusion theory discussed in
chapter 3. Methodologically, it shifts away from discussing the UNGPs via formal
governance and institutionalized structures, to engage with literature on business ethics,
sociology, and grassroots socio-cultural movements in order to present a constructive
perspective to the UNGPs. The constructivist approach enables a reconstruction of the
UNGPs as a set of “pluriversal” normative principles that are nourished from diverse
perspectives via intercultural exchanges.1 This imperative is what Jutta Brunnée & Stephen
Toope capture in their observation that “…without a deep engagement in diversity, without
robust interaction, law cannot be created in international society.” 2
The chapter is inspired by the views of social constructivists who believe that
grassroot norms can transform, influence, and change the global Eurocentric narrative
regarding norm diffusion, namely, a handing down from the top (Global North) to Third
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World Peoples. These scholars, including Acharya,3 Dunford,4 Bettiza and Dionigi,5
Merry,6 and Levitt and Merry,7 argue that the process of norm diffusion must be
decolonized and democratized to include the voices of local communities in the shaping of
a norm.8 They reject a norm diffusion theory carried by the wisdom of a white-male
saviour, thus challenging the West-centric story in which Western values are the
“normative referent in world politics.”9
Throughout this chapter, this thesis focus on Pillar II of the UNGPs because it
embodies the CR2R norm. This thesis offers a plausible reinterpretation of the CR2R norm
through Acharya’s localization technique discussed in chapter 3. Reframing the CR2R
norm is important because it helps the norm to: (1) gain local legitimacy among Third
World Peoples, especially in local communities in Africa; (2) re-order the economic
imbalance that a dominant interpretation of the C2R2 norm perpetuates in Third World
countries; and (3) re-write the story of international human rights norm-making which sees
non-western traditions and philosophies as non-existent or non-influential to support
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human rights norms. In sum, this chapter constructs an alternative normative version of the
CR2R norm that the UNGPs promote, albeit through an Afrocentric lens.
In normative terms, this chapter examines how an Afrocentric interpretation of the
CR2R norm can contribute to a relational system where corporations participate in host
communities in Africa. It argues that an Afrocentric approach adequately responds to the
historical reality, and the political and socio-economic needs of Africa. In effect, this
chapter proffers African solutions to African socio-economic and human rights issues.10
But to be clear, this thesis does not discard other (for example, western or Asian) views.
Rather, it reflects on them through Africa’s socio-cultural lens to construct its pluriversal
worldview. The aim is to show how a local norm (Ubuntu) can support and influence the
interpretation of the CR2R norm to move from conceptions of “do no harm” to “do good.”
The use of the localization technique enables me to argue that an analysis of the African
philosophy of Ubuntu (dignity of persons) further clarifies MNCs’ responsibility to respect
human rights under the UNGPs.11 This perspective is important because to gain local
legitimacy, which enhances the prospects of promotion and enforcement by state and nonstate actors, the CR2R norm must be intelligible in a local idiom.12 It is only when a version
of the CR2R norm is supported by local norms that the CR2R norm can be internalized.
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It is also important to clarify the analytical scope of Afrocentrism and Ubuntu as
used in this chapter. This thesis does not argue that MNCs should not make a profit as is
often the case.13 Rather it argues that making a profit should not be the only goal of MNCs,
especially in situations where members of the community in which they operate wallow in
poverty and environmental degradation. In effect, profit maximation should not be at the
expense of host communities. The current interpretation of the CR2R norm seems to
suggest that MNCs can make a profit so far as they do not infringe on the rights of
community members. Meyersfeld argues that “the current international law regime
identifies certain socio-economic rights as human rights; however, an accumulation of the
violation of the rights to water, to health, to housing or justice, - we call this ‘poverty.’ Yet
poverty is not considered a human rights violation or a breach of international law.”14
Ubuntu recognizes how poverty can reduce human dignity. Therefore, this thesis examines
how an Ubuntu interpretation of “respect for human rights” as conceived by the UNGPs,
will not only prevent human rights breaches, but also promote human rights.
Ubuntu can both be a constitutive and restraining norm. It is constitutive when it
prescribes an Ubuntu-like behavior. In this sense, the actions of actors are judged against
Ubuntu values that are intersubjectively held among Africans. For example, a behavior
may be judged as Ubuntu-like if it promotes human flourishing. Thus, the constitutive
contents of Ubuntu prescribe the character traits that a person should exhibit to be adjudged
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as an Ubuntu person.15 Ubuntu as a constraining norm prevents actors from exhibiting
behaviours that may jeopardize Ubuntu values. For example, Ubuntu prescribes a relational
framework where everyone looks out for the other. Therefore, Ubuntu values, if complied
with, constrains behaviours based on self-interest because actions that exhibit greed are
abandoned for those that promote the interest of others.
This thesis adopts both the constitutive and constraining aspects of Ubuntu. Ubuntu
does not only prescribe that a company should do no harm (a constraining norm). It also
prescribes that a company should do good (a constitutive norm). The thesis uses these
approaches to determine whether the CR2R norm contains these two interpretations. If the
answer to this query is positive, it means that the CR2R norm is congruent with a social
norm in Africa. Since this thesis argues that the CR2R norm does not go far enough as
would Ubuntu, it argues that the CR2R is partly congruent with Ubuntu. Therefore, this
chapter attempts to reframe the CR2R norm in Ubuntu terms.
The pursuit of this theme is divided into five parts in this chapter. Part 2 generally
examines the term Afrocentrism and its relevance to discussing matters related to Africans.
It explores the characteristics of Afrocentrism and its importance for constructing an
alternative worldview, notwithstanding the dominant (global) narrative. Part 3 examines
the Afrocentric philosophy of Ubuntu, its meaning and relevance in Africa. It identifies
Ubuntu as a social norm that applies in different sectors of activity, including management,
education governance, and law. It also discusses other characteristics of Ubuntu which
show that individuals (and, indeed, corporations) are relational beings who should promote
human dignity. Part 4 explains why the CR2R norm should be localized in Africa through
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Ubuntu. It argues that Ubuntu is an example of a local norm through which corporations
can fulfil their commitments to the CR2R norm. Part 5 examines how to use existing
channels—human rights initiatives and structures, legislation, and company policy
statements—to interpret the CR2R norm through Ubuntu. It also demonstrates how Ubuntu
could be used to interpret the CR2R norm, using a case study. To conclude, the chapter
emphasizes that a local norm like Ubuntu has the potential to support the CR2R norm.
Therefore, scholars must continue to devise creative ways to rewrite and re-interpret the
global narrative of the CR2R norm. Proceeding on the footing that the norm, as presently
constituted, must not be taken as an end in itself, this thesis is conceived as a modest
beginning to an unfolding journey onto a fresh normative landscape regarding the
regulation of corporate conduct by all actors.
Part II
4.1. Afrocentrism—Nature and Characteristics
Afrocentrism refers to a mode of analysis where Africans seek to assert subject place within
the context of African history and culture.16 It is a paradigm dedicated to “validating,
regenerating, creating, and perpetuating African life and living, informed by an African
perspective or world outlook.”17 Afrocentrism seeks to free African studies from
Eurocentric hegemony on scholarship, and thus present an alternative worldview through
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which Africa can be studied.18 Afrocentrism is not a universal perspective because it
recognizes the validity of other non-hegemonic perspectives—Asia-centered, Americacentered, and even Europe-centered in its non-dominant form.19 In sum, Afrocentrism
offers the opportunity to look at the world from a non-dominant perspective in order to
better understand our diversified and multicultural universe.20
The word “Afrocentric” was first coined by Du Bois in the early 1960s to describe
the subject matter of his project, Encyclopedia Africana.21 However, Afrocentrism's
contemporary meaning comes from Molefi Kete Asante22 who sees it as a “mode of thought
and action…placing African people in the center… [and] enshrining the idea that blackness
itself is a trope of ethics.”23 Asante argues that human beings cannot divest themselves of
culture; they are either participating in their historical culture or that of some other group.
The Afrocentric school of thought, rather than embrace Eurocentric dominance, promotes
an African viewpoint in the rendering of historical and cultural world events. In effect,
Afrocentrism is an intellectual exercise aimed at breaking global narratives by putting
African people at the center of the narrative.24
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Afrocentrism shares similar ideologies with other African movements like PanAfricanism, because it promotes a philosophical understanding of African culture, history,
and politics in the liberation of Africans from colonial and neo-colonial ideologies.25
Although Afrocentrism is criticized for trying to replace Eurocentricity in its hegemonic
form,26 Afrocentrists deny this charge. In their view, Afrocentrism only pushes for the
interpretation of matters concerning Africans through an African socio-cultural and
historical

lens.27

In

effect,

Afrocentrism

dethrones

Eurocentric

philosophical

interpretations in matters relating to Africans.28 It embraces a multi-cultural approach
rather than a universal or hegemonic interpretation of the history and culture of nonAfricans.29 This thesis adopts Afrocentrism’s multicultural approach to norm creation.30 It
is from this viewpoint that Part II, next, examines the Afrocentric philosophy of Ubuntu.
In so doing, it situates Africans at the center of the CR2R norm-building discourse to
examine what a CR2R norm might mean to them in Ubuntu terms.
Part III
4.2. The African Philosophy of Ubuntu
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Ubuntu is a pan-African philosophy that emphasizes being human through other
people—relationality .31 It is aptly reflected in the phrase, “I am because of who we all
are,” or “I am human because I belong, I participate, I share.”32 These translate into a
popular Zulu saying “Umuntu ngumuntu ngabantu.”33 Ubuntu rests on such core values as
humanness, caring for human beings, sharing, respect for human beings, respect for human
dignity and human life, compassion, hospitality, interdependence, interconnectivity, and
communalism.34 These values reflect themes that include respect for persons, community,
personhood, and morality.35 Regardless of social status, gender, or race, persons are
recognized, valued, and accepted for their own sake.36 This is because a person is the
cornerstone of a community.37 Therefore, anything that undermines, hurts, threatens, and
destroys human beings is not accommodated in the Ubuntu worldview because community
and personhood are intricately intertwined. If one person maltreats or disrespects another,
other members of society can intervene or remind the perpetrator of the victim’s dignity
and the necessity to uphold the value of a human being in society.38
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The foregoing reflects the centrality of communalism, interdependence, solidarity,
and dignity in the construction of Ubuntu.39 Nkodo notes that “Ubuntu advocates...express
commitment to the good of the community in which their identities were formed, and a
need to experience their lives as bound up in that of their community.”40 A successful
person (whether natural or artificial) must recognize that their success is from the
community and must seek to live harmoniously and share with others.41 Therefore, society
is inbalanced where individuals profit at the expense of others, or do not share their success
to help others within the community.42 In sum, Ubuntu frowns on “exporting” wealth from
one community to another because each community is a source of wealth that must be
distributed to benefit all its members—distributive justice.43 It is arguable that those who
take the risk to make wealth should enjoy the proceeds of their risk. However, Ubuntu
prescribes that it is in the sharing that joy and happiness is derived because Ubuntu
preaches that no one should lack.44
Ubuntu is expressed differently in different African languages because its
etymological root is found in African proverbs.45 Nkonko Kamwangamalu, using a
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sociolinguistic approach, found that Ubuntu is expressed in different countries including
Gimuntu (giKwese, Angola), Bomoto (iBobangi, Congo), Umundu (Kikuya, Kenya),
Vumuntu (ShiTsonga, Mozambique), and Bunmuntu (kiSukuma, Tanzania).46 Other
similar concepts include Ubunwe (Kinyarwanda, Rwanda), Hunwe (Shona, Zimbabwe),
umoja (Swahili, Kenya, Tanzania, and Zanzibar), ubawananyina (Bemba, Zambia),
pamodzi (Malawai), al takafol al egtma’ ey (Arabic, Egypt, Libya, Morocco, Tunisia,
Sudan, Algeria), Ku tchew (Cameroon),47 igwebuike (Igbo, Nigeria), Agbajowo la fin soya
(Yoruba, Nigeria).48 These examples show that Ubuntu finds expression in almost all
languages in Africa. The expansive literary interpretations demonstrate that the application
of Ubuntu is not limited to Southern Africa.
Ubuntu has social and economic influence in Africa because it seeks to prevent
economic relations that produce harmful poverty by depriving others of the essential means
of survival.49 It regards the essential means of survival, such as land and labour, as universal
communal resources that must be accessible to all members of the community.50 Vilikazi
refers to Ubuntuism as the foremost priority in all conduct.51 According to him,
the value, dignity, safety, welfare, health, beauty, love, and
development of the human being and respect for the human being
are to come first, and should be promoted to the first rank before all
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other considerations, particularly, in our time, before economic,
financial, and political factors are taken into consideration.52
Therefore, an individual is both the subject and object of duties and obligations
because of the interconnectivity between personhood and society.53 In sum, Ubuntu
philosophy, although expressed differently in different African languages, emphasizes the
importance of persons in community. It seeks the good of all members of a community and
requires group solidarity to work toward achieving this common goal. The requirement is
that each member of the group must align their self-interest with the ultimate realization of
the community’s needs, seeing that it is only in the realization of community goals that
their personal goals are fulfilled.54 In effect, Ubuntu espouses ideas of communalism with
an emphasis on social responsibility.55
Ubuntu’s values of communalism, solidarity, and interrelatedness may also find
expression in western ideologies,56 such as in Rousseau’s postulation that individual
interests must be in submission to the general will;57 Hegel’s view that the same must be
in unqualified submission to state institutions;58 Karl Marx’s view that communism and
socialism together are an alternative to capitalism.59 A feminist relational theory is also
similar to Ubuntu because they share similar values on the interdependence of human

52

Vilikazi, ibid at 70.
Etieyebo, supra note 43 at 140.
54
Indeed, Martin Luther King, Jr noted that “[a]n individual has not started living until he (or she) can rise
above the narrow confines of his individual concerns to the broader concerns of all humanity.” See Sharon
Griffin, Ubuntu: The Virtue of Being Fully Human (Durban: Institute of Current World Affairs Letters, 1995)
at 3.
55
Ibid at 1.
56
A Shutte, “The Ubuntu Project” (Paper presented at the 22nd Congress of Philosophical Society of
Southern Africa, Durban, University Natal, July 1994) [unpublished].
57
See generally Patrick Riley, “A Possible Explanation of Rousseau’s General Will” (1970) 64:1 The
American Political Science Review 86.
58
Jeffrey Church, Infinite Autonomy: The Divided Individual in the Political Thought of GWH Hegel and
Friedrich Nietzche (Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2012) at 57.
59
Karl Marx & Frederick Engels, Manifesto of the Communist Party (Chicago: Kerr & Co, 1848).
53

185

beings and connection to the environment.60 Thus, “[i]t would be ethnocentric and silly to
suggest that the Ubuntu ethic of caring and sharing is uniquely African. After all, the values
which Ubuntu seeks to promote can also be traced in various Eurasian philosophies.”61
However, Ubuntu and western philosophies have different origins. Communism,
socialism, fascism, and social democracy have been characterized as “western
humanism”— a sense of humanity or self-worth that is developed by the intellect, science,
and technology.62 Ubuntu, on the other hand, is an African form of humanism that has a
religious connotation and origin.63
Similarly, Ubuntu’s notion of the dignity of persons has limited expression in the
corpus of human rights. The preamble to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
(UDHR) speaks of the inherent dignity, equality, and inalienable rights of all members of
the human family.64 Human dignity may be the basis for upholding human rights. Beyond
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this, however, Ubuntu protects the intrinsic value of being human.65 And to the extent that
dignity of persons means autonomy, self-fulfillment, and individualism outside the
community, Ubuntu deviates from the corpus of human rights thought. This is because, in
the Ubuntu conception of dignity, human beings emanate from the network of relationships
in a community.66
So then, though Ubuntu’s ideals may be expressed in other western traditions and
philosophies that preach compassion, warmth, kindness, understanding, humanness, and
sharing,67 its interdependence (communalism) values have a distinct and unique cultural
and religious meaning to Africans, which can be described as a social norm.68 This thesis
describes Ubuntu as a norm because though there are cases of violence, corruption, and
intolerance in Africa,69 Ubuntu represents a cultural ideal that most Africans strive to
achieve.70 In other words, “Ubuntu is both a given and a task or desideratum in African
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societies.”71 This is why Renee Caprari sees the recent xenophobia in South Africa as “unAfrican and a violation of the spirit of Ubuntu.”72
Ubuntu is not only a social norm, but it also contains normative values that
influence constitutional and human rights interpretations in some countries.73 For example,
the landmark case of S v Makwanyane in South Africa reinforces it as such.74 The South
African Constitutional Court declared capital punishment unconstitutional, among other
grounds, because of its lack of compassion, and respect for dignity and solidarity. The
Court noted that South African society must reflect Ubuntu values and since capital
punishment does not reflect them, it ought to be abolished.75 Also, in Barkhuizen v Napier,
the same court, per Ngcobo J, held that South African public policy is influenced by
Ubuntu.76 The Constitutional Court further recognizes Ubuntu as a standard to uphold in
dealing with foreigners.77 South African Courts have also linked Ubuntu to restorative
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justice and Truth and Reconciliation practices.78 In a restorative justice context, Ubuntu
emphasizes virtues that include forgiveness, reconciliation, and truthfulness.79
Beyond the judicial landscape in South Africa, Ubuntu has been judicially
recognized and asserted in other African jurisdictions.80 For example, the Uganda High
Court in Solvatori Abuki v Attorney General confirmed the application of Ubuntu to
communities in Uganda.81 The court rejected the argument that Ubuntu is confined to South
Africa or any other group because Ugandan communities recognize Ubuntu. Also, the
Lesotho High Court in Mokoena v Mokoena

82

referred to Ubuntu in a case where the

applicants sought to dispossess the widow of their deceased brother of the land he left
behind under Lesotho’s customary law of succession. In a way that shows the importance
of Ubuntu in fostering solidarity and respect for human dignity, the court held that
[t]he widow has a customary law right to expect her late husband's
relatives to protect her and the property that her husband left her
with…It is contrary to Basotho culture, good conscience and a sense
of what is right in the African sense -that applicant should be
attempting to deprive the widow of her house and arable lands
(masimo). It is not botho or Ubuntu to dispossess a widow.83
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As a contribution to human rights and constitutional law scholarship, Ubuntu has
also been used to justify a constitutional interpretation of human rights to water in
Namibia.84 Ndjodi Ndeunyema argues that to solve the problems of water scarcity in
Namibia, courts must purposively interpret the Namibian constitution. He argues that
although everyone should have a right to safe and clean water in Namibia, the right to water
is not included in the Namibian constitution. Using Ubuntu, he contends that the right to
water could be implied from the interpretation of the right to life as stated in Article 6 of
the Namibian constitution.85 Ndeunvana justifies this argument on the basis that African
normative values animate the foundational principles of the Namibian constitution.
Therefore, a purposive interpretation of the constitution will include considerations of
Ubuntu which imposes a duty on the state to provide water in the fulfilment of its socioeconomic obligations to its citizens.86 In effect, Ndeunvana claims that the right to water
can be implied as a socio-economic dimension of the right to life through Ubuntu. It is
important to note that Ndeunvana suggests that Ubuntu is part of African customary law,87
a claim that points to its normative influence as a source of interpreting human rights and
constitutional rights outside South Africa.
Therefore, Ubuntu is Africa’s worldview of social relations—a social and
humanistic ethic.88 It is an “…African ethical concept, a way of life, an authentic mode of
being African, an individual ideal, the appropriate public spirit, a definition of life itself,
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and the preferred manner of conducting public and private business.”89 Ubuntu is important
in Africa because it is “the foundation and the edifice of African philosophy,”90 the
foundation of “African communal cultural life,”91 and a “unifying factor, bringing people
together regardless of their background or access to wealth.”92 As a social norm, Ubuntu
does not only apply to individuals. It also applies to institutions (MNCs) that have formal
decision-making structures.93 The composition or corporate structure of a company (as
state-owned enterprises or Africans in management positions in foreign-owned companies)
is irrelevant to determining whether a company should speak Ubuntu. To give credence to
the structure or nomenclature of a company in determining who should be Ubuntucompliant is akin to arguing that only particular individuals, for example, based on their
gender, should be the only ones to inculcate Ubuntu values. In effect, local, foreign-owned,
and state-owned enterprises are all subject to Ubuntu values.94
Bearing in mind the meaning and normative relevance of Ubuntu in Africa, Part
IV, next, examines the importance of reframing the CR2R norm through an Ubuntu lens.
It identifies the reasons for this reframing: (1) to increase the norm’s intelligibility in Africa
by clarifying and contextualizing the meaning of the term “respect” as used in Pillar II; (2)
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to fill the ethical gap in its interpretation; (3) by its Ubuntu-inspired interpretation, to
insulate CR2R from the critique that the norm’s scope is narrow because it only encourages
MNCs to avoid infringing human rights without prescribing positive obligations. The
overall argument advanced is that reframing the CR2R norm in Ubuntu terminology may
be a modest way to influence corporate conduct in Africa, and beyond.
Part IV
4.3. Localizing the CR2R Norm Through Ubuntu
The interpretation of the UNGPs, especially pillar II, is a subjective exercise.95
Therefore, by way of a localization theory, it is possible to contextually interpret the CR2R
norm. In a view similar to Acharya’s congruence theory, Gaby Aguilar notes that
localization is a “strategic framework for prompting the normative development of human
rights from the bottom up.”96 It is a process where research recognizes the local need for
human rights to inspire the re-interpretation or elaboration of human rights. Koen De Feyter
also notes that localization “implies taking human rights needs as formulated by local
people (in response to the impact of economic globalization in their lives) as the starting
point for both the further interpretation and elaboration of human rights norms and the
development of human rights action, at all levels, ranging from domestic to global.”97
Pillar II refers to MNCs’ responsibility to respect human rights norms as contained
in international legal instruments, including the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
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the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), and eight ILO core
conventions as set out in the Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work.98
From the list of the instruments, it could be gleaned that the benchmark for measuring
compliance with the CR2R norm is contemporary human rights norms, including those on
civil, political, labour, social, cultural, and economic rights.
These human instruments are broadly classified as those containing positive and
negative rights.99 For example, the ICCPR contains negative rights—that is, rights that
require others to abstain from actions that interfere with individual liberties and political
freedoms.100 Similarly, the IECSR contains positive rights—that is, rights that require
others to actively contribute to the realization of human rights by providing basic
necessities of life, including access to housing, food, and education.101 However, there is a
debate about whether civil and political rights should have priority over economic and
social rights.102 The debate may be unnecessary because both positive and negative rights
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can complement each other.103 This is because human rights are interrelated,
interdependent, and indivisible.104
Pillar II’s framing of the CR2R norm mirrors a language that denotes negative
rights because it states that MNCs have a responsibility to prevent human rights abuse
through their actions or relationships with third parties. However, scholars have criticized
this framing. Some scholars like Daniel Aguirre and Olivier De Schutter, explore the
possibility of using human rights norms contained in instruments like the IECSR to extend
the scope of the CR2R norm.105 The underlying argument is that human rights cannot be
enjoyed in the absence of basic necessities of life which include rights to education,
housing, food, clothing, health, and freedom from hunger.106 Therefore, MNCs have a duty
to promote the realization of basic rights. The enjoyment of these rights, especially in
Africa, is considered paramount in living a dignified life.107 For example, Danwood Chirwa
and Nojeem Amodu point to the need to extend the scope of the CR2R norm using the
ISECR.108 They argue that MNCs have a responsibility to promote human rights when the
CR2R norm is read together with the IECSR.
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Similarly, David Bilchitz argues that the CR2R norm should not only mean a
negative duty to avoid infringing on human rights; it should also include a positive
obligation to fulfill human rights—that is, to contribute to the realization of fundamental
human rights.109 He argues that the failure of the SRSG to express the CR2R norm in
positive terms makes the UNGPs’ framework “fundamentally incomplete.”110
Chirwa, Amodu, and Bilchitz are not alone in their proposal and critique of the
CR2R norm. Scholars like Florian Wettstein,111 Denis Arnold,112 and Wesley Cragg,113
maintain the same position. Wettstein argues that the interpretation of the CR2R norm
should not mean that MNCs only have a “minimalist” obligation not to infringe human
rights; it should also be interpreted to mean that MNCs have obligations to take proactive
and positive steps towards the protection and realization of human rights. 114 Arnold, like
Chirwa and Amodu, refers to the obligations of MNCs to provide basic rights under IESCR
and argues that the content of the CR2R norm is vague because it does not fully set out the
responsibilities of MNCs in cases where state laws do not protect human rights. 115 He
argues that MNCs should have the obligation to promote basic human rights.116 Therefore,
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he proposes that the tripartite pillars of the UNGPs should be modified to include MNCs’
obligation to promote basic rights, without which human beings cannot enjoy human
rights.117 Cragg also argues that the foundation of the CR2R norm is “intellectually
unpersuasive.”118 This is because the CR2R norm is based on an appeal to the self-interest
of MNCs and not on any moral or ethical foundation. According to him, MNCs should
fulfil human rights not because of their self-interest, but because of the intrinsic moral and
ethical value of doing so.
While Chirwa, Amodu, and Arnold critique the CR2R norm from the prism of
IESCR and basic rights, Bilchitz, Wettstein, and Cragg critique the norm from the prism
of morality and ethics: that the CR2R norm lacks an ethical and moral foundation by which
to persuade MNCs to prevent human rights abuse and promote human rights. The latter
argument raises the following questions on morality and ethics: how do we define morality,
by what standards should morality be judged, and how do we apply morality in different
geographical contexts? These questions are important because the proposal that MNCs
should undertake positive obligations is not rooted in any social norm that justifies or spell
out the contours of MNCs’ moral duty. The questions can be answered by interpreting the
CR2R through an Ubuntu lens to justify MNCs’ positive obligations in Africa. An Ubuntuinspired interpretation of the norm is important because, as Surya Deva points out, MNCs
“ought to comply with basic moral and legal norms of society in which they operate, for
not doing so will lead to chaos and instability.”119
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This thesis contends that using an Ubuntu lens to interpret the CR2R norm supports
the claim that MNCs should discharge both negative and positive obligations. As stated in
chapter 2, one of the advantages of using soft law that contains vague terms as a tool for
global governance is that it leaves room for reconstruction.120 Therefore, the UNGPs’
wording of the CR2R norm in general terms leaves room to re-interpret the norm through
a localization technique.121 Since social expectation (which differs from one region to the
other) is the basis of the CR2R norm,122 and this thesis has pointed out that Ubuntu is a
social norm, it is safe to conclude that Ubuntu is a tool to reframe and broaden the
normative scope of the CR2R norm in Africa.
First, it is conceded that it is almost impossible to find an exact vocabulary for
Ubuntu in the CR2R norm.123 Admittedly, the CR2R norm was not subjected to this
contextual scrutiny.124 However, when understood that both the CR2R norm and Ubuntu
seek to influence social conduct, it is important to contextually define the social conduct
that would meet the social licence requirement of the CR2R norm in Africa.125 Interpreting
the CR2R norm through Ubuntu also helps to clarify the meaning of “respect” as used in
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the UNGPs, more so because the “respect” terminology is labeled as “confusing” and
“deeply flawed.”126
Altogether, the CR2R norm has been criticized for not fully clarifying the exact
contours of MNCs’ human rights responsibilities,127 Ubuntu’s virtues help to contextualize
the interpretation of the CR2R norm by defining UNGPs’ “respect” terminology
relationally.128 As argued below, it is when the CR2R norm is defined relationally that
MNCs’ commitment to meeting social expectations and obtaining a social licence may be
meaningful in Africa. This is because respect for “human rights mean very little within a
context of mass poverty, unemployment, illiteracy, hunger, marginalization, and the
general lack of basic human needs.”129
Since human rights are rooted in morality,130 reframing the CR2R norm in Ubuntu
terminology provides a moral justification for MNCs' positive duties. Considering
Acharya’s norm localization and grafting techniques discussed in chapter 3, it is possible
to reframe the meaning of the CR2R norm for the benefit of the Third World Peoples in
Africa. One way to do this is to reframe the terminology of “respect” as used in the CR2R
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norm. When the terminology of respect for human rights is interpreted in Ubuntu terms, it
carries a broader human rights obligation beyond a negative responsibility to “do no harm.”
Johann Broodryk gives an insight on the respect terminology in Ubuntu terms.131 He
explains that respect is associated with words like commitment, dignity, and care.132
According to him, respect is the most central theme in the Ubuntu worldview that governs
relationships at different levels of society. This is because human existence is dependent
on goodwill and acceptance from one another.133 Although Broodryk explains the respect
terminology relationally, he does not fully explore the human rights angle. However, his
definition is enough to show that respect in Ubuntu terms carries an obligation and
commitment to care for others’ quality of life.
Thaddeuz Metz explores Ubuntu’s relational framework by conceptualizing the
meaning of respect for human dignity.134 He argues that dignity, which is the foundation
of most human rights claims, is an inherent value in all human beings that commands
respect from others. However, the definition of dignity in Ubuntu is different from the
Kantian philosophy’s meaning of dignity that treats human beings as autonomous.135
Rather, the basis of human dignity in Ubuntu is communality—that is, human beings’
capacity to form communal relationships.136 Metz explains that a person respects the
dignity of others by identifying with them and exhibiting acts of solidarity towards them—
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actions that are borne out of care and concern for the quality of life of others. 137 These
actions create and nurture the capacity of human beings to create friendly and loving
relationships.138 In sum, Metz says a person is “friendly” when they can share an identity
with others and stand in solidarity with them.139
Metz further explains that in Ubuntu terms, respect for human dignity means that a
person has a duty not to impair other people’s capacity to form communal relationships
(negative duty) and also to take steps to act in a friendly way towards others (positive
duty).140 For example, human rights abuses, including slavery and forced labour make
persons who are capable of being friendly become unfriendly. People are unfriendly when
they treat others as a means to an end to accumulate power or wealth for themselves. Those
subjected to inhumane treatments feel less than human beings, which makes them evince
feelings of animosity and ill-will that destroy the capacity for communal relationships.141
Besides acts of omission, Metz points out that respect for human dignity is also
demonstrated by deliberate actions that nurture communal relationships (positive duty).142
This entails empowering other people to encourage them to actualize their capacity to
create and sustain relationships. The provision of food, education, housing, and health care
are some of the examples that Metz cites as forms of empowerment.143 These examples
show that the definition of respect entails the promotion of human flourishing that
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contributes to the socio-economic development in society. Metz classifies these actions as
those that fulfil positive rights because they require aiding deprived persons to fulfil pillars
of Ubuntu, which include communality and solidarity.144
So, when re-interpreted in the business and human rights context, the Ubuntuinspired CR2R norm stipulates that community members should help and defend one
another in cases where anyone's capacity to form a communal relationship is threatened or
abused.145 For example, under the notion of respect for human rights, MNCs will be
required to avoid business practices that promote slavery (as it prevents people from
forming communal relationships) and to promote socio-economic conditions that protect
peoples’ vulnerability to slavery (an action that encourages others to be friendly). The
terminology carries both negative and positive obligations and prescribes commitment, and
not mere responsibility,146 to protect and promote relationships in African societies. This
could be a catalyst for development in an African society because it ensures that everyone
has access to basic human necessities.147 It also has the potential to curb the exploitation of
African markets by MNCs and to make them assume active roles in ensuring individual
welfare as part of society’s welfare.148
Furthermore, since Ubuntu’s definition of “respect” connotes commitment and
duty, an Ubuntu-inspired CR2R norm does not make human rights promotion voluntary

144

Metz, supra note 134 at 312, 309. He notes that solidarity means “roughly enjoying a sense of togetherness
and engaging in cooperative projects.”
145
Mnyaka & Motlhabi, supra note 35 at 219, 227, 228.
146
This is contrary to the CR2R norm. Lopez notes that the term “responsibility” as used in pillar II is does
not denote commitment. See Lopez supra note 109 at 68 (“…the ‘term’ responsibility’ is clearly different
from ‘commitment’ or similar words which require a voluntary act”).
147
Rita Kiki Edozie, Pan Africa Rising: The Cultural Political Economy of Nigeria’s Afri-Capitalism and
South Africa’s Business (London, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017) at 79-80.
148
Ibid at 81

201

because its conception of respect for human rights has obligatory implications.149 A onesided duty to prevent human rights abuse without a corresponding obligation to effectuate
social capacity does not conform with Ubuntu’s values of solidarity. Therefore, Pillar II’s
provision that MNCs “may undertake other commitments or activities to support and
promote human rights…”150 is incongruent with the expectations under Ubuntu.
As pointed out above, the CR2R norm is criticized for being vague.151 Leaving the
norm as vague as it is may be detrimental to the interest of the Third World Peoples.
Clearly, capital flight from the Global South to the Global North is arguably a contributor
to underdevelopment in Africa.152 The UNGPs may have unwittingly legitimized capital
flight because the CR2R norm may be interpreted as only a “baseline expectation” that
asks MNCs not to abuse human rights while transferring wealth to home countries. The
transfer of wealth to MNCs’ home states to the detriment of African host communities
means that African countries may continue to be at the mercy of home countries who
benefit from the profit of MNCs.
However, if the CR2R is defined relationally in Ubuntu terms, it will encourage
MNCs to take active roles in the community to promote human rights because Ubuntu
recognizes wealth-sharing among individuals in a community. This is always found in
expressions like: “if you want to see Ubuntu, you will find it in socialism, it is when we
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are sharing,”153 and “where I live I slaughtered a cow; then all of my neighbours come with
dishes to get meat. It is not their cow, but the meat is for all of us because no one should
be hungry. So, each person will take what they need and we share the meat.”154 Therefore,
MNCs’ relationship with host communities should mean that they contribute positively to
the sustenance of the community that they operate in.155 Obviously, the CR2R norm’s
baseline expectation of “do no harm” does not address the systemic root causes of human
rights abuses in Africa.156
Arguably, it may be unfair to subject MNCs who are not based in Africa or whose
headquarters are outside Africa to an Ubuntu interpretation. It raises the question of
whether MNCs’ compliance with Ubuntu values should be by assimilation or imposition.
This thesis does not support either of these methods because they are similar to the reasons
why TWAIL scholars criticize international law. Adopting these methods would mean that
Afrocentrism is assuming universalism. Rather, this thesis proposes that compliance should
be based on Metz’s concept of shared identification discussed above.157 This stipulates that
MNCs should see themselves as part of the social group in Africa because it is the source
of their operation. Community in this sense means a society formed by relationship and
affinity, and not necessarily by descent.158 So, if MNCS identity with the problems of
poverty, illiteracy, and lack of basic amenities, they would have the (moral) impetus to
153
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stand in solidarity with host communities to eradicate or reduce the economic
impoverishment in society.159
Justifying compliance with Ubuntu based on shared identification is synonymous
with the SRSG’s embedded liberal philosophy that seeks to embed economic actions into
social norms.160 The SRSG’s proposal for synergetic interaction between states, non-state
actors, and MNCs to contain market forces can be locally interpreted through what
Ntibagirirwa calls an Ubuntu economy. An Ubuntu economy is a framework where
everyone, MNCs, states, or individuals synergize efforts to contribute to economic growth
and development. According to Ntibagirirwa, “what one can learn from African values
centered on the community is that what would work to achieve economic development is
not exclusion but the inclusion of all the actors. Accordingly…. in the African context,
what could achieve economic growth and development is the synergy of the state, the
market, and the people. I called this the Ubuntu economy.”161
The relationship in an Ubuntu economy is characterized by collectivism—the
community provides both human and natural resources, while MNCs use social capital to
generate wealth for themselves and other members of the community.162 Each actor relies
on its unique qualities to advance socio-economic development in the community. Indeed,
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Africans “do not see [MNCs’] as legal artefacts but focus on human beings who preside
over organizational activities and should exude Ubuntu.”163 Therefore, the bounded
relationship between states and non-state actors to contain global market forces, as the
SRSG describes it, occurs in an Ubuntu economy.
Interpreting the CR2R norm through Ubuntu is more compelling because of
Africa’s weak state mechanisms compared to developed states.164 MNCs can provide
capacity for local communities to hold governments accountable through Ubuntu’s
communitarian values of solidarity.165 This way, MNCs would indirectly help to create
formidable social pressure for and against states to promote human rights and deliver on
their promise of good governance. When MNCs help with basic amenities like water,
education, and access to good roads, it indirectly empowers individuals to hold their states
accountable for their human rights and socio-economic development obligations.166The
CR2R norm’s positive obligations can also be framed under a stakeholder theory
influenced by Ubuntu.167 A communitarian stakeholder theory states that MNCs should
promote the interest of all actors who are part of the production process.168 Therefore,
MNCs are answerable to different actors in society under a tripartite framework of
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shareholders, host communities, and employees.169 This theory recognizes the
interconnectedness between corporate activities and host communities.170 It focuses on
MNCs’ potential to serve the interest of shareholders and non-shareholders alike.171 Indeed,
John Ruggie, Caroline Rees, and Rachel Davis accept that the UNGPs’ corporate
governance framework veers toward a stakeholder-oriented approach—one under which
MNCs have a multi-fiduciary obligation toward the individual and their community.172
The influence of Ubuntu on a stakeholder model in Africa is described, for example,
by Khomba and Vermaak as having direct impact on business ethics, corporate governance
approaches, and corporate performance of organizations that operate in Africa.173 They
note that corporate systems in the world are influenced by different socio-cultural
frameworks which ultimately underpin their approaches to corporate governance. 174 For
example, North America’s corporate governance structure is influenced by an exclusive
model of shareholder theory, which primarily protects the interests of shareholders.175
Conversely, the African model is influenced by the inclusive stakeholder theory which
aims to satisfy a variety of stakeholder concerns and interests.176 Africa’s stakeholder
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model is influenced by African values, including Ubuntu.177 James Khomba, Rhoda
Bakuwa, and Ella Kangaude-Ulaya agree that under Africa’s socio-cultural framework,
business ethics approaches to corporate governance, and the performance of Africa-hosted
corporations cannot retain their western orientations in these matters.178 This re-orientation
is what an Ubuntu-stakeholder approach to the interpretation of the CR2R norm will
secure—an emphasis and practical observance of a corporate culture that upholds African
social values.179
The next part, first, using the case study from the Democratic of Congo (DRC)
described in Chapter 1, demonstrates how the CR2R norm is insufficient on its own to
promote corporate responsibility, especially as it relates to their due diligence
responsibility. This shows a need to reframe the CR2R norm through an Ubuntu lens. It
then examines how the interpretation of human rights and corporate governance initiatives,
regional instruments, and the UNGPs, can promote an Ubuntu-influenced CR2R norm.
Part V
4.4. “Ubuntulizing” the CR2R Norm—A Reframing Exercise
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The events that unfolded in the DRC show how a supply chain relationship harmed children
working in the “copper belt” mines. Giant technology companies, including Apple, Google,
Tesla, Alphabet, Microsoft, and Dell profited from cobalt that is tainted with human rights
abuse of children.180 The parents of these children filed a class action against the companies
in the United States for aiding and abetting forced labour in the mines.181 The claimants
sought relief based on common law claims of unjust enrichment, negligent supervision,
and intentional infliction of emotional distress on children.
The claimants allege that the defendants breached provisions of the Trafficking
Victims Protection Reauthorization Act (TVPRA) in the United States.182 This statute
provides that any company in the United States that knowingly profits from a “business
venture” involved in child labour or recklessly disregards the use of child labour in its
business venture is liable to a fine or 20 years imprisonment, or both.183 However, the
defendants argue that the arrangement under the supply chain contracts cannot qualify as a
“business venture” to trigger the provisions of the TVPRA. To the defendants, an entire
global supply chain is not a business venture. However, this argument is unsupported by
the defendants’ later argument that they mandate suppliers to commit to a due diligence
framework modeled along with the OECD Guidelines before doing “business” with
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them.184 It is difficult to rationalize the use of HRDD in supply chain contracts when the
defendants argue that there is no “business venture.”
On the other hand, the claimant sought relief based on the doctrine of unjust
enrichment. This relief merits attention because the rationale of the doctrine is similar to
Ubuntu—they both abhor profiting at the expense of others. Under the doctrine, the
plaintiff must prove that: (1) the defendant was enriched; (2) the plaintiff suffered a
corresponding deprivation; and (3) there is an absence of a juristic reason for the
enrichment.185 Similarly, in Ubuntu terms, the MNCs’ will be rebuked for unjustly
enriching themselves at the expense of the children in the mines. However, the defendants
denied having a “requisite” knowledge of the specific human rights abuse in the mines
which would have made them liable for unjust enrichment. This defence is surprising
because the defendants admitted that they knew that forced labour existed in the mining
industry. This thesis will demonstrate how this defence is insufficient in Ubuntu terms
below.
The District Judge dismissed the claimants’ class action on 3rd November 2021.186
It held that the human rights abuse is too remote to ground the defendants’ liability because
the harm is untraceable to the defendants. In dismissing the claim, the court noted that the
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claimants did not show a causal connection between the injuries in the DRC and the
defendants in the United States. The legal analysis of the court’s decision is beyond the
scope of this chapter. Rather, this thesis is concerned about whether the defendants’ action
conforms with the CR2R as a social norm. At first blush, it is arguable that since the
defendants performed HRDD, they complied with the CR2R norm’s baseline expectation
of “do no harm.”
It is important to ask why issues of forced labour arose from the supply chain
relationship despite the defendants’ claim that they performed HRDD. This thesis contends
that this is because of the moral and ethical bankruptcy of the CR2R norm. The norm does
not prescribe any moral or ethical obligation in the performance of the HRDD. An Ubuntuinfluenced CR2R norm described above would have filled this ethical gap because it would
require MNCs to be committed to the HRDD process. The MNCs’ argument that they do
not have the requisite knowledge of the specific situation in the mines shows they are not
committed to upholding human dignity in the mines. This makes their actions fall short of
Ubuntu’s definition of respect for human rights, which includes identifying with the host
communities and standing in solidarity with them.187 Their admission that incidents of child
labour are not uncommon in the mining industry points to their responsibility to investigate,
identify, and mitigate specific risks associated with their supply chain in the DRC. They
adopted a “don’t look, don’t ask” approach in an industry that is prone to human rights
abuse. This approach throws humanism away in the face of huge profits generated from
the business relationship.
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The human rights abuse in the DRC shows how a due diligence exercise could be
reduced to a mere tick-box exercise if it is not rooted in social norms that are based on
relationality. Ubuntu compels members of society to look out for one another. If one person
maltreats or disrespects another, other members of society can intervene or remind the
perpetrator of the victim’s dignity and the necessity to uphold the value of a human being
in society. Interpreting HRDD in this light means that the MNCs, although not directly
involved in human rights abuse, still have the responsibility to ask questions about the
source of the cobalt, investigate the human rights risk before doing business with Congo
Dongfang Mining International (CDM), a 100% owned subsidiary of China-based
Company Ltd (Huayou Cobalt).
The MNCs argue that they should not be burdened with the obligation to inquire
about the source of the cobalt because this would mean that every user of cobalt will also
have the same obligation. However, they downplay the economic resources at their
disposal which put them in a better position to identify and mitigate the risk of doing
business in the mines. They also downplay the leverage they have on suppliers to prevent
human rights abuse. Ubuntu’s relational framework allows MNCs to leverage their
relationship to demand accountability from them.
The MNCs can, in Ubuntu terms, relationally fulfil their CR2R responsibilities on
two levels. First, they can use their leverage in supply chain contracts to prevent human
rights abuses. For example, in 2017, human rights groups, including Amnesty
International, reported the human rights abuses in the DRC mines but the MNCs did not
demand accountability from their suppliers.188 It was not until 2020 that Huayou Cobalt
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announced that it has temporarily stopped sourcing cobalt from two mines in DRC until it
is sure that they are free from human rights abuse.189 Huayou’s decision shows the type of
leverage that MNCs have on suppliers to demand accountability. It also shows that MNCs’
resolve to demand accountability from suppliers is not impossible; it only depends on the
companies’ ethical values
Second, MNCs can promote the right to subsistence in the DRC. The children in
the mines are weak persons who cannot provide for themselves. For example, a policy
report identified poverty, illiteracy, and hunger as causal factors that made children
vulnerable to forced labour in the DRC mines.190 Many of the children who worked at the
mines do so to pay their school fees.191 Others worked at the mines to feed their parents
who are displaced by the miners.192 This situation made children and women vulnerable to
local miners who exploited them. So, what does Ubuntu say about this? Ubuntu requires
MNCs to build social capacity, which includes providing basic amenities like education,
clean water, and small-scale businesses for members of the host communities. By doing
this, they indirectly displace the economic hold that local miners have on children and
women. In effect, MNCs can “do good” if they acknowledge poverty as a factor that makes
people vulnerable to human rights abuses. For example, Huayou Cobalt, as part of its
responsible supply chain obligations, admitted that poverty is one of the reasons for the
human rights abuse in the DRC mines and expressed commitment to support free education
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and offer small loans to small-scale businesses.193 This statement shows that in the face of
poverty and illiteracy, a baseline responsibility for MNCs not to infringe human rights
would not be enough.
The DRC Congo case study shows that the CR2R norm is not sufficient to persuade
MNCs to be responsible in Africa (partly) because it is not hinged on any moral normative
framework. It also shows that, sometimes, MNCs’ discharge of the baseline responsibility
to do no harm may not be sufficient to receive a social licence from the community where
they operate. Therefore, Ubuntu provides an ethical lens through which the CR2R norm
could be interpreted to command both positive and negative responsibilities from MNCs.
The norm on its own cannot initiate or sustain virtues in people; it must also be initiated in
interpersonal relationships outside the reach of laws. An Ubuntu interpretation of the CR2R
norm is hinged on the moral and ethical integrity of individuals behind the corporate veil,
which can support the CR2R norm by emphasizing the embedded relationship between
MNCs and host communities.
4.5. Reframing the CR2R
To implement the CR2R norm through Ubuntu, MNCs must understand principles
of relational ethics in Africa as described in this thesis.194 Without understanding the sociocultural context in which MNCs operate, it will be difficult to operationalize the CR2R
norm through Ubuntu.195 For a perceived socio-cultural gap will not only adversely affect
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corporations’ ability to obtain a social license to operate;196 it also means that there is
continued underdevelopment and social conflict in Africa. In effect, there should be a
balance between profit maximization and socio-economic development as understood in
an Ubuntu economy.197
MNCs can function as members of society—the visible economic faces of a social
system.198 Stavridou and Vangchuay agree that “[i]f there is a social contract regulating
the relationship between individuals, society, and government, a corporation as a natural
person and member of society should be part of that relationship.”199 Therefore, to function
in an Ubuntu economy, MNCs should be part of an embedded relationship in society.200 In
this view, they contribute to social capital and development in host communities.201 This
resonates with the Ubuntu-influenced stakeholder theory proposed in this thesis. A fluid
interpretation of the UNGPs may enable MNCs to adopt an Ubuntu-influenced
interpretation of the CR2R norm.
Principle 16 of the UNGPs, which relates to the operational activities of MNCs,
provides that MNCs should express their commitment to respect human rights through a
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policy statement. This provision allows MNCs to include context-specific human rights
commitments that address host communities’ concerns. Given this, Principle 16 offers an
avenue by which to express MNCs’ commitment to Ubuntu values in various operational
activities affecting human rights, environment, climate change, finance, management,
conciliation, and sustainability.202 In effect, an organizational strategy via which MNCs
may embed Ubuntu in policy statements may potentially set them on the path to obtaining
a social licence from host communities in Africa. Their implementation of such Ubuntuinfluenced policy statements would reflect MNCs’ stance on participatory culture, strategic
planning, management strategy, treatment of their workforce, supply chain contracts, and
interaction with host communities. In sum, MNCs’ policy statements on Ubuntu may
demonstrate their resolve to coexist and consult with host communities as part of their
economic activities in these communities.203
To achieve the foregoing, it must be pointed out that a commitment to HRDD
cannot be over-emphasized in an Ubuntu-influenced interpretation of the CR2R norm. This
stance would ensure that MNCs operating in Africa can make objective assessments, and
adopt unbiased attitudes regarding people’s rights, values, beliefs, and property.204 This
commitment would ensure that they identify potential problems of socio-cultural clashes
in their relations with their host communities. Traditionally, MNCs use due diligence in
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business transactions involving mergers and acquisitions (M&A).205 This is because
merging two companies with different organizational cultures can generate internal rancour
within the new company—a “we” versus “they” relationship.206 The notion and process of
merging two companies can be extrapolated to the relationship between host communities
and MNCs. It stands to reason, therefore, that MNCs must consider how best to integrate
into host communities to prevent living in a relationship of ostracism with them.207
Adopting ethical values embedded in Ubuntu to interpret their obligations under the CR2R
norm will foster harmonious co-existence between MNCs and host communities in Africa.
The HRDD exercise proposed in Pillar II of the UNGPs is one way to create harmony
between rights holders and rights bearers.208 For a stakeholder engagement to acquire a
social licence in Africa, and indeed globally, it should be transparent, fair, and show
genuine concern for the protection and fulfilment of human rights.209 These values are core
tenets of Ubuntu.
Indeed, some scholars, including Oyeniyi Abe, propose that increasing local
community participation is key to the business and human rights agenda.210 Similarly, the
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African Commission on Human and People’s Rights in its Report on how MNCs in the
extractive industry impact the realization of human rights cited lack of genuine consultation
as one of the major causes of human rights abuses in the extractive sector. 211 The
Commission proposed genuine consultation as a means toreduce human rights abuses in
Africa. These proposals point to the need to view and construct meaningful consultations
through Ubuntu’s ethical lens of a shared identity as discussed above. In sum, the
interpretation of the CR2R norm should not only be a legal exercise; it should also be
interpreted through non-legal (social) values.212 Ubuntu is an example of a social value the
adoption of which would enrich the normative content and leverage of the CR2R norm as
an operational obligatory standard of conduct on the part of MNCs.
Regarding their supply chain relationships, through HRDD, MNCs may use their
leverage with supply chain contractors to influence a human rights culture inspired by
Ubuntu.213 Ubuntu supports an operational risk management system that promotes human
dignity within a network of relationships.214 The SRSG and his team acknowledge that
HRDD goes beyond issues of corporate law to a greater concern about relationships among
corporate actors.215 Therefore, MNCs can use their leverage in supply chain relationships
to inspire an Ubuntu-based interpretation of the CR2R norm through their policy
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statements, the impact of which may transcend national boundaries into those jurisdictions
from which the major MNCs operating in Africa originate. Indeed, jurisdictions like the
United Kingdom, Netherlands, France, and Australia have enacted HRDD legislation that
mandates companies to prevent, mitigate, and remedy human rights abuses in their supply
chain relationships.216 Ubuntu interpretations with regard to supply chain relationships
would complement these normative efforts and lay the foundation of domestic HRDD
legislation in Africa.
As earlier discussed, Ubuntu is a source of law with established and developing
jurisprudence in African jurisdictions. Thus, if MNCs disregard its ethical values, this may
be a cause of action in the courts in some jurisdictions.217 Ruggie agrees that noncompliance with the CR2R norm can make MNCs subject to public opinion, or in some
cases, subject to suit before courts of law.218 Apart from securing MNCs’ compliance to
the CR2R norm through non-legal means, strategic litigation inspired by Ubuntu values
can establish an Ubuntu jurisprudence that may inspire Africa courts to rely on local norms
to protect human rights in Africa.219 This proposal creates challenges of its own in view of
corporate legal personality and other corporate law doctrines. Lawyers must rise above
these challenges to forge an Ubuntu human rights jurisprudence to localize a corpus of
human rights jurisprudence that promotes the upholding and respect for the socio-economic
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rights of individuals and communities across Africa.220 It is noteworthy that conversations
about company law reform that promote rather than inhibit human rights protection as part
of business operations are taking place in Europe.221 Unless scholars and human rights
advocates from Africa also pursue corporate law reforms that suit Africa’s socio-economic
context, African states would continue to be norm-takers rather than norm-givers in the
business and human rights discourse.
Glimpses of hope are emerging, however. As discussed above, scholars like
Ndeunyema are beginning to ground human rights claims on Ubuntu.222 Also, the
normative influence of Ubuntu as a source of law and its promotion via strategic litigation
is seen in a decision of the ECOWAS Community Court of Justice (ECCJ), Linda Gomez
v The Federal Republic of Gambia.223 The issue was whether Gambia’s legislation on death
penalty constitutes an arbitrary deprivation of life. Though the ECCJ held that the death
penalty is inconsistent with the right to life and is an inhuman punishment, the Amicus
Brief submitted by Amnesty International is instructive.224 Amnesty International framed
the issue for determination on whether “under evolving legal and judicial norms of right to
life and freedom from inhumane treatment, the imposition of the death penalty may
constitute arbitrary deprivation of life.”225 Amnesty International then referenced Ubuntu
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and its judicialization in South Africa to support its arguments that the abolition of the
death penalty is a growing norm.226 Although the EECJ did not refer to Amnesty
International’s argument on Ubuntu in its judgment, the Amicus Brief’s reference to
Ubuntu to support a human rights to life norm means that Ubuntu also has the potential to
support the CR2R norm.
African regional efforts can also play an important role in interpreting the CR2R
norm through an Ubuntu lens.227 In particular, the proposed African Union Policy on
Business and Human Rights, which aims to make businesses more responsive to human
rights,228 is an important contribution to the African business and human rights discourse.
This policy document, which will be an African Union soft law, offers an opportunity to
push forward the need to internalize the CR2R norm as this thesis argues for. First, the AU
policy provides an opportunity to consult with local communities in Africa on how to
fashion socio-economic relationships with MNCs operating in Africa for mutual benefit.
The policy document would serve as a Handbook or a road map by which MNCs may
navigate their operations in Africa. The document would likely define what human rights
means to host African communities and how MNCs can respect and meet societal
expectations.229
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Second, the AU policy has the potential to interpret the CR2R norm to include
Ubuntu-informed positive obligations. It could move the CR2R norm from “do no harm”
to “do good” in Africa. This is not the first time that a policy document from the AU will
make such a recommendation. Article 24 of the Draft Pan-African Investment Code already
provides that investors must comply with human rights and business ethics principles by
supporting and taking steps to protect internationally recognized human rights and ensuring
equitable sharing of wealth derived from their investments.230 If corporations observe this
mandate of the Code, they will be implementing Ubuntu values of positive obligations.
Again, the CR2R norm may be implemented through the African Charter on
Human and Peoples’ Rights (The African Charter).231 The African Charter has been
described as “… a synthesis of universal and African elements” that balances between
African traditional principles and modern principles of international law. 232 The Charter is
distinct because it supports African norms that reflect the African rich tradition of
communalism.233 Although the Charter does not outrightly reject universal human rights
norms, it contextualizes them to suit the circumstances and sensibilities of Africans.234 The
Charter has a wide scope because it applies to both states and individuals in Africa. 235 It
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contains correlative rights and duties on social, economic, and cultural rights for both states
and individuals (including corporations).236 In effect, the Charter reinforces the proposals
of scholars like Chirwa and Amodu that MNCs should have a positive obligations to
promote socio-economic rights under the IESCR.
The Charter provides a unique opportunity to interpret an Ubuntu-influenced CR2R
norm because the instrument obligates individuals to promote the communal relationship
in African societies.237 The duty of individuals in relation to other members of the
community is contained in Chapter II of the Charter. Articles 27-29 highlight the
individual’s duty to place his physical and intellectual abilities at the service of society.238
They also refer to an individual’s duty to preserve and strengthen positive African values
in his relations with other members of society and to promote the moral well-being of the
society.239 Drawing from these provisions, the Charter implicitly refers to an Ubuntu
economy where all members, including corporations, can meaningfully participate in a
relational system. They also implicitly refer to corporations’ duty to strengthen the positive
African values that Ubuntu represent. In sum, an Ubuntu-inspired CR2R norm can be
moored in an African regional instrument like the Charter that promotes African values.
Another policy document from Africa that recognizes and explicitly builds on an
Ubuntu economy, is South Africa’s King Reports on South Africa’s corporate
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governance.240 The King IV Code, the latest version published in 2016, expressly states
that:
[t]his idea of interdependency between organisations and society is
supported by the African concept of Ubuntu or Botho…Ubuntu and
Botho imply that there should be a common purpose to all human
endeavours (including corporate endeavours) which is based on
service to humanity. As a logical consequence of this
interdependency, one person benefits by serving another. This is
also true for a juristic person, which benefits itself by serving its own
society of internal and external stakeholders, as well as the broader
society.241
The King IV Code is not restricted to listed companies. It also applies to unlisted
entities and family, state/foreign-owned companies whose shares are not traded widely.
The Code is described as “a homegrown solution by Africans for Africans” and Ubuntu is
described as the “philosophical golden thread that binds the content of the Code.”242 The
SRSG and his team received a report on corporate law in South Africa as part of a multistakeholder consultation it held in Toronto in support of the “corporate law tools
project.”243 This report considers how corporate law in South Africa enhances the prospect
of corporations to respect human rights. The King IV Code was one of the documents
considered in the report.244 It is plausible to assume that this code, and consequently
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Ubuntu, may have influenced Ruggie’s decision adoption of the stakeholder approach,
instead of a shareholder primacy approach to the construction of the CR2R norm.245
In sum, Ubuntu holds the potential of an efficacious tool for socio-economic
transformation that MNCs, local communities, and African regional bodies can
collaboratively explore in order to improve the normative scope and obligatory imprimatur
of the CR2R norm. The ultimate framework must remain focused on strong business ethics
to minimize the negative impacts of business practices, enhance MNCs’ potential to live
by human rights standards, promote social justice, and share with the local community as
co-habitants of mother earth. De Schutter rightly notes that the UNGPs has set in motion
an unfolding process.246 To enhance its prospect of gaining legitimacy and influence over
corporate conduct in Africa, the CR2R norm must be localized and moored to the sociocultural languages of the people.
4.6. Conclusion
This chapter demonstrated that prior local norms in Africa can localize and support
the CR2R norm. It established that a local reframing of the CR2R must be viewed through
an Afrocentric lens to validate its own jurisprudential claims in a world of competing
perspectives through a pair of Afrocentric goggles.247 The reinterpretation of the CR2R
norm through those goggles and, highlighting its content virtues of humanness, sharing,
respect for human dignity, interdependence, interconnectivity, and communalism, the
analysis argued that Ubuntu and the C2R2 norm are similar on two levels. First, they both
prescribe normative conduct for corporate behaviour. Second, they also recognize the
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interconnectivity between corporations and the society in which they operate. However,
Ubuntu goes beyond the CR2R norm’s baseline expectation to “do no harm” to demand a
committed devotion to “do good.” Thus, it was argued that an Ubuntu-influenced
interpretation of the CR2R norm would help to fill the positive obligation vacuum that the
CR2R norm presently has. Also, it argued that re-interpreting the CR2R norm through an
Ubuntu lens helps to provide a legitimate normative platform to implement the CR2R norm
in Africa. In other words, localizing the CR2R norm via Ubuntu provides an opportunity
to develop practical normative tools by which MNCs, as relational beings, can act to foster
socio-economic development in Africa.
The next chapter moves beyond a normative analysis. It adopts a doctrinal method
to examine how sub-regional human rights institutions in Africa, as local actors, can
support the CR2R norm. It uses the ECCJ as an example of a local actor, and argues that
through purposeful interpretation, ECCJ decisions can support the CR2R norm. Combining
the analyses in this chapter and the next, this thesis demonstrates how African prior local
norms and local actors can support and promote the CR2R norm.
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Chapter 5: The Role of Human Rights Institutions in Promoting the CR2R Norm—
The ECOWAS Court of Justice
5.0. Setting the Stage
This Chapter examines sub-regional human rights institutions in Africa that can
potentially support the diffusion of the corporate responsibility to respect human rights
(CR2R) norm. Specifically, it examines the Community Court of Justice of the Economic
Community of West African States (ECCJ) in terms of its unique position as a norm
entrepreneur to support the diffusion of the CR2R norm. It proposes that through creative
and purposeful interpretation of international guidance instruments, the ECCJ can
influence the obligatory implications of corporate responsibility in international law. This
thesis proposes that by doing so, the ECCJ would chart a path to localize the CR2R norm
in Africa.
The pursuit of the ECCJ’s CR2R norm promotion theme in the rest of this chapter
proceeds as follows: Part 2, situates this chapter within existing literature. It maps out the
analytical scope of this chapter by providing a conceptual definition of state-owned
enterprises (SOEs). Part 3 examines ECCJ’s special design features and normative
structures. It identifies the ECCJ’s characteristics, including its accessibility to private
individuals, and its expansive human rights mandate that distinguishes it from other subregional courts in Africa. Part 4 describes the case of SERAP v Nigeria & Ors as a tale of
a missed opportunity for the ECCJ in 2010 to promote the obligatory implications of
corporate accountability in Africa.1 It argues that the ECCJ’s reluctance to hold SOEs
responsible as a matter of international law, despite arguments before it, underutilizes its
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normative influence as a court. Part 5 argues that considering the growing recognition of
the CR2R norm in other parts of the world, the ECCJ must revisit its stance on corporate
responsibility of SOEs in international law. Part 6 explores how the ECCJ can actively
contribute to the promotion of the CR2R norm—through holding SOEs responsible for
human rights abuses, and for this to serve as a catalyst for MNCs to be held accountable in
their home states for such misconduct, an outcome that may be founded on mandatory
human rights due diligence legislation, the doctrine of negligence, or international human
rights principles. The ECCJ’s willingness to take this initiative would be a green light for
litigants, human rights advocates, NGOs, and litigators, to harness its potential to pursue
cases through which CR2R can be internalized in West Africa (and beyond).
5.0.1. Research Scope and Conceptual Clarification
Scholars have examined the capacity of African human rights systems to influence
corporate accountability in Africa. For example, Joe Oloka-Onyango and Olufemi Amao
argue that the African Commission on Human Rights could pronounce on the responsibility
of MNCs in international law.2 It is noteworthy that the African Commission is not a court;
it is a body established to receive complaints from individuals and states on issues,
including human rights abuses.3 Oloka-Onyango and Amao contend that the Commission
could have exercised its power to pronounce on MNCs’ liability in Social and Economic
2
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Rights Action Centre (SERAC) & Another v Nigeria, a similar case to the ECCJ’s decision
that will be the focus of this chapter.4 Like Oloka-Onyango and Amao, this chapter
examines the status of non-state actors in international law. First, it admits that it may be
difficult to hold MNCs liable under international law because, as stated in chapter 1, MNCs
do not have a concrete presence under international law.5 It then examines whether nonstate actors like State-owned enterprises (SOEs) should have the same status as MNCs.
This chapter points out that SOEs are entities that have obligations to protect human rights
in international law. Therefore, they should be amenable to international law’s jurisdiction.
This argument is examined in detail in part 6 below.
In a collection of essays edited by James Thou Gathii, some African scholars,
including Karen Alter, Laurence Helfer, Solomon Eboborah, Obiora Okafor, and Olabisi
Akinkugbe examine how human rights claimants, activists, lawyers, and civil societies
harness the normative powers of African regional courts in advancing causes relating to
human rights, the environment, rule of law, and opposition to authoritarian governments.6
They argue that these courts are advantageous to litigants because they give credibility to
their causes and help them to communicate and advance their agenda of social, political,
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or legal change by engaging governments in a forum that they do not control.7 The social
relevance of these courts to promote norms, especially the ECCJ, is the anchor upon which
the analysis in this chapter hinges.
Obiora Okafor, using a constructivist theory, examines the influence of
international human rights institutions on peacebuilding in Africa states.8 He identified
how human rights NGOs, which he described as an example of a local popular force, can
harness the normative influence of international human rights institutions like the African
System on Human and People’s Rights. He argues that the importance of human rights
institutions should not be based on how their decisions are complied with—a compliancefocused and positivistic approach.9 Rather, they should be assessed based on their influence
to contribute to the domestic social justice struggles that rage within states. Although
Okafor focuses on the work of local popular forces within states, this chapter looks beyond
states to focus on regional human rights institutions. Like Okafor, this thesis does not use
a positivistic lens to examine the possible contributions of the ECCJ to the diffusion of the
CR2R norm in Africa.
Okechukuwu Effoduh also interprets decisions of the ECCJ through a constructivist
lens.10 He examines the normative role of the ECCJ in advancing the justiciability of
environmental and socio-economic rights in Africa. In doing so, he chose three landmark
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cases of the ECCJ—SERAP v. Nigeria& Anor (2010); SERAP v. Nigeria & 8 Ors (2012);
and SERAP & 10 Ors v. Nigeria & 4 Ors (2014)—to tease out the normative influence of
the court. Effoduh’s (constructive) methodology is similar to how this chapter examines
ECCJ decisions. However, this thesis is different in that it focuses on the UNGPs to
demonstrate the court’s potential to diffuse the CR2R norm in Africa. It uses one of the
ECCJ decisions to show how the court could have exercised its normative influence. In
other words, while Effoduh focuses on the normative contributions of the ECCJ, this thesis
looks at the potential normative contribution of the court in future cases.
Essentially, this chapter contributes to the literature on the role of African subregional courts, albeit in the business and human rights (BHR) context. Drawing from
Ayodeji Perrin’s conclusion that African regional courts have the potential to “dispense
distinctly African Jurisprudence over African claims,”11 this thesis examines the current
role of the ECCJ in the development of the CR2R norm. It classifies the court’s role as
conservative because of its reluctance to affirm corporate responsibility in international
law when it had the chance to do so in 2010. However, considering the normative history
of the court, it argues that the ECCJ is not fulfilling its potential to promote the CR2R
norm. Consequently, this chapter examines how the court could contribute to this effort
through interpretational approaches to the application of the CR2R norm in disputes.
The ECCJ is chosen for this examination due to its strikingly capacious jurisdiction
and access to justice rules. There is no other African sub-regional court that has a similar
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Ayodeji Perrin, “African Jurisprudence for Africa’s Problems: Human Rights Norm Diffusion and Norm
Generation Through Africa’s Regional International Courts” (2015) 109 ASIL Proceedings 32.
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expansive jurisdiction and authority as the EECJ.12 Except for the East African Court of
Justice,13 African sub-regional courts only allow state-state claims.14 Even if individuals
are allowed to file claims, their access is restricted. For example, Article 5 of the Protocol
Establishing an African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights limits parties who can file a
claim before the court to the African Commission, state parties, and African
intergovernmental organizations.15 Individuals and relevant NGOs with observer status
with the Commission can only be given access if the state concerned makes a declaration
accepting the competence of the court to receive such cases. Similarly, Articles 33 and 49
of the Protocol Establishing the Southern African Development Community Tribunal
(SADC) limits access to states.16 Non-state actors’ lack of access limits the potential of
these courts to contribute to the jurisprudence in business and human rights claims. As
argued below, states may not be willing to file human rights claims on behalf of their
citizens, a situation that prevents the courts from entertaining business and human rights
claims. The ECCJ could advance CR2R jurisprudence because individuals and NGOs from
ECOWAS member states like Nigeria, Sierra Leone, and Guinea-Bissau can access the

12

Karen Alter, Laurence Helfer & Jacqueline McAllister, “A New International Human Rights Court for
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court to claim damages from environmental and human rights abuses in the West African
sub-region.17
A caveat must be entered at this juncture. This chapter cites examples of the
recognition of the CR2R norm at different levels of courts (national and regional) to
demonstrate the ECCJ’s potential contribution to the norm’s diffusion. These cases are
examined at a superficial level because of the need to tease out important points that
advance the general theme in this chapter. At first blush, drawing examples from domestic
courts to ground analysis in a regional court may be tantamount to comparing apples and
oranges. However, considering that the ECCJ can exercise jurisdiction in the same areas
of competence as some national courts, normative lessons from national courts can serve
as a compass for the ECCJ in its effort to assert its role as a norm promoter of the CR2R
norm in Africa.
Similarly, it is important to define SOEs because this is the context in which the
analysis in Part 6 proceeds. It is difficult to define SOEs because there is no universally
accepted definition for these entities. However, within the business and human rights
context, this chapter, consistent with the UNGPs Working Group,18 adopts a working
definition of SOEs developed by the Organization for Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD) to mean:

17

See e.g., Human Rights Watch, “The Regional Crisis and Human Rights Abuses in West Africa: A Briefing
Paper to the UN Security Council” (20 June 2003), online (blog): Human Rights
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[a]ny corporate entity recognized by national law as an enterprise,
and in which the State exercises ownership, should be considered as
a state-owned enterprise. This includes joint stock companies,
limited liability companies and partnerships limited by shares.
Moreover, statutory corporations, with their legal personality
established through specific legislation, should be considered as
state-owned enterprises if their purpose and activities, or parts of
their activities, are of a largely economic nature.19
The OECD working definition shows that factors like ownership, control, and
purpose of the company matter in identifying an SOE. These factors will be examined in
detail in Part 6 to examine whether SOEs have legal status in international law, and hence,
amenable to the ECCJ jurisdiction.
5.1. Background and Jurisdictional Scope of the ECCJ
The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) is a sub-regional
community of 15 states.20 ECOWAS was founded by West African states in 1975 under
the ECOWAS Treaty signed in Abuja, Nigeria.21 The treaty aims to secure the economic
interest and integration of member states.22 Articles 11 and 56 of the treaty create a tribunal
to ensure the observance of law and justice in the interpretation of its provisions and to
settle disputes that may be referred to it by member states.23 At that time, the court was not
physically constituted. As well, it was given jurisdiction over only economic and regional
integration issues.24 In 1993, ECOWAS member states signed a new treaty to replace the
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1975 Charter.25 The 1993 revised treaty addresses issues relating to security, good
governance, and human rights.26 Article 15(4) of the revised treaty created an ECOWAS
Court whose decisions are binding on all member states, ECOWAS institutions,
individuals, and corporate bodies.27 Despite this reform, ECOWAS still did not have an
existing court.
In 1991, ECOWAS member states adopted a Community Protocol which did not
enter into force until November 1996.28 The Protocol created a permanent and physical
ECOWAS Court (the ECCJ) that maintains jurisdiction over cases relating to the
interpretation and application of ECOWAS legal instruments.29 The ECCJ entertains
disputes between member states inter se or one or more member states and ECOWAS’
institutions.30 It also hears cases instituted by a member state on behalf of its nationals
against another member state or an ECOWAS institution.31 Although the court has a
permanent status, member states did not grant access to private individuals to present
claims before it, despite repeated proposals from interest and civil society groups.32
Therefore, between 1991 and 2002, the ECCJ was established to resolve only economic
disputes among member states.33
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A culmination of events, starting from 2004, led to private individuals’ access to
the ECCJ and the expansion of the court’s jurisdiction to human rights issues. The first of
such events is the case of Afolabi v Nigeria where the ECCJ declined to entertain a private
individual’s request to present a claim arising from Nigeria’s non-compliance with
ECOWAS free movement rules.34 Afolabi, a Nigerian trader, had entered a contract to
purchase goods in Benin. Afolabi could not complete the transaction because Nigeria
unilaterally closed the border between the two countries. He filed a suit with the ECOWAS
Court, claiming that the border closure violated the right to free movement of persons and
goods. Nigeria challenged the jurisdiction of the court and Afolabi’s standing because,
according to Article 9(3) of the 1991 Protocol, only states could present claims on behalf
of their citizens. The court upheld Nigeria’s preliminary objection.
The dismissal of Afolabi’s case disclosed a flaw regarding the implementation of
the ECOWAS economic agenda. It became apparent that “governments had little incentive
to challenge barriers to regional integration, and private traders had no judicial mechanism
for doing so.”35 To bridge this gap, judges of the ECOWAS court, together with NGOs,
West African Bar Associations, human rights groups, and ECOWAS secretariat officials
formed a lobby group and campaigned for the inclusion of private individuals in the list of
those with standing before the court.36 They also advocated for an expansive human rights
jurisdiction for the court to deal with human rights issues arising from disputes connected
to economic and trade relations. These groups met with ECOWAS member states, engaged
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with the media, and made policy arguments for the overhaul of the 1991 Protocol which,
according to them, was restrictive.37
On 19 January 2005, barely nine months after the dismissal of Afolabi’s case,
ECOWAS member states adopted a Supplementary Protocol that amended the 1991
Protocol—Supplementary Protocol A/SP1/01/05 Amending the Preamble and Articles 1,
2, 9, and 30 of Protocol(A/P.1/7/91).38 The Supplementary Protocol gave distinctive and
broad authority to the ECCJ, a feature that most sub-regional courts in Africa lack.39 Article
9 (4) of the Supplementary Protocol extends the jurisdiction of the ECCJ to human rights
cases. It provides that “[t]he Court has jurisdiction to determine case[s] of violation of
human rights that occur in any Member State.”40 Also, Article 10 (d) of the Supplementary
Protocol grants standing to individuals and corporate bodies to seek relief for violations of
their human rights before the ECCJ. These two provisions (Articles 9(4) and 10 (d)) are
examined in detail below for strategically positioning the ECCJ as a norm entrepreneur in
the BHR context.
5.1.1 Article 9(4)—An Indeterminate Human Rights Jurisdiction
Article 9(4) of the Supplementary Protocol is significant because it grants the ECCJ
jurisdiction to adjudicate human rights issues. Importantly, there is no ECOWAS Protocol
or treaty that delimits the scope of human rights instruments that the ECCJ Judges can

37
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apply.41 Usually, as regards the European Union, the Americas, and other African courts,
regional courts interpret only their respective regional human rights charters and
international instruments ratified by member states.42 For example, the Inter-American
Court of Human Rights only applies the American Convention on Human Rights, treaties
ratified by the Organization of American States members, and other regional treaties.43
Similarly, the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights (AfCHPR) applies the African
Charter and “other relevant Human Rights instrument[s] ratified by the States
concerned.”44 In contrast, the ECCJ is not restricted to apply or interpret instruments signed
or adopted only by ECOWAS member states. The ECCJ can apply both hard and soft law,
including the UNGPs. As Ebobrah notes, “[f]rom the viewpoint of a human rights lawyer,
the human rights jurisdiction of the ECCJ should be cause for celebration, especially as
most domestic courts have not lived up to the high expectations of human rights lawyers
and activists alike.”45
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On the application of norms and rules of international customary law, the ECCJ in
Ugokwe v Nigeria held that under Article 19 (1) of the 1991 Protocol and Article 38(1) (c)
(d) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, the ECCJ can apply general
principles of law recognized in “civilized nations” and customary international law.46 In
effect, customary international law can ground a cause of action in the ECCJ as it did in
the Supreme Court of Canada in Nevsun v Araya.47 The implications of the Nevsun case
for the ECCJ are examined in Part 6.
5.1.2. Article 10(d)—Private Litigants’ Access to the ECCJ
Article 10 (d) of the Supplementary Protocol grants private litigants, civil societies,
NGOs, and corporate bodies access to the ECCJ.48 For example, in 2020, seven NGOs,
including Amnesty International, filed a suit against the Republic of Togo, claiming that
the Togolese government’s shut down of the internet during an anti-government protest in
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2017 violates Togolese peoples’ right to freedom of information.49 The plaintiffs argued
that the Togolese people have the right to seek and receive information, and to disseminate
opinions under Article 9 (1) and (2) of the ACHPR, the right to freedom of expression
under Article 19(2) of the ICCPR, and access to information under Article 66(2) of the
Revised ECOWAS Treaty.50 The ECCJ upheld the arguments of the NGOs and ordered
the Togolese government to enact legislation to protect freedom of information in the
future.
Another striking feature of Article 10 (d) is that it does not require litigants to
exhaust local domestic remedies before applying to the ECCJ.51 In effect, the ECCJ is a
court of first instance, just like national courts.52 The status of the ECCJ as a court of first
instance removes the political protection that most states rely on to object to the jurisdiction
of sub-regional courts.53 For example, in Collectif Des Anciens Travailleurs Du
Laboratoire Als v Republic of Mali, the plaintiffs approached the AfCHPR, claiming that
the defendant violated their rights to health under Articles 16 and 24 of the African Charter
on Human and People’s Rights.54 The plaintiffs had initiated a claim in Mali but abandoned
it because it was unduly prolonged. The AfCHPR held that the plaintiffs had not exhausted
domestic remedies because there were other mechanisms in Mali which they could have
used before initiating the claim. Therefore, the court declined jurisdiction.
49
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Ibibia Worika and Uzuazo Etemire argue that an exhaustion of the domestic remedy
clause is necessary to regulate the ECCJ’s workload.55 They suggest that in cases where
domestic local remedies are available, the ECCJ should not be the court of first instance.56
In their opinion, limiting the court’s jurisdiction aligns with prevailing customary
international law and treaty trends on exhaustion of domestic remedies.57 Also, the
exhaustion of local remedies clause reduces the risk of conflicting judgments arising
between the ECCJ and national courts.58 Muhammed Ladan concludes that the ECCJ’s
mandate as a court of first instance is a “design flaw” that needs to be remedied.59
In response, the ECCJ judges argue that there is no design flaw in the mandate of
the court and even if this were true, only member states’ express amendment of the 2005
Supplementary Protocol would take away private litigants’ direct access to the ECCJ.60
The ECCJ judges’ argument is sound. First, insisting that litigants should exhaust local
remedies in member states may take the court back to the Afolabi era where litigants are
denied access to the court, notwithstanding the merit of a case. In effect, human rights
victims will be left at the mercy of states that may be complicit in their abuses. Second, it
will reduce the normative legitimacy and influence of the ECOWAS Commission and
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consequently diminish the ECCJ’s growing jurisprudence on human rights. This is because
if private litigants do not have access to court, there will be limited opportunities for the
court to make some pronouncements. For example, Hadijatou Mani Kouraou v The
Republic of Niger,61 a case discussed below because of its significance in promoting antislavery nom in Africa, was filed because the plaintiff, an individual, had access to the court.
In cases where individuals do not have access to ECCJ, the court may lose an opportunity
to pronounce on the norm. This is more so because states may be reluctant to file such cases
because they may be complicit in the human rights abuse.
Notwithstanding its critics, the ECCJ’s expansive mandate on human rights and
individuals’ access to the court potentially set it up to shape the normative potential of the
CR2R norm. The ECCJ has delivered judgements on different human rights issues,
including slavery, wrongful imprisonment, and torture.62 It has also offered remedies,
including declarations, damages, and injunctions.63 The next section examines the ECCJ’s
position in a BHR claim in 2010. As earlier noted, it argues that the Court missed an
opportunity to adopt a creative approach to the CR2R norm, and that, hopefully, it may
fare better at the next chance.
5.2. The ECCJ—A Missed Opportunity
In 2010, the ECCJ had the opportunity to consider arguments on the “Protect,
Respect and Remedy” framework64 in the case of The Registered Trustees of the Socio-
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Economic Rights and Accountability Project (SERAP) v President of the Federal Republic
of Nigeria and others.65 The defendants, alongside Nigeria, are a Nigerian SOE, the
Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC), and six subsidiaries of MNCs—Shell
Petroleum Development Company (SPDC), Elf Petroleum Nigeria Ltd, Agip Nigeria Plc,
Chevron Oil Nigeria Plc, Total Nigeria Plc, and ExxonMobil Corporation.66 The plaintiffs
claimed damages arising from abuse of their rights and for adverse social and
environmental impacts of the operations of the MNCs. They alleged that the defendants
individually and/or jointly violated international law and, therefore, sought an order
compelling them to pay damages to the victims.67
The third defendant, SPDC, filed a preliminary objection challenging the ECCJ’s
jurisdiction to entertain issues relating to the responsibility and liability of corporations in
international law. In response, the plaintiffs, finding support in the UN “Protect, Respect
and Remedy” framework, argued that the defendant corporations failed to conduct due
diligence, which also means they failed to apply the minimum requirement of the CR2R
norm.68 The plaintiff argued that if the MNCs carried out due diligence as required under
pillar II of the “Protect, Respect and Remedy” framework, they would have discharged
their responsibility to respect human rights.
The ECCJ ruled that corporate accountability has an unsettled status in international
law, notwithstanding initiatives in that legal realm to promote corporate accountability.
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Particularly, the ECCJ referred to the nomination of the SRSG, John Ruggie, and the
“Protect, Respect and Remedy” framework as “one of the greatest reference[s] on the
accountability of multinationals for human rights violation in the world.”69 However, the
court held that it lacked jurisdiction to declare the liability and responsibility of the
corporate defendants. It reasoned that “the process of codification of international law has
not yet arrived at a point that allows the claim against corporations to be brought before
international courts.”70 The court held that, in any event, only member states can be sued
for their alleged violation of human rights.71 In sum, though the ECCJ recognized that the
CR2R norm is going through a “norm cycle,” it concluded that it had in 2010, not yet
reached an internalized stage.
The ECCJ’s decision is quintessentially traditional regarding corporate
accountability in international law.72 It held that the Nigerian government is responsible
for failure to regulate oil companies whose oil extraction activities polluted Niger Delta’s
clean water and environment. It, therefore, ordered the government to “(1) [t]ake all
effective measures, within the shortest possible time, to ensure restoration of the
environment of the Niger Delta; (2) [t]ake all measures that are necessary to prevent the
occurrence of damage to the environment; and (3) take all measures to hold the perpetrators
of the environmental damage accountable.”73 These declarations are restatements of
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Nigeria’s obligations under international human rights treaties to protect human rights. In
sum, the ECCJ re-iterated that states are the duty bearers and enforcers of human rights
obligations. This holding did not expand the frontiers of the CR2R norm.
It is pertinent to ask whether if presented with the same facts in 2021 as in SERAP,
the ECCJ would come to a different conclusion regarding corporate accountability in
international law. Simultaneously, it is important to ask whether the ECCJ should assume
jurisdiction over corporations owned and controlled by states—SOEs. In the section that
follows, it is argued that considering the evolving normativity of the CR2R norm and the
normative history of the ECCJ, the ECCJ’s response may be different. Proceeding from
this premise, in Part 6, It is argued that the court should take a different approach from its
previous decision by considering the liability of SOEs in international law—if the ECCJ
finds SOEs liable, it may indirectly establish the liability of other corporations with whom
SOEs have relationships through supply chain contracts (SPCs), joint venture agreements
(JVAs), Investment Agreements (IAs), and Production Sharing Contracts (PSCs). The
argument in part 6 is based, in part, on the guidance instrument on the attribution of SOEs’
conduct to states in international law— the Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for
Internationally Wrongful Acts (ARSIWA)—and the UNGPs.74
5.3. Courts’ Recognition of the CR2R Norm—Some Examples
There is transnational judicial recognition of the CR2R norm. Although it may be anecdotal
to claim that there is a universal consensus among national courts, there is support for the
claim that judicial decisions are contributing to the development of the CR2R norm. It has
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been noted that “[t]he UNGPs as a whole have been referenced in numerous legal cases
against companies, not as a cause of action themselves but to illustrate overall shifts in the
international normative landscape.”75 Courts, mostly in developed states, recognize
corporations’ responsibility to respect human rights, either because of their direct
involvement in human rights abuses, or indirectly through relationships with subsidiaries
and contractors in a developing state. Some of these cases—from Canada, the United
Kingdom, the United States, and the Netherlands—are examined below to demonstrate
approaches by national courts that, arguably, tend to the recognition of the CR2R norm.
These decisions are significant because they represent the evolving state of things in
Europe and North America from where some MNCs operating in Africa originate. The
cases are only selected to illustrate the evolving normativity of the CR2R norm in different
countries.
5.3.1 Canada
The first case arises from the 2020 Supreme Court of Canada’s (SCC) decision in
Nevsun v Canada.76 This case involves three Eritrean workers who are refugees in Canada
as plaintiffs and a Canadian company—Nevsun Resources Ltd—as defendant.

The

Eritrean workers claimed that they were conscripted into Eritrea’s military service where
they were placed under indefinite forced labour and subjected to violent, cruel, inhuman,
and degrading treatment. The plaintiffs sought damages for breaches of customary
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international law which prohibits forced labour, slavery, cruel, inhuman, or degrading
treatment, and crimes against humanity.77 As a preliminary point, the company argued that
the claims should be struck out because customary international law cannot give rise to a
cause of action in Canada, and that in any case, corporations are not subject to international
law.78 Consequently, the plaintiff's arguments have no reasonable prospect of success. The
Chambers Judge and Court of Appeal dismissed the defendant’s preliminary objection. The
company then appealed to the SCC.
On the application of customary international law to corporations, the SCC noted
that international law has long since evolved from a state-centric position. It concluded that
the current state of the law is that corporations do not “enjoy a blanket exclusion under
customary international law from direct liability for violations of ‘obligatory, definable,
and universal norms of international law.”79 In effect, the SCC, citing international human
rights instruments and principles, recognized that corporations are subject to rules of
customary international law.80 The case was remitted to the British Columbia Supreme
Court for trial but parties settled out of court.81 In sum, Canadian courts expressly recognize
that the days when corporations were untouchable under international law are long gone.
5.3.2. The United Kingdom
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Regarding corporate responsibility, the UK courts take a unique traditional
common law tort approach rooted in negligence. The UK Supreme Court has held that
MNCs can be held responsible for human rights abuses that occurred abroad for failure to
discharge their duty of care to victims of human rights abuse. In a line of cases, including
Vedanta Resources Plc (Vedanta) v Lungowe,82 Okpabi & Ors v Royal Dutch Shell Plc,83
and Begum v Maran (UK) Ltd,84 claims against parent companies in the UK were declared
to have a prospect of success because parent companies know or ought to know that human
rights abuse could arise from their relationships with subsidiaries and contractors. For
example, in Vedanta, residents of the Zambian city of Chingola brought proceedings in the
English courts against Vedanta, a UK incorporated parent company, and Konkola Copper
Mines Plc (KCM), its Zambian subsidiary, claiming that waste discharged from the
Nchanga copper mine—owned and operated by KCM—had polluted the local waterways,
causing personal injury to the local residents, as well as damage to property and loss of
income. The claims are founded in negligence, although the allegations also relate to
breaches of applicable Zambian environmental laws.
Vedanta challenged the jurisdiction of English courts to hear the suit because the
parent company is merely an indirect owner of KCM, and no more than that. The company
argued that the plaintiffs are only using a claim against Vedanta PLC in England purely as
a vehicle for attracting English jurisdiction against their real target defendant, KCM, by
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means of the necessary or proper party gateway. In other words, there is no real issue to be
tried against Vedanta PLC before the English courts. The UK Supreme Court rejected this
argument. It affirmed the reasoning of the lower courts that there is a real issue to be tried
because the parent company exercised a sufficiently high level of supervision and control
of the activities at the Zambian mine to incur a duty of care towards third parties, including
farmers, living in the vicinities of the mine.85
Similarly, in Begum v Maran, the UK Court of Appeal extended the MNC’s duty
of care from that rooted in a contractual relationship to the “unusual case” involving third
parties’ intervention causing harm.86 In this case, the UK Court of Appeal imputed
constructive knowledge to a UK shipbroker, Maran (UK) Ltd, who sold a ship to be
ultimately demolished through a third party, Hsejar Maritime Inc. The third-party company
chose to demolish the vessel in Bangladesh, a place where there are lower health and safety
standards. In effect, the third party did not follow health and safety standards in
demolishing the ship, causing the death of a Bangladeshi shipbreaker. The UK company
(Maran) raised the defence that the death of the shipbreaker was too remote from itself,
since it had sold the ship before its demolition.
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However, the UK Court of Appeal imputed constructive knowledge to Maran
because it knew the vessel would be dismantled in Bangladesh, rather than in one of the
shipyards in China or Turkey where health and safety standards are higher. As such, the
court held that Maran owes a duty of care to the plaintiff (the wife of the deceased) and
may be liable for its failure to exercise a duty of care in the sale and demolition of the ship.
Although this case focused on jurisdiction and choice of law issues, it demonstrates how
far a court in the UK is willing to go to hold MNCs responsible for the consequence in their
remote dealings with contractors, and in supply chain relationships where they have
oversight control or supervision.
5.2.3. The Netherlands
In January 2021, the Dutch Court of Appeal assumed jurisdiction over an oil spill
case from Nigeria involving some Nigerians from the Niger Delta as plaintiffs, against
Royal Dutch Shell (RDS), an MNC domiciled in the Netherlands and a parent company of
Shell Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria (SPDC).87 The Plaintiffs claimed
damage resulted from an oil spill in 2005 from a pipeline near the village of Oruma in
Nigeria. The Plaintiffs contended that oil supply in the leaking pipeline could have been
shut down sooner if Shell had provided a Leak Detection System (LDS). For its failure to
provide the LDS system, the plaintiffs claimed jointly and severally against the SPDC and
its parent company (RDS).
The Court of Appeal held RDS responsible for failure to discharge its duty of care
owed to the plaintiffs. This duty arises from RDS’ policy statements on environmental and
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health standards for Shell’s corporate group. Consequently, the court held SPDC liable for
the 2005 oil spill due its failure in its oversight management functions. The court also
ordered both RDS and SPDC to equip and maintain the pipelines in the Oruma village with
an LDS. The court found that the Nigerian law on negligence, which is the applicable law
in this case, is similar to the one laid down in the Vedanta decision. Therefore, it adopted
the duty of care analysis in Vedanta to reach its decision. This case is significant because
it shows that courts (at least, those in Europe) are increasingly permeating territorial
barriers to hold MNCs accountable. For example, in 2015, SPDC objected to the
jurisdiction of the court, arguing that the Hague is not the proper forum because both the
parent and subsidiary company cannot be sued in the Netherlands.88 The court rejected this
argument based on the combined provisions of the Brussels I Regulation (applicable in the
European Union)89 and the Dutch Code of Civil Procedure.90 Article 2 of the Brussels I
Regulation states that persons domiciled in a Member State shall be sued in the court of
that Member State. Article 60 states that a company is domiciled at the place where it has
its statutory seat. Since RDS’ seat is in The Hague, it falls under the scope of the
Regulation. Also, article 7(1) Dutch Code of Civil Procedure allows a court to hear a case
against a defendant that is not within its jurisdiction, provided the claim is in such a way
related to the claim of the defendant over which the court does have jurisdiction (in this
instance, the claim against RDS). Therefore, the court held that it is efficient to assume
jurisdiction over both companies. This shows that court rules in some jurisdictions are
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evolving to create a conducive procedural environment in which the CR2R norm can
thrive.
Similarly, in Vereniging Milieudefensie v Royal Dutch Shell PLC(RDS),91 the
Dutch High Court, in May 2021, expressly adopted and followed the UNGPs to hold RDS
responsible for its contribution to harmful greenhouse gas and their global impacts. The
court declared the UNGPs as a “suitable guideline in the interpretation of the unwritten
standard of care.”92 It noted that MNCs do not need to expressly adopt the UNGPs before
they are bound by them because the content of the UNGPs is universally endorsed.93 The
court held that corporations are responsible for actions taken (or not taken) in their value
chain relationships where they maintain control, leverage, or supervision. The court found
that the defendant has control over the Shell corporate group and suppliers. Therefore, it
held that RDS is responsible for the harmful CO2 emissions that arose from its value chain
relationship.94 This judgement is significant. It is the first time that a court expressly
adopted and applied the CR2R norm as prescribed in the UNGPs. Second, it is the first
time that a court has held an MNC responsible for harmful emissions causing climate
change. The court ordered RDS to reduce the C02 emissions of the Shell corporate group
by a net 45% by 2030. Third, the court interpreted the meaning of MNCs’ “activities” as
stated in UNGPs to include emissions. This way, it extended the scope of MNC’s business
responsibility as set out in the UNGPs to international climate responsibility.
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5.2.4. The United States
Apart from Canadian, UK, and Netherlands cases, there are developments in the
United States that suggest that the US courts recognize corporate liability under
international law. In 2013, the US Supreme Court in Kiobel v Royal Dutch Petroleum Co
held that the plaintiffs who are outside the US cannot rely on the Alien Tort Statue [ATS]
to sue parent companies in US courts.95 Although ATS gives federal courts jurisdiction to
hear lawsuits filed by non-U.S. citizens for torts committed in violation of international
law, the court held that there is a presumption that the ATS cannot be applied
extraterritorially due to the US foreign policy of non-interference in other states. However,
the court noted that the presumption against extraterritoriality can be displaced when
claims “touch and concern the territory of the United States... with sufficient force.” This
decision was followed in Daimler AG v Bauman,96 and Jesner v Arab Bank.97 However,
the recent Supreme Court decision in Nestle US Inc. v Doe has clarified the decision in
Kiobel and the status of MNCs in international law. In Nestle, the issue was whether a
claim against Nestle on aiding and abetting slavery and inhumane practices in Ivory Coast
can overcome the extraterritoriality bar earlier set in Kiobel and Jesner. Another question
was whether the Court has the power under the ATS to impose liability on domestic
corporations like Nestle.
The plaintiffs, in this case, are formerly enslaved children who were kidnapped
and forced to work on cocoa farms in the Ivory Coast for up to fourteen hours without pay.
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They alleged that Nestle was complicit in the human rights abuse they suffered because it
was aware or ought to be aware that child slave labor is a problem in the Ivory Coast. Yet,
Nestle continued to provide financial support and technical farming aid to farmers who use
forced child labor. In effect, the case was about Nestle’s aiding of farmers in their cocoa
production, though there is no value chain relationship between them and the farmers. The
District Court did not agree with the plaintiffs’ claim, but the Court of Appeal for the Ninth
Circuit allowed it, holding that corporations are triable under the ATS for human rights
abuses committed abroad. Nestle appealed to the US Supreme Court.98 At the Supreme
Court, arguments similar to those put before the Supreme Court of Canada in Nevsun, were
advanced by the defendants. They argued that corporations are not triable under customary
international law. Specifically, the court was asked to determine whether there is a
universal and obligatory international law norm of corporate liability that fully applies to
US domestic corporations.
The Supreme Court delivered its Judgment in June 2021.99 On the question whether
corporations are amenable to the jurisdiction of ATS and international law’s obligatory
norms, the court held that a corporate status does not justify immunity. Therefore, it is
irrelevant whether the defendant in the ATS suit is a corporation or not.100 On the second
question whether Nestle triggered the ATS, the court answered the question in the negative.
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Following its decision in Sosa v Alvarez-Machain,101 the court held that courts cannot
create a cause of action outside those laid down by specific statutes in the United States.
Since there is no specific statute that creates a cause of action for aiding and abetting
transnational human rights abuses, judges cannot create or sustain this cause of action
under the ATS. This is because a cause of action created by judges has foreign policy
implications under the ATS.102 For example, in the present case, Thomas J, writing for the
majority, noted that the relationship between Nestle and farmers in Ivory Coast is that of a
partnership where Nestle provides technical aid to the farmers. Therefore, holding Nestle
liable for such activities means that corporations may be reluctant to perform
intergovernmental activities for fear that those activities may subject them to private suits.
In effect, the Supreme Court held that Nestle did not trigger any tort action recognized
under ATS, and judges cannot create a new cause of action to cover this gap.
The decision of the Supreme Court is significant on two levels. First, it sets the
threshold for plaintiffs to meet when suing corporations under the ATS jurisdiction.
Second, like previous Supreme Court cases, it delimits the causes of action under the ATS
to actions contrary to international law norms that are specific, universal, and obligatory.
The decision also delimits actions that qualify under the ATS. The court held that pleading
general corporate activity or presence in a foreign jurisdiction without pleading domestic
corporate conduct in the United States is not enough to sustain an action under the ATS.
Though the Supreme Court dismissed the case, its recognition of corporate liability in
international law indirectly promotes the CR2 norm. Notwithstanding the US court’s
restrictive foreign policy approach, it is a matter of time before a plaintiff meets the
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requirements of ATS. This is because there are precedents that set the threshold to trigger
the ATS jurisdiction.
Apart from the Supreme Court cases, other courts have mentioned or referred to the
UNGPs. For example. the U.S. District Court for the District of Delaware (in the Third
Circuit) mentioned the UNGPs in its Memorandum Opinion in Acuna-Atalaya v. Newmont
Mining Corp.103 Although the court did not rely on the CR2R norm, it acknowledged the
UNGPs’ overarching theme of corporate reform. The First Circuit court made a similar
reference in Tomasella v. Nestlé USA, Inc. et al.104 The plaintiff alleged that the defendant’s
supply chain activities offended established and internationally recognized public policies
(including the United Nations’ 1948 Universal Declaration on Human Rights). Although
the court did not rely on the UNGPs or any soft law, in a footnote, the court restated the
UNGPs’ human rights due diligence requirements, which is one of the ways companies
adopt the CR2R norm. Similarly, parties have cited the UNGPs in submissions before
courts. For example, parties’ submissions referenced the UNGPs in Wirth v Mars, Inc.,105
Hodsdon v Mars, Inc., and Calhoun v Google.106 Although courts have not adopted or
commented on these submissions, their increasing references to the UNGPs indirectly point
to the uptake of the CR2R norm by litigating parties in the United States.107
5.2.5. Courts in Africa
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African courts have made limited references to the UNGPs or the CR2R norm. However,
there are still instances where corporations have been held accountable for their
contribution to human rights abuses and environmental degradation. For example, in 2021,
the Nigerian High court, Federal Capital Territory Division, found the 2nd defendant liable
in tort in Obong Effiong Archiang & Ors v Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation,
Mobil Producing Nigeria Unlimited, & Exxon Mobil Corporation (5959) Las Conilas
Boulevard Irving Texas, United States of America (USA).108 The first defendant is a
Nigerian State-owned enterprise, the second defendant is a subsidiary of the 3rd defendant
operating under a joint agreement with the NNPC. The plaintiffs claimed against the
defendants for their negligence in oil spillage from a pipeline causing environmental harm
in the Niger Delta Region of Nigeria. The court found in favour of the plaintiffs, and the
case is significant because it analyzed parent-subsidiary relationships.
The court was influenced by the UK Supreme Court decision in Vedanta because
there was no Nigerian precedent that touches directly on how to establish liability arising
from a parent-subsidiary company relationship.109 Since the CR2R norm may have
indirectly influenced the decision in Vedanta, the norm may have also indirectly influenced
the Nigerian court decision. Like in Vedanta, the court held that a parent company
domiciled outside Nigeria may be subject to the jurisdiction of Nigerian courts if the
plaintiffs adequately plead facts showing that the parent company exercises control and
supervision over the subsidiary company in Nigeria. However, the necessary facts were not
pleaded in this case to show that the US parent company exercises such control and
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supervision over the Nigerian subsidiary company. As the court rightly noted, holding a
parent company liable in Nigeria may help the plaintiffs to enforce the judgement against
parent companies who are often financially capable of satisfying the judgment sum. In
effect, Nigerian courts may be treading the same paths as their counterparts in the UK and
the Netherlands.
There is also a limited reference to the CR2R norm in South Africa. In 2015, the
South African Appellate Court, in University of Stellenbosch Legal Aid Clinic and Ors v
Minister of Justice and Correctional Services and Ors, cited the UNGPs when it held that
a garnishment law was unconstitutional because it does not adequately protect human
rights, which states should protect under pillar I of the UNGPs.110 The Court noted that
“while reports of the UN General Assembly and Human Rights Council are not binding,
they are highly persuasive and generally express the current consensus among States.”111
However, there are no reported authorities on the application of the CR2R norm to ground
the civil liability of MNCs in South Africa.112 Similarly, the UNGPs have only been
mentioned once by the Kenyan courts in the case of Kenneth Gona Karisa v. Top Steel
Kenya Limited.113 The Kenyan constitutional court referred to the UNGPs while
summarizing the petitioner’s arguments. However, the court did not rely on the UNGPs in
its reasoning. In sum, compared to counterparts in Europe and North America, there has
been less reported cases in Africa that reference the CR2R norm.114
5.2.6. Regional Courts
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Regional courts, especially in the Americas, have made references and applied the
UNGPs. These decisions hold states liable for failure to protect human rights. For example,
in 2020, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACHR) referenced the UNGPs in
The Kaliña and Lokono People v. Suriname.115 The IACHR, relying on pillar I of the
UNGPs, held that Suriname’s mining concession to a mining company, Suralco, without
prior supervision of, and an independent social and environmental impact assessment
violates the state's responsibility to protect human rights. Similarly, the court referenced
the CR2R norm in its statement on the role of corporations to prevent human rights abuse.
The court noted that “businesses must respect the human rights of members of specific
groups or populations, including indigenous and tribal peoples, and pay special attention
when such rights are violated.”116 Although the court did not hold the company
accountable, this pronouncement on the CR2R norm supports the argument in this thesis
that there is continued recognition of the norm.
Similarly, in Spoltore v. Argentina, the IACHR in 2020 held that the plaintiff has a
right to fair and satisfactory working conditions.117 In its concurring judgment, the court
clarified the status of the UNGPs in the IACHR’s legal framework by noting that “[t]his
Court has incorporated into its juridical reflections the ‘Guiding Principles on Business and
Human Rights.”118 Like in The Kaliña and Lokono People v. Suriname, the court also
referred to the state duty to protect human rights and the corporate responsibility to respect
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human rights. These two cases have a normative significance. First, they represent the few
cases where the UNGPs has been recognized and cited with judicial approval in a regional
court. Second, they provide a precedent for future cases brought before the IACHR and
may be a catalyst for other domestic courts in the region and beyond to consider the
normative value of the UNGPs.
Overall, the cases examined in this section show that there are growing domestic
and regional procedural rules, analysis, doctrinal interpretations that are breaking territorial
barriers, and corporate law doctrines (corporate separability) that MNCs often rely on to
evade accountability. Also, the examples above show that some courts are beginning to
understand the foundational values and spirit behind the UNGPs, especially the CR2R
norm—while some courts directly reference it in their decisions, others do so indirectly. It
is, therefore, safe to say that the norms of the UNGPs are diffusing through the courts in
different jurisdictions slowly but steadily.
5.3. Normativizing CR2R: The Prospect of ECCJ’s Contribution
A question that follows from the growing recognition of the CR2R norm is whether,
if the ECCJ is presented with another opportunity like SERAP, it would still conclude that
as a matter of international law, CR2R has not reached a stage for its recognition as a rule
of that legal regime. From the growing normativity of the CR2R norm, it will not be
difficult for the ECCJ to make a pronouncement on the CR2R norm, even if it is just a
reference to the role of MNCs as the Inter-American Court did. However, the court would
still have to determine whether it has jurisdiction over MNCs and SOEs to make such
pronouncements. This thesis contends that although the court may decline jurisdiction over
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MNCs, it should not do so for SOEs. The ECCJ should revisit its position on the jurisdiction
of non-state actors, especially SOEs in the business and human rights context.
The position of the court has been that only member states who are signatories to
the ECOWAS treaty can be sued before the court. For example, in Nancy Bohn-Doe v
Liberia, the plaintiff sued Liberia together with the Central Bank and Attorney General of
Liberia.119 The court struck out the latter two defendants because they are not “principal
subjects of international law.”120 The court noted that since the Central Bank and Attorney
General are not signatories to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights nor the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, they cannot be defendants in the ECCJ, not even
as a nominal party. This decision flows from the Court’s holdings in a line of cases,
including, Peter David v Ambassador Ralph Uwechue121 and Tandja v Djibo and
another,122 that only states can be sued for alleged human rights violations.123
The ECCJ’s blanket prohibition of non-state actors because they are not “principal
subjects” of international law narrows the mandate and normative influence of the court.
Over the years, the court has maintained a reputation as a human rights promoter by
delivering landmark judgments that shape the human rights jurisprudence in West Africa
and beyond.124 The case of Hadijatou Mani Koroua v Niger is an example of a situation
where the court engaged its human rights jurisdiction.125 The court held that the state of
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Niger violated its international obligations to protect Hadijatou Mani from slavery. The
case is significant on three levels. It was the first time that a case on slavery was brought
and won at the international level.126 Second, it was the first case to expose and condemn
the practice of slavery in Niger, which is widespread and yet unacknowledged.127 Third,
the court reached this decision by relying on international law principles and applying
decisions from other courts, including the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). The
decision of the court was historic128 and it shows that the ECCJ is not shy to exercise its
human rights mandate. Beyond Hadijatou’s case, the ECCJ became a promoter of an antislavery norm. The decision influenced legislation, domestic court decisions, and
government policies in African counties, including Niger, Mali, and Mauritania.129 This
shows the normative character and strength of ECCJ decisions.
The reputation of the ECCJ necessitates examining whether the court should revisit
its position on non-state actors in the BHR context. The next section examines how SOEs
may be classified to determine their responsibility before sub-regional courts like the
ECCJ. First, it examines the International Law Commission’s work in the Draft Articles
on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (ARSIWA) to draw practical
guidance from the requirements for attributing the actions of SOEs to states. Second, it
examines the growing literature on how SOEs are classified under the UNGPs. It then
draws larger conclusions based on the analysis from ARSIWA and UNGPs for possible
guidance on future cases like SERAP before the ECCJ or any regional court in Africa.
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5.4. Attributing Human Rights Abuse Responsibility: International Law Guidance
& UNGPs Perspectives
In international law, the attribution of human rights responsibility to SOEs is
usually not clear-cut. This is because the establishment of SOEs, usually by legislation,
does not automatically generate state responsibility.130 In some human rights cases, it is not
always clear whether to determine that the conduct of SOEs can be attributed directly to
states. To resolve this dilemma demands identifying the criteria by which to determine the
extent of SOEs’ liability. Doing so would ensure that decisions on SOE liability are not
capricious or arbitrary but are paired to applicable legal factors. This thesis classifies the
tools by which courts may be guided in this attribution exercise into two—an international
instrument, the Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts
(ARSIWA) and the UNGPs—a soft law. To be clear, this section answers the question of
whether a non-state actor’s (SOEs) conduct can be attributed to the state as an agent that
receives instructions or is controlled by the state. If the question is answered positively,
then, it is argued that SOEs have obligations in international law, which should make them
amenable to the ECCJ jurisdiction.
5.4.1. Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts
(ARSIWA)
The International Law Commission adopted ARSIWA at its fifty-third session in
2001.131 The purpose of the Draft Articles is to provide guidance regarding the
responsibility of states in international law. At its 85th Plenary meeting in 2001, the United
Nations took note of the Draft Articles and commended the International Law
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Commission’s efforts.132 Although ARSIWA has not been adopted to the status of
Convention, it is nevertheless considered to represent an accurate codiﬁcation of the
customary international law on state responsibility.133Therefore, notwithstanding some
debates on the status of ARSIWA,134 its non-elevation to the status of a Covenant does not
detract from its influence in international law.135
Article 1 of ARSIWA states that “every international wrongful act entails the
international responsibility of that State.” This provision is broad because it means that
state responsibility could arise for any acts or omissions that may be contrary to their
obligations under international law, including human rights violations. However, the
attribition of the conduct of individuals and corporations to the state, giving rise to state
responsibility is the focus of this thesis. Since ARSIWA contains a “logic similar to that of
vicarious liability in domestic law,”136 it is important to examine the logic behind states’
liability through the actions or omissions of SOEs.
Article 4 of ARSIWA generally attributes the conduct of a state organ to a state
under international law.137 Conducts of state organs—executive, legislature, and
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judiciary—are automatically considered as state actions because these are channels through
which states carry out their constitutional duties. The state organs do not perform
commercial activities as their principal aim is to discharge constitutional responsibilities.
Article 4 aligns with the principle that the acts or omissions of all state organs should be
regarded as acts or omissions of the State for the purposes of international responsibility.138
Therefore, it is not difficult to attribute their actions to states because they have a joint
constitutional mandate. However, article 4 does not cover actions of non-state actors owned
and controlled by the state in furtherance of its public functions.
Articles 5 and 8 of ARSIWA provide some of the criteria to be met in order to
attribute non-state actors’ conduct to states.139 Article 5 provides that the conduct of any
person or entity that does not qualify as a state organ (under Article 4) can be attributed to
a state if the entity or person is empowered by the laws of the state to exercise elements of
governmental authority. However, for this Article to be triggered, the entity or person must
be acting in a governmental capacity.140 The commentary to Article 5 clarifies that
“parastatal entities” that exercise elements of governmental authority will qualify as an
SOE, as well as former state corporations that have been privatized but retain certain public
or regulatory functions.141 In effect, Article 5 is not based on the status of the government
agency but the exercise of a government authority.142 The commentary also defines the
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term “entity” to include public corporations, semi-public entities, public agencies of
various kinds, and private companies, provided the private company is empowered by the
law of the state to exercise functions of a public character normally exercised by state
organs.143 The condition that private companies should exercise public functions similar to
a state organ is unclear because Article 5 does not define the scope of the government
authority required for the attribution of an SOE conduct to the state. However, the
commentary clarifies that matters that could be considered to determine the scope include:
(1) the way powers are conferred on an entity; (2) the purposes for which the powers are
to be exercised; and (3) the extent to which the entity is accountable to the government for
their exercise.144
Article 8 offers a more remote attribution of private actors conduct to the state. It
provides that an individual’s actions may still be attributed to the state where the person,
though not formally employed by the state, is acting for, or under the instruction of the
state.145 The most important test for analysis under Article 8 is whether the government has
an “effective control” over SOEs.146 Therefore, Article 8 is triggered where there is a form
of state control, notwithstanding that the person or group of persons that are acting was not
commissioned for state purposes.147 An example is where states’ instructions to
paramilitary groups or supernumerary police result in human rights abuse.148 Such conduct
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may be attributed to the state under Article 8. It is not clear whether corporations can fall
under Article 8 since it only refers to “persons.” However, it is arguable that the definition
of “persons” in international law may include corporations who enjoy legal personality.149
Indeed, the African Human Rights Commission defines the category of persons included
in ARSIWA to mean
individuals, organisations, institutions and other bodies acting
outside the State and its organs. They are not limited to individuals
since some perpetrators of human rights abuses are organisations,
corporations or other structures of business and finance, as the
research on the human rights impacts of oil production or the
development of power facilities demonstrates.150
A combined interpretation of Articles 5 and 8 shows that for states to be responsible
for an SOE’s conduct, the plaintiff must show that the state has exercised authority or
showed effective structural control over the SOE.151 Elements of structural control are nonexhaustive. They include factors such as states’ voting rights in the SOE, the right to
nominate or withdraw leading executives, and reporting and accountability obligations of
state officials.152 As Schönsteiner argues, it is also important to consider whether the SOE
is carrying out states’ obligation to fulfil human rights. 153 For example, SOEs’ provision
of clean water, health, and environmental protection are indicators of government control.
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This argument may be extended to say that SOEs that perform human rights risk
management oversight functions in an industry whose activities can harm the public may
be an SOE because they fulfil the state’s obligation to protect human rights.154 In sum, state
control of the SOEs is the most important factor by which to determine whether an SOE’s
conduct is attributable to the state.
5.4.2. The Status of SOEs—ARSIWA and The UNGPs
Principle 14 of the UNGPs provides that the CR2R norm applies to all enterprises
regardless of their size, sector, operational context, ownership, and structure. However, the
UNGPs does not mention SOEs in pillar II that embodies the CR2R norm. Rather, it refers
to SOEs in pillar I which relates to states' duty to protect human rights. As stated in chapter
1, pillar I—the state duty to protect human rights—is a restatement of states’ obligations
under international law. This thesis examines two Principles (4 and 5), which pillar I used
in conceptualizing the “state-business nexus.” The purpose is to show that Pillar I mirrors
the provisions of ARSIWA. Therefore, the UNGPs is also a useful guidance tool to
interpret SOEs’ responsibilities in the business and human rights context.
Under the “state-business nexus,” Principle 4 provides that states should take
additional steps to protect against human rights abuses by businesses that are owned or
controlled by the state by requiring them to undertake human rights diligence. The
condition to trigger state protection is that the company must be controlled or owned by
the state. The commentary to Principle 4 explains that “[w]here a business enterprise is
controlled by the State or where its acts can be attributed otherwise to the State, an abuse
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of human rights by the business enterprise may entail a violation of the State’s own
international law obligations.”155 This is because states must exercise oversight and
regulatory functions over the activities of SOEs to ensure that they undertake human rights
due diligence.
Principle 4 and its commentary mirrors Articles 5 and 8 of ARSIWA because it
identifies the test for attributing SOEs’ actions to states—state ownership and control.
States must take additional steps to protect human rights whenever SOEs engage in a
business relationship, even if the state is merely a shareholder with no actual control of the
business.156 This is because the principle applies in either direct or indirect state ownership.
An example of indirect ownership could occur where the state is a minority shareholder of
a company, or, in extreme cases, where completely independent businesses receive support
and services from an SOE.157
Principle 5 of the UNGPs also provides that “[s]tates should exercise adequate
oversight to meet their international human rights obligations when they contract with, or
legislate for, business enterprises to provide services that may impact upon the enjoyment
of human rights.”158 The commentary to this principle explains that states have human
rights obligations even when SOEs are privatized.159 This principle implies that the
“private” status of the SOEs is immaterial in attributing SOE’s action to states. It mirrors
Article 5 of ARSIWA which provides that the state’s exercise of an oversight function is a
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key factor in the attribution process.160 For example, a privatized national oil company or
military will fall under this category.161 In sum, if companies provide a public good or have
the capacity to contribute to human rights abuse, their actions could be attributed to states.
International human rights jurisprudence arising from the European Court of
Human Rights (ECtHR) further clarifies the provisions of the UNGPS and ARSIWA. For
example, in the Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping vs Turkey, the court considered the
meaning of “non-governmental organization” as stated in Article 34 of the European
Convention on Human Rights.162 It held that when considering whether an SOE’s conduct
can be attributed to a state, the court will assess: (1) SOE’s legal status and the rights that
the status gives to the SOEs; (2) nature of the SOE’s activity and the context in which it is
carried out; and (3) degree of the SOE’s independence from political authorities.163 The
court also stated that SOEs carrying out commercial activities and who are subjected to the
ordinary laws of the state will not meet the requirement of state attribution. Similarly, SOEs
that do not exercise government powers do not meet the requirements of state attribution.164
Also, a corporation that does not enjoy a monopoly in the production of public services
will not meet the requirement of state attribution.165 In another decision, the ECtHR held
that the non-applicability of insolvency laws to SOEs suggests attribution of state
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responsibility.166 Also, the court noted in Mykhaylenky v Ukraine that where the SOE
operates in a strictly regulated sector, such as nuclear energy, the ECtHR may attribute the
SOE’s actions to the state.167 These cases show that the purpose of a company together
with its relationship with the state plays an important role in the State-SOE attribution
process.
However, it is important to examine whether SOEs only have a “responsibility” to
respect human rights as in pillar II or an elevated “duty” to respect human rights as in pillar
I. This issue arises partly because notwithstanding that the UNGPs refers to SOEs’
responsibility in pillar I, it also subjects them to the CR2R norm under pillar II. Larry
Backer suggests that Principle 4 could mean that SOEs have a dual role under the
UNGPs—a duty to protect (pillar I) and a responsibility to respect human rights (pillar
II).168 This is because although SOEs carry out commercial activities, their management
and control rest with states who are charged with the responsibility of protecting human
rights. This interpretation may raise some complexities. For example, it will be difficult to
know when a responsibility or duty arises. Arguably, a duty to protect is triggered when
SOEs are performing a public function. However, the definition of a public function is
problematic. In my view, the responsibility to respect could be merged into the duty to
respect because the performance of a duty to respect would necessarily have obligatory
implications, which comes with commitment. Indeed, Sara Seck agrees that
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“...international law imposes on SOEs an enhanced, rather than diminished, responsibility
to respect human rights.”169
Another approach to interpreting the UNGPs is to focus on the status of SOEs in
international law—a purpose-centric approach.170 Mihaela Barnes argues that SOEs are
“sui generis” participants in international law because states confer this status on them,
which makes them “limited” subjects of international law.171 Barnes asserts that although
SOE’s have a corporate status, they are owned and controlled by the states. First, she
acknowledges that SOEs operate both in the public and private domains.172 However,
although SOEs are created by domestic law and carry out commercial activities, they
belong to the public domain because they are purposed to fulfil public interest. Also, she
argues that usually, the purpose of an SOE is to keep the proprietary interest in the company
with the public or regulate an industry by creating a monopoly with the SOE—elements
that point to the public purpose of the company.173 In effect, Barnes suggests that there is
a false dichotomy between a public and private function of an SOE. Therefore, when SOEs
are seen in the light of their public function, “the corporate ‘responsibility’ to respect
human rights may be elevated to the level of a ‘duty’ in the case of SOEs.”174
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If SOEs have a duty to protect human rights as sui generis participants in
international law, why should they not be amenable to the ECCJ jurisdiction, even as a
nominal party? The argument is that due to the relationship between states and SOEs, SOEs
are duty bearers in international law, a status that should make them subject to international
law, and consequently, the ECCJ jurisdiction. Recognizing the relationship between SOEs
and states, the United Nations Global Compact warns that “State-owned enterprises should
be aware that because they are part of the State, they may have direct responsibilities under
international human rights law.”175 Therefore, before concluding that SOEs do not have
status in international law, it is only prudent to examine each SOE on a case-by-case basis
with the guidance of ARISWA and the UNGPs in the business and human rights context.
Events that unfolded after Afolabi’s case show that the court is responsive to the
need to promote human rights in Africa. Arguments made before the ECCJ in Afolabi are
similar to the one made in this thesis for SOEs because they both invite the court to
reconsider the role of traditional non-state actors before the court. Therefore, an invitation
to reconsider its stance on SOEs to promote human rights in Africa aligns with the
jurisdictional history of the court. This examination could be a step to promote the CR2R
norm. Indeed, Xili Ma notes that focusing on the SOE-state attribution could be a “golden
opportunity” to renew the opportunity to rethink corporate accountability in international
law.176 Although Ma cautions that the application of ARSIWA may sometimes be a
difficult task, this thesis believes it is not an impossible one. The next sub-section examines
what it would look like if the ECCJ conducts an ARSIWA analysis before concluding that
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it does not have jurisdiction over non-state actors, like the NNPC.177 The court did not
make this analysis in SERAP before declining jurisdiction over NNPC. Therefore, this
thesis asks the question whether the court can find NNPC’s conduct attributable to Nigeria
in the SERAP’s case. To this end, the characteristics of NNPC are examined against the
criteria set out in ARSIWA and the UNGPs and it is argued that Nigeria has effective
control of the NNPC.
5.5. NNPC—Nigerian State-owned Enterprise
As at the time ECCJ decided the SERAP case, NNPC was established by an Act of
the National Assembly—Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation Act (NNPC Act).178
The Corporation has the attributes of a company, which include the power to own moveable
and immovable properties, the ability to enter contracts or partnerships with any company,
firm, or person, and to purchase and acquire property.179 The NNPC is headed by a Board
of Directors which consists of a Chairman and other appointed members. The Chairman is
a Minister in the Nigerian government, known as Minister of Petroleum Resources.180
Similarly, the director of the Corporation is appointed by the Nigerian Council of
Ministers.181 NNPC’s establishment through an Act of the National Assembly means that
the mode of appointment of the leading executives could not be changed without a
resolution passed by the National Assembly and assented to by the President of Nigeria.
Also, the Nigerian government controlled the budget and finances of the NNPC.182 In
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effect, NNPC does not have operational and financial autonomy as its budgets, loans, and
expenditures must be approved by the government.183
The Long Title of the NNPC Act also indicates its special status and the
government’s control over it. The Long Title states that the “...Corporation [is] empowered
to engage in all commercial activities relating to the petroleum industry and to enforce all
regulatory measures relating to the general control of the petroleum sector through its
petroleum inspectorate department.”184 Section 5 of the Act enumerates the Corporation’s
duties to include: “(1) exploring and prospecting for, working, winning or otherwise
acquiring, possessing and disposing of petroleum; and (2) doing anything required for
giving effect to agreements entered into by the Federal Government [of Nigeria] to secure
participation by the Government or the Corporation in activities connected with
petroleum.”185 Section 5(i) of the Act gives NNPC the omnibus power to perform any
activity that is necessary or expedient to give full effect to the provisions of the Act. These
characteristics demonstrate Nigeria’s ownership and control of the NNPC. Therefore, it is
not difficult to conclude that NNPC was an SOE in 2010 when the ECCJ decided SERAP.
However, in September 2021, the NNPC Act was repealed by the Petroleum
Industry Act (PIA).186 Part V of the legislation privatized the NNPC by converting the
Corporation to a limited liability company. Section 53 (1) of the PIA provides that within
6 months of the Act coming into force, NNPC is to be commercialized and registered as
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Nigerian National Petroleum Company Limited (NNPC Limited)—a limited liability
company under the Company and Allied Matters Act, 2020.187 However, the government
will still maintain shares in the company, which will be held in trust by the ministries of
finance and petroleum on behalf of the government.188 Also, the government will continue
to control the appointment of key members of the board of directors. Members of the
Board, including the Chairman, Chief Financial Officer, Chief Executive Officer, are
appointed and removed by the president of Nigeria.189 Some of the objectives of the
company include acting as a national oil company and managing the production sharing
contracts in the petroleum industry.190 Going by the new legislation, the PIA Act shows that
NNPC Limited is an SOE in charge of the government’s policies regarding the production,
marketing, and distribution of petroleum products. Therefore, NNPC Limited’s functions
will still meet the requirements under Articles 5 and 8 of ARSIWA and Principles 4 and 5
the UNGPs, as the company’s purposes are in furtherance of the state’s objectives and
policies in the petroleum industry. Also, the PIA Act shows that the federal government of
Nigeria effectively controls the appointment and withdrawal of the company’s leading
executives. As Article 5 of ARSIWA and UNGPs point out, the privatization of NNPC
does not detract from its SOE status.
Altogether, the characteristics of the NNPC Limited justify attributing its conduct
to Nigeria. These features can be summarized as follows: (1) state control of the company
through its Board of Directors appointed by the president; (2) Nigeria nominates and (can)
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withdraw leading executives of the company; (3) the company is established by a statute,
and (4) the company is saddled with the responsibility to maintain regulatory standards in
the petroleum industry. The characteristics of NNPC and the (prospective) NNPC limited
show that Nigeria still maintains ownership and exercises a degree of control in both
entities. Notwithstanding the privatization of NNPC, the control and management of the
new company largely remain the same under the NNPC Act. The point is that viewed from
the previous legislation or the new one, companies like the NNPC who perform public
functions, whether they are privatized or not, can attain the status of an SOE. However, for
the remainder of this chapter, this thesis will proceed under the assumption that NNPC still
has its current structure because the 6 months period for incorporating NNPC limited has
not lapsed as at the time of writing this thesis.
Viewed then, in light of the SERAP case, it is safe to conclude that NNPC is an
SOE whose actions or involvement in Niger Delta’s oil pollution should be attributed to
Nigeria. The oil pollution incident may be linked to NNPC’s failure to maintain regulatory
standards in the production and distribution of petroleum products. The ECCJ held Nigeria
accountable for its failure to regulate oil companies whose oil extraction activities have
degraded the Niger Delta. It ordered the government to “[t]ake all measures that are
necessary to prevent the occurrence of damage to the environment…”191 The regulatory
functions that the ECCJ alludes to are performed by the NNPC who is already before it. It
is only reasonable that when SOEs whose actions are being impugned are before the court,
the court should have the power to make specific declarations regarding their responsibility
and liability. Had the ECCJ assumed jurisdiction to determine that it was liable, this finding
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would indirectly hold Nigeria responsible for the failure to protect the human rights
violated. The point is that “[w]here a business enterprise is controlled by the state, an abuse
of human rights by the business enterprise may entail a violation of the state’s own
international law obligations.”192 As well, declaring NNPC liable for environmental and
human rights abuses may have direct and indirect implications for the home state liability
of other corporations with which NNPC maintains business relationships through Supply
chain Contracts (SPCs), Joint Venture Agreements (JVAs), and Production Sharing
Contracts (PSCs).
The next sub-section examines the legal implication of holding SOEs accountable
in the ECCJ for purposes of fostering the internalization of the CR2R norm. It argues that
when SOE’s liability is established before the ECCJ, this may be a catalyst for holding
MNCs liable in their home states.
5.6. Legal Implications of the ECCJ’s Jurisdiction over SOEs
To operate in a foreign jurisdiction, MNCs usually maintain relationships with
SOEs through SPCs, JVAs, IAs, and PSCs. For example, in Nigeria, Shell Nigeria operates
mainly through the Shell Petroleum Development Company (SPDC), the largest oilproducing venture in Nigeria. SPDC is 100% Shell-owned, but operates a joint venture
consisting of the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (55%), Shell (30%), Elf (10%),
and Agip (5%).193Also, Shell Nigeria Exploration and Production Company (SNEPCo)
operates in deep-water acreage off-shore and in frontier areas onshore under production-
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sharing contracts agreed with the Nigerian Government.194 Similarly, the Nigeria Liquefied
Natural Gas (NLNG) project operates as another joint venture, consisting of NNPC (49%),
Shell (25.6%), Elf (15%), and Eni (10.4%).195
Therefore, if the ECCJ holds NNPC liable together with Nigeria for failure to
perform regulatory functions in its relationship with MNCs, it indirectly indicts MNCs
involved in its oil exploration activities.196 For example, Amnesty International in its 2013
Report, accused Shell of not operating according to international standards in the Ogoni
region of Nigeria.197 Indeed, the plaintiffs in SERAP claimed jointly and severally against
Nigeria and MNCs, because Shell and other corporate defendants aided and abetted the
environmental pollution in the Niger Delta of Nigeria. Given this, the EECJ’s declaration
of NNPC’s liability may indict the other corporate defendants involved in the joint venture
relationship with NNPC. This indictment may necessitate the home countries of the MNCs
to look into the involvement of those companies in the alleged human and environmental
abuse in the host states.198 The decision of the Nigerian High Court in Obong Effiong
Archiang & Ors cited above, alludes to the relationship between NNPC and MNCs. The
trial judge concluded that
It is a fundamental right of all persons and communities to clean and
healthy environment. Legislations and agencies out in place to
address issues of environmental degradation, including the 1st
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Defendant [NNPC] must be seen to make sure that the legislations
are complied with by oil companies. [NNPC] should not only be
interested in the profit it shares with the 2nd Defendant [Mobil].199
MNCs may raise the defence of the “act of State” doctrine in their home countries,
as did the defendants in Nevsun before Canada’s Supreme Court.200 The doctrine, when
invoked, is to the effect that courts cannot examine the actions of a foreign sovereign.201
My response to this defence is two-fold. First, as the Nevsun case shows, the “act of state”
defence is limited to common law countries that have adopted this doctrine.202 Second,
even for countries that have adopted the doctrine, it may not apply in every situation
involving a foreign sovereign. This is because, as the Supreme Court of Canada did in
Nevsun, courts can bifurcate the act of state from other issues by examining the cause of
the harm. Therefore, courts are only interested in the causal factors that contribute to the
human rights harm either through the parent-subsidiary relationship, or business
partnership with contractors. This involves analyzing the evidence of MNCs’ leverage or
control within a corporate group and in relationships with SOEs.203 The ECCJ’s decision
on the SOE’s liability only apportions SOEs’ liabilities in a chain of commercial
relationships.204 In effect, the ECCJ decision will be the first step in a liability attribution
process for corporations involved in human rights and environmental abuse.
In terms of legislation, the ECCJ’s decision may have legal implications for some
states’ human rights due diligence laws. This is because some mandatory human rights due
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diligence legislation prescribe MNCs’ responsibility to respect human rights in their
dealings abroad through SPCs, JVAs, and PSC.205 For example, the French “Duty of
Vigilance” Law enacted by the French National Assembly on 27 March 2017 provides that
corporations domiciled or doing business in France should perform due diligence functions
to identify, mitigate, and remediate human rights, health, safety, and environmental risks
arising from their operations or in their relationship with other companies.206 The corporate
relationships exist in the forms of parent-company relationships, supply-value chain
contracts, or permanent business relationships between a company domiciled in France and
another company outside of France. Therefore, the duty to conduct human rights due
diligence can arise from a relationship where a company has leverage over another
company, or where it maintains business relationships with other entities for the long
term.207 Failure to perform human rights due diligence in such relationships may establish
a corporation’s liability in civil cases before French courts.208
In February 2022, the European Commission adopted a proposal that will mandate
companies to conduct environmental and human rights due diligence within their value
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chains.209 The proposal will be submitted to EU Parliament and the European Council for
approval. Once approved, each EU Member State would have two years to adopt a national
law incorporating the Directive.
Article 2(8) of the proposed EU Directive states that “[u]ndertakings shall carry out
value chain due diligence, which is proportionate and commensurate to their specific
circumstances, particularly their sector of activity, the size and length of their supply chain,
the size of the undertaking, its capacity, resources and leverage.”210 Also, the proposed EU
Directive instructs member states to enact legislation that requires corporations to
“identify, assess, prevent, cease, mitigate, monitor, report, address and remedy potential
and/or actual adverse impacts on human rights, the environment and good governance in
their value chain.”211 Although the scope of each member states’ legislation is unknown at
the time of writing this thesis, the member states’ legislation may ground the civil liability
of parent companies in relationships with subsidiaries and in value chain relationships with
business partners.
Some scholars, including Carolijn Terwindt, Nicolas Bueno, and Claire Bright,
argue that considering the tort doctrine of negligence and recent cases in the EU,212 MNCs
can be held liable for failure to exercise a duty of care in supply chain relationships.213
Specifically, Douglas Cassel argues for the judicial recognition of a common law duty of

209

See
European
Parliament
Procedure,
online:
<https://oeil.secure.europarl.europa.eu/oeil/popups/printficheglobal.pdf?id=716220&l=en>.
210
Ibid.
211
European Parliament Procedure, supra note 209, art 1(1).
212
See e.g., Jabir anors v KiK’ (2016) 16 HRLR 373.
213
Carolijn Terwindt et al, “Supply chain liability: pushing the boundaries of the common law?” (2017) 8:3
Journal of European Tort Law 261; Nicolas Bueno & Claire Bright “Implementing Human Rights Due
Diligence Through Corporate Civil Liability” (2020) 69 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 789.

281

care in relationships where companies have effective control or leverage.214 The EU
Directive may adopt these arguments because its scope has been interpreted to cover human
rights harms that occur outside the EU.215 If anything at all, the case of Begum v Maran216
discussed earlier, suggests that UK courts are willing to extend the scope of MNCs’ duty
of care to third parties over which a company has leverage or control. It remains to be seen
whether EU courts will follow this path. In sum, the judicial recognition of the CR2R norm
discussed earlier means that some home state courts may be open to strategic initiatives
anchored on the relationship between SOE and MNCs.
If the liability of MNCs is extended to business relationships as suggested in
legislation and scholarly literature, it will not be difficult for the ECCJ’s decisions to
influence corporate liability in home countries. For example, if the ECCJ in SERAP finds
NNPC liable, the judgement will indirectly touch on the liability of MNCs with which
NNPC has business relationships through BITs, JVAs, or PSCs. It will also touch on the
role of MNCs as shareholders in some NNPC production arrangements. The indictment
could raise issues of collusion, aiding or abetting human rights or environmental abuse.217
Therefore, the ECCJ’s declaration of an SOE’s liability could contribute to the pursuit of a
cause of action regarding which plaintiffs can approach MNCs’ home countries to demand
accountability for the part that the MNCs played in the business relationship with SOEs.218
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Indeed, it has been noted that “…in cases of harmful outcomes resulting from the actions
of multiple wrongdoers, one should look beyond the jurisdictional limitations to possible
interactions between international and national dispute settlement bodies called upon to
adjudicate ‘shared responsibility’ cases arising from the same factual patterns.”219
In sum, the ECCJ’s jurisdiction over SOEs and its recognition of the CR2R norm
will position the court as a norm entrepreneur helping the CR2R to develop normative
relevance. It has been noted that “…a European human rights due diligence instrument
cannot replace effective protection of human rights by the countries of the Global South
themselves. All efforts to impose human rights due diligence obligations on companies
must therefore be complemented by measures that bring these countries on board.”220
ECCJ’s judicial creativity via purposeful interpretation of ARSIWA and learning from
practices from other regional courts on state attribution will greatly promote the CR2R
norm and aid legislative developments in African and other countries to consolidate the
norm’s internalization process.
5.7. Conclusion
This chapter examined the possible normative influence of the ECCJ in the business
and human rights context. Its concern was to ask how the ECCJ can contribute to diffusing
the CR2R norm alongside growing national legislation and case law that recognize
corporate accountability. It was argued that considering the expansive jurisdiction of the
ECCJ on human rights, the court has the potential to be a norm entrepreneur for this cause.
The ECCJ had held in 2010 that it does not have jurisdiction over corporations, or the
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power to declare corporate responsibility to respect human rights in international law. This
thesis has argued that should a similar case come before the ECCJ in 2021, its decision
should be different. This argument is anchored on two pivotal points. First, there is a
growing number of decisions from national courts that declare corporate accountability in
international law. Second, though the ECCJ declined jurisdiction over NNPC, an SOE,
ARSIWA, and jurisprudence from the ECtHR and IACHR show that courts cannot turn a
blind eye to the relationship between states and SOEs. Therefore, if the ECCJ conducts a
control analysis of the relationship between states and SOEs, it would have reason to
assume jurisdiction over NNPC in a case like SERAP. Holding SOEs accountable for
human rights and environmental abuse may have legal implications for corporations with
which the SOEs maintain business relationships. The growing mandatory HRDD
legislation in the EU suggests that a cause of action could arise from MNCs’ relationships
with corporations abroad. Therefore, MNCs’ relationship with SOEs in Africa could cause
MNCs’ conduct to be questioned in their home states.
This chapter concluded that the ECCJ could play a pivotal normative role in
affirming accountability of corporations by acknowledging and declaring their liability of
SOEs as arising from their business relations or supply chain arrangements. African courts
cannot continue to rely on developed states to hold corporations responsible for human
rights abuses that take place within their jurisdictions. Sub-regional courts, like the ECCJ,
must play their part when called upon to do so, to hold these entities accountable for their
violations of human rights rules and principles of acceptable conduct in their business
undertakings. Undoubtedly, these rules and principles are, quite clearly, established
international and transnational law, including the evolving CR2R norm.
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Chapter 6: Conclusion—Social Constructivism and the CR2R Norm
This thesis adopted a social constructivism theory influenced by a Third World Approach
to International Law (TWAIL) in the business and human rights context. It examined the
unique perspectives that a TWAIL constructivist approach brings to the interpretation of
the United Nations Guiding Principles (UNGPs). This thesis focused on pillar II of the
UNGPs which prescribes that MNCs should respect human rights wherever they operate,
not because of any binding obligation, but because of existing social norms.1 This thesis
characterized the Special Representative of the Secretary General’s (SRSG) proposal of
pillar II to the UN Human Rights Council and its endorsement by the Council as a normbuilding exercise aimed to promote responsible corporate conduct globally. Since pillar II
relies on social norms to drive compliance among MNCs, this thesis characterized it as
corporate responsibility to respect human rights (CR2R) norm. However, it recognized that
social norms are dynamic and different from one society to another. Therefore, its focus
was on how social norms and actors in Africa can support the CR2R norm. To this end,
this thesis examined how existing African prior local norms and actors can influence
corporate accountability in Africa. In sum, it answered the question of how African local
norms and actors can accentuate and tilt the CR2R into becoming a global standard of
acceptable conduct.
6.1 CR2R Norm-An Afrocentric Constructive Exercise
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This thesis argued that the CR2R norm has the potential to gain legitimacy in the
Third World through a social constructivism theory. To do this, this thesis focused on the
relationship between actors in international law. First, this thesis examined approaches to
global governance in the BHR field. This thesis classified scholars’ models of governance
under two rubrics: (1) the international treaty stream, representing traditional international
law; and (ii) the soft law stream, representing contemporary emerging practice. Scholars
that fall under the treaty rubric argue that to regulate state and non-state actors in the BHR
context needs an international treaty that sets out the obligations of each international actor,
particularly MNCs. On the other hand, scholars that fall under the soft law rubric, argue
that considering the history of states’ non-implementation of international human rights
treaties and the political nuances that engulf the negotiation, signing, ratification, and
implementation of treaties, a soft law that sets international standards for international
actors is the appropriate global governance instrument.
This thesis argued that there are inherent weaknesses in an exclusive soft or hard
law approach. This is because, as John Ruggie rightly noted, there is no silver bullet
solution to corporate accountability problems. This thesis invited us to look at what makes
law generate commitment among international law actors, rather than focusing on the
instruments of regulation. In other words, it invited us to look beyond the form of global
governance instruments and focus on the characteristics of international law-making that
ensure commitment from actors. Using Brunnée and Toope’s interactional account of
international law, this thesis proposed a global governance approach that considers the
interaction between legal and social norms. Arguably, the UNGPs adopts an interactional
approach because it relies on social and legal norms as standard-setting tools. However,
this thesis argued that the UNGPs ultimately fail Brunnée and Toopes’ legitimacy test
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because it does not consider Third World Peoples’ voices—and by extension, social
norms—that are marginalized in the construction of the CR2R norm. In effect, this thesis
argued that international law-making must not only occur at the horizontal level among
states, MNCs, INGOs, transnational social networks, and human rights defenders; it must
also occur at a vertical level between local norms and global norms.
To anchor and substantiate its proposal for relationships between norms and actors
in different levels of governance, this thesis adopted insights from social constructivists on
the creation and diffusion of norms in international relations. Its focus on Finnemore and
Sikkink’s theory of the norm cycle, specifically the characteristics of each stage of the
cycle—norm emergence, norm cascade, norm internalization, and the conditions that cause
a norm to proceed from one stage to another—points out that these theorists fail to explain
why and how norms diffuse. This gap is filled in by resort to Acharya’s theory of norm
diffusion. The theory highlights that norm diffusion is both cosmopolitan and one of
congruence. The former emphasizes the role of transnational networks, and the latter
focuses on the influence of local actors and norms on norm diffusion. The discussion
highlights that congruence is expressed in localization and subsidiarity and emphasizes that
these are significant regarding local and domestic contestation or support for assuring the
legitimacy of international norms or rejecting them as such. The application of these ideas
to the development of the UNGPs’ norm of the CR2R allowed me to establish that the
efforts of the SRSG with his team, as norm entrepreneurs, advanced the diffusion of the
CR2R norm, which is presently cascading. This thesis also classified the SRSG’s norm
diffusion strategy as cosmopolitan, not one of congruence, and noted that a congruence
approach would better enhance the legitimacy of the CR2R norm and tip it more quickly
towards norm internalization. This implies that the congruence approach has greater
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potential to minimize the impact of local actors and norms as “disruptors” and enhance
their roles as “supporters” of the CR2R norm.
To demonstrate the application of the congruence approach to the UNGPs, this
thesis examined how local norms and actors can support the CR2R norm to promote
corporate accountability in Africa. It argued that prior local norms in Africa can localize
and support the CR2R norm. To do this, it proposed a local reframing of the CR2R that is
viewed through an Afrocentric lens to validate Africa’s jurisprudential claims in a world
of competing perspectives through a pair of Afrocentric goggles. This thesis used an
African norm—Ubuntu—as an example of how a local norm can influence the
interpretation of the CR2R norm in Africa. Using an African goggle, it highlights Ubuntu’s
content virtues and values of humanness, sharing, respect for human dignity,
interdependence, interconnectivity, and communalism. The analysis argued that Ubuntu
and the C2R2 norm are similar on two levels. First, they both prescribe normative conduct
for corporate behavior. Second, they also recognize the interconnectivity between MNCs
and the society in which they operate. However, Ubuntu goes beyond the CR2R norm’s
baseline expectation to “do no harm” to demand a committed devotion to “do good.” Using
a case study from the Democratic Republic of Congo, this thesis noted that the CR2R norm
is not sufficient to persuade corporations to be responsible in Africa (partly) because it is
not hinged on any moral normative framework. It also showed that, sometimes, MNCs’
discharge of the baseline responsibility to do no harm may not be sufficient to receive a
social licence from the community where they operate. Thus, it was argued that an Ubuntuinfluenced interpretation of the CR2R norm would help to fill the positive obligation
vacuum that the CR2R norm presently has. Similarly, an Ubuntu-influenced interpretation
will increase the intelligibility of the CR2R norm among local communities. Re288

interpreting the CR2R norm through an Ubuntu lens helps to provide a legitimate
normative platform to implement the CR2R norm in Africa. In other words, localizing the
CR2R norm via Ubuntu provides an opportunity to develop practical normative tools by
which MNCs, as relational beings, can act to foster socio-economic development in Africa.
In effect, since the intended purpose of the UNGPs is to command compliance
through appeal to social norms, this thesis argued that Ubuntu can serve as a springboard
by which the CR2R norm is interpreted in Africa. Also, because the CR2R norm is rooted
in the conception of societal expectations that is different from one society to another,
Ubuntu serves to shape MNCs’ understanding of the societal expectation in Africa.
Therefore, constructing a social norm in Africa through congruence between CR2R and
Ubuntu increases the potential of the UNGPs’ legitimacy and minimizes social conflicts
that arise from divergent expectations from local communities and MNCs operating in
Africa. In sum, this thesis demonstrated how social norms can interact at a global and local
level to influence responsible business conduct in Africa.
However, norms do not by themselves crystalize into law or influence conduct; they
are driven by local actors or institutions. This thesis also examined how local actors in
Africa can support the CR2R norm. It examined the possible normative influence of the
Community Court of Justice of the Economic Community of West African States (ECCJ)
in the business and human rights discourse. Its concern was to ask how the ECCJ can
contribute to diffusing the CR2R norm alongside growing national legislation and case law
that recognize corporate accountability. It was argued that considering the expansive
jurisdiction of the ECCJ on human rights, the court has the potential to be a norm
entrepreneur for this cause. The ECCJ had held in 2010 that it does not have jurisdiction
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over MNCs, or the power to declare corporate responsibility to respect human rights in
international law. This thesis argued that should a similar case come before the ECCJ in
2021, its decision should be different.
This argument is anchored on two pivotal points. First, there is a growing number
of decisions from national courts that declare corporate accountability in international law.
Second, though the ECCJ declined jurisdiction over Nigerian National Petroleum
Corporation, a state-owned enterprise (SOE), the Draft Articles on Responsibility of States
for Internationally Wrongful Acts, Pillar I of the UNGPs, and jurisprudence from the
European Court of Human show that courts cannot turn a blind eye to the relationship
between states and SOEs. Therefore, if the ECCJ conducts a control analysis of the
relationship between states and SOEs, it would have reason to assume jurisdiction over
NNPC in a case like SERAP. Holding SOEs accountable for human rights and
environmental abuse may have legal implications for MNCs with which the SOEs maintain
business relationships. The growing mandatory HRDD legislation in the EU suggests that
a cause of action could arise from MNCs’ relationships with MNCs abroad. Therefore,
MNCs’ relationship with SOEs in Africa could cause MNCs’ conduct to be questioned in
their home states.
This thesis argued that the ECCJ could play a pivotal normative role in affirming
the accountability of MNCs by acknowledging and declaring their liability of SOEs as
arising from their business relations or supply chain arrangements. African courts cannot
continue to rely on developed states to hold MNCs responsible for human rights abuses
that take place within their jurisdictions. Sub-regional courts, like the ECCJ, must play
their part when called upon to do so, to hold these entities accountable for their violations
of human rights rules and principles of acceptable conduct in their business undertakings.
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Undoubtedly, these rules and principles are, quite clearly, established international and
transnational law, including the evolving CR2R norm.
Overall, social constructivism informed by a Third World perspective shows that
actors in the Third World are normative agents that may increase the support for a global
norm based on the norm’s congruence or incompatibility with prior existing norms in their
societies. Also, the constructivist TWAIL view of the CR2R norm demonstrates that
responsible corporate conduct cannot be viewed through a universal standard formulated
by international global actors, but the norm must be a dynamic and evolving one whose
content and scope can be modified by other norms. Also, this thesis affirms the SRSG’s
statements that there is no silver bullet to solving the problem of corporate accountability
and that there is a need for a smart mix of measures to regulate corporate conduct.
6.1. Opportunities for Further Research
Future research can build on this project through various research methods, including
empirical research. For example, empirical research may identify companies that imbibe
Ubuntu in their dealings with local communities. This project would help to assess
Ubuntu’s normative relevance to companies operating in Africa. Also, it may be rewarding
to examine how Ubuntu supports human rights norms in supply chain relationships beyond
Africa. For example, future research may examine whether Ubuntu supports provisions in
supply chain legislation and contracts. Although this thesis focused on pillar II of the
UNGPs, future research may also examine the congruence between Ubuntu and pillar I
which relates to states’ obligation to protect human rights. Possible questions include: does
Ubuntu support state obligations to protect human rights, what will a state duty to protect
human rights influenced by Ubuntu look like, does Ubuntu support accountability of state
officials and institutions in their constitutional and statutory roles, does Ubuntu apply to
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SOEs? In effect, it is important to examine whether Ubuntu applies to states in the
discharge of their human rights obligations.
It is also important to examine the sphere of relationship in Ubuntu terms and
Principle 13 of the UNGPs. For example, is Ubuntu’s relational approach congruent with
Principle 13 which limits the scope of responsibility of MNCs to instances where they
cause or contribute harm? Also, is Ubuntu congruent with principle 13’s prescription that
MNCs should provide prevent, mitigate, and remedy only in cases where they are directly
linked to business relationships? Would Ubuntu also consider MNC’s sphere of influence
beyond direct causal links? These are some of the questions that may arise from research
that examines the sphere of relationship in Ubuntu terms and the UNGPs.
Similarly, there are multiple layers in the UNGPs’ prescription with HRDD,
especially in relation to preventing harm and providing an effective remedy. Although this
thesis describes what an Ubuntu-influenced CR2R norm would look like, it does not
examine the procedural rights associated with HRDD and mechanisms for grievance
redress. Empirical research can go further to sample some MNCs’ HRDD policies and
procedures. This project would aim to determine Ubuntu’s influence on policies and
procedures.
Similarly, future research may explore how local norms support pillar III of the
UNGPs which relates to providing effective remedies to victims of human rights abuse.
This research could focus on non-state or company-led grievance mechanism procedures.
For example, future research may focus on the role of local norms in creating grievance
procedures and determining appropriate remedies for victims of human rights abuse. It will
also be important to examine how local norms can enhance the potential of grievance
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mechanisms to satisfy the criteria stated in Pillar III, which include legitimacy,
accessibility, predictability, equitability, rights compatibility, and transparency.
Furthermore, it is important to assess whether these criteria reflect an Ubuntu
approach. Future research may examine how local norms may enable MNCs to assess the
effectiveness of the remedial outcomes from the grievance mechanisms. This includes
assessment as to whether there was genuine consultation with affected stakeholders or
groups, or whether the remedies reflect the expectations of the victims.2
Beyond the normative sphere, future research may also focus on the recognition of
the CR2R norm in Africa. This thesis used the ECCJ as an example of an institution that
can support the CR2R norm. However, other sub-regional human rights institutions may
lend themselves to this sort of analysis. They include the African Court on Human and
Peoples and the East African Court of Justice. It is important to examine the jurisdictional
scope of these institutions to determine whether they possess commonalities with the
ECCJ. Also, future research may examine how local popular forces, including civil
societies, non-governmental organizations, and members of the local community, have
harnessed the institutions’ jurisdiction over business and human rights abuse. This inquiry
would consequently speak to the institutions’ capacity to further push the CR2R norm in
Africa and support the UNGPs’ vision of corporate responsibility.
In sum, this thesis is a beginning of an unending journey to examine the
contributions of African norms and actors in the growing international effort to hold MNCs
accountable for their actions/inactions that cause or contribute to human rights abuse.

2

See generally Sara L Seck & Akinwumi Ogunranti, “Accountability – Legal Risk, Remedies and Damages”
in Rae Lindsay & Roger Martella, eds, Corporate Social Responsibility – The Corporate Governance of the
21st Century (Kluwer Law International, 2020).
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